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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Winter 1980/81 *$3.75 a copy*

The Purposes of American Power—*Robert W. Tucker*
The Iraq-Iran War—*Claudia Wright*
China Policy for the 1980s—*Michel Oksenberg*
South Africa: Strategy for Change
Chester A. Crocker
Rethinking Arms Control—*Christoph Bertram*
THE THIRD WORLD CHALLENGE
The Fate of Nonalignment—*Fouad Ajami*
Another Chance for The North?—*Barbara Ward*
Negotiating the Future—*Mahbub ul Haq*

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Grant A. Porter, Vice President/Petroleum Division. Photographed at Marathon's Kinsale Head metering station, County Cork, Ireland

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EDITOR'S NOTE

A long drawn-out presidential campaign, closely fought up to the very end, must produce in many besides the editors of a more-or-less quarterly magazine some of the sensations a scuba diver experiences when coming up after a long sojourn in the depths. A lot has changed at the surface, important events have taken place that may have registered only superficially, and there is (in this case) a new climate of opinion whose impact remains to be clarified. To further the thinking of emerging divers in such a situation, while at the same time dealing with ongoing problems, has been a challenge. In meeting it, we claim no more than a best effort.

Two of the articles in this issue—the one by Robert Tucker, the other by Chester Crocker—are by individuals associated, at least intellectually, with the new Administration, while one other author, Michel Oksenberg, served in the outgoing one. None is in any sense "official"; their common thread, from our standpoint, is that they frame issues of central importance that will be faced early in the new year. And the same is true of the Iraq-Iran war, the nearest thing to an existing crisis that both old and new makers of American policy must grapple with.

For other issues, especially in the Third World, we have found ourselves turning to non-American authors. Their perspectives may be useful antidotes, or correctives, to the America-centered climate of a campaign year.

So that is the mix. We hope it is as interesting to our readers as it has been to edit.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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Robert W. Tucker

THE PURPOSES OF AMERICAN POWER

Once again we have reached a major turning point in American foreign policy. On this, at least, there is widespread agreement. The conviction that the nation has come to a critical juncture in its foreign relations is broadly shared by those who may disagree on virtually everything else. Everywhere the signs point to the conclusion that for the third time in the post-World War II period we are in the throes of far-reaching change in the nation's foreign policy. What these signs do not divulge are the eventual scope and magnitude of the change.

Yet the same was true of the two earlier occasions in which American foreign policy underwent significant transformation. The observer in 1947 could not know from the events of that year the form that the emerging policy of containment would ultimately take. In its inception containment had no determinate outcome. Neither the external circumstances in which containment arose and which conditioned the immediate development of that policy nor the domestic reaction to these circumstances dictated the form that containment would ultimately take. It is true that in the sweeping language of the Truman Doctrine—"We must assist free peoples to work out their destinies in their own way"—as well as in its sense of universal crisis—"At the present moment in world history every nation must choose between alternative ways of life"—we can see the subsequent course of a policy that led to the equation of American security with world order, world order with the containment of communism, and the containment of communism with the conflict—Vietnam—that brought an end to the policy of global containment.

But the Truman Doctrine did not foreordain Vietnam, whatever the intent of its authors. Instead, it was the Korean War, and the sudden extension of containment to Asia that the war precipitated, which led to Vietnam. It was the American intervention in

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Robert W. Tucker is Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University, co-director of studies at The Lehrman Institute, and the author of *The Inequality of Nations* and other works. The author wishes to express his gratitude to David Hendrickson for his invaluable assistance in preparing this essay.

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Korea—prompted far more by conventional balance-of-power calculations than by the universal pretensions of the Truman Doctrine—that led to the extension of containment in Asia, which was divisive from the start and never supported by more than a negative consensus.

What may be said of the policy of global containment may also be said of the policy that succeeded it in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Nixon policy reformulation held out the promise of a foreign policy that, while preserving America's essential role and interests in the world, would be far less burdensome than the policy it presumably displaced. That promise could not be fulfilled. The logic of the Nixon reformulation, with its centerpiece of détente, was the logic of retrenchment. But this is not to say that the "new structure of peace" had from its inception an outcome that had to lead to the general decline experienced by America in the 1970s any more than the policy of containment initiated by the Truman Administration had to lead to Vietnam.

The domestic circumstances that attended the coming to power of the Carter Administration did not dictate the foreign policy that it followed during its first three years in office. In contributing to the further decline in the American global position it acted as much from internal conviction—not domestic political necessity—as the Johnson Administration did in its pursuit of the war in Vietnam.

It is worth recalling these earlier occasions today, if only to question the view that the course of American foreign policy in the 1980s is already largely dictated by the present situation. This view is shared by otherwise very divergent groups in the foreign policy spectrum. Those who believe that we must adjust our interests and behavior to the more modest position we now occupy in the world emphasize such a view as much as those who believe that we can and must recapture the position and leadership we once enjoyed. To the former, adjustment to our diminished status is a necessity we can attempt to escape only at our peril. To the latter, the reassertion of something akin to the former policy of global containment is the only safe course we can take. Otherwise we shall suffer ever more severe threats to our security, whether in our competition with the Soviet Union or, more generally, in our attempt to preserve the essential elements of a moderate international system.

If these positions are oversimplified here, the emphasis common to both is clear enough. In a darkening international landscape, the view that we must return to our pre-Vietnam role has recently

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gained an unexpected strength. Even so, its emphasis on the virtual absence of any other choice lacks persuasiveness. The degree of freedom in foreign policy we continue to enjoy today, once immediate security threats are addressed, may not be as broad as it once was but it is still considerable. How this freedom will be employed remains an open question.

II

How are we to account for the rising debate today over American foreign policy? To some, the debate has been largely precipitated by domestic critics who have succeeded in creating the requisite atmosphere for disaffection and debate over the nation's foreign policy. This is the view expressed most notably perhaps by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. To him, "much of the current dissatisfaction with the world and our role in it rests on certain fallacies." It is those who have purveyed these fallacies or myths—above all, "the pervasive fallacy that America could have the power to order the world just the way we want it to be"—who have led the way not only to much of the current dissension over foreign policy but to the "disturbing fear in the land that we are no longer capable of shaping our future."[1]

The difficulty with this view is its inversion of cause and effect. If there is marked dissatisfaction over American foreign policy today, it is not mainly the handiwork of critics but the result of events. It has been the visible decline of American power and position that has led today to a greater dissatisfaction over foreign policy than we have experienced for a decade.

If there can be little question over what has precipitated renewed debate, there can also be little question that it is a debate over American security: once again, we are "reconsidering" our security. We are doing so, moreover, against the background of an experience that led to the discrediting of the security rationale on which postwar American foreign policy had come to rest. The debate provoked by Vietnam was, like the debates of the 1930s and 1940s, over security. At issue was a broad disagreement over both the conditions, and even the very meaning, of American security interests whose vindication would justify, if necessary, the use of American military power.

But the outcome of the debate was unlike the outcome of earlier ones. Whereas the earlier ones had resulted in the triumph of the

[1] Speech delivered by Cyrus Vance at Harvard University, June 5, 1980, *The New York Times*, June 6, 1980, p. A12.

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view held by the administration of the day, Vietnam led to the defeat of the view urged by the Johnson Administration. The succeeding Nixon Administration was careful to avoid the appearance of attempting to restore this view. Indeed, though it continued the war, it did so ostensibly on other grounds and, at the same time, seemed to accept the principal critique brought against the war by liberal and moderate opponents.

This critique denied that there were any meaningful security interests at stake in Vietnam. Clearly, it was argued, this was true of the interests for which the war was allegedly undertaken. Yet it was also held to be no less true of the interests for which the war was continued after victory had been all but openly abandoned. Vietnam had neither intrinsic nor symbolic importance for American security. Even when judged from the perspective of the containment of China, the outcome of the war was deemed largely irrelevant to the nation's legitimate security concerns. Instead, what Vietnam showed in the view of most critics were the absurd lengths to which a security rationale might be employed in circumstances that bore little relationship to those in which this rationale had once been meaningful and persuasive. In this liberal and moderate critique, then, Vietnam was above all the product of intellectual error. It resulted from a failure to understand the changes that had occurred over a generation and more, which had irrevocably altered while radically improving the American security position.

The prolonged debate that attended the war led to the belief that the world which had emerged by the middle to late 1960s, though far more complicated than the world of a generation earlier, was a much safer one—presumably, on the whole, because it had become a far more pluralistic one. Interpreted, in essence, as the triumph of nationalism, pluralism was thought to mean that communist expansion no longer carried the threat to America it had once carried. Pluralism meant, as well, that the prospect of Soviet expansion had dramatically declined. A pluralistic world might, it was conceded, be more disorderly. But in the circumstances of the late 1960s and early 1970s this seemed a reasonable price to pay if such a world also pointed to a marked decline in the need for military intervention as a means for preserving vital American interests.

Yet it was not so much the optimistic expectations generally entertained of an increasingly pluralistic world that appear so striking in retrospect, as it was the change that many, this writer included, found to have already occurred in the structure of

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American security.[2] Taken alone, the appeal to pluralism as a refutation of the security rationale that led to Vietnam seemed, at best, inconclusive. But the argument that concentrated on the change in the structure of American security which had presumably occurred between the late 1940s and a generation later was another matter. It rested on the tried and true calculations that have always conditioned a nation's security—or so it seemed. On these calculations it no longer appeared plausible, let alone persuasive, to imagine an imbalance of power resulting in a serious threat to American security—that is, to our physical security, our economic well-being, or the integrity of our democratic institutions.

A wiser counsel would have cautioned—as a few did—that the persistence of a favorable power balance cannot be taken for granted, and that this particular constellation of power, like so many in the past, might also prove to be fragile and mutable. Indeed, we can now see that the foundations on which this constellation rested were beginning to erode even at the time their solidarity was being so confidently proclaimed. For the security it appeared to afford depended primarily on a favorable balance of military power that could be maintained, if at all, only by measures that were not taken.

Instead, the policy adopted by the Johnson Administration, and subsequently given formal expression by the Nixon Administration, accepted the Soviet Union as the equal—or soon to be equal—of this country in strategic military power. How this policy might be safely reconciled with the continued integrity of American vital interests and commitments in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, particularly if the United States together with its allies did not enjoy parity in conventional military power with the Soviet Union, was never satisfactorily explained. Those who made policy never persuasively addressed the central issue of what would effectively restrain the Soviet Union from taking such advantage as it safely could of an ever-improving military position.

[2] Robert W. Tucker, *Nation or Empire? The Debate Over American Foreign Policy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968, p. 32. Surveying the changes that had occurred over a generation in the structure of American security, I concluded that: "There is, in fact, no meaningful comparison to be drawn between the security position of this nation in the late nineteen-forties and its security position today. Whereas in the nineteen-forties it was still entirely possible, if not entirely plausible, to imagine an imbalance of military power that would threaten the physical security of America, today this contingency is no longer a meaningful possibility. Whereas in the nineteen-forties it was still entirely possible, and altogether plausible, to imagine an imbalance of power resulting in a security problem the solution of which would severely strain the nation's resources and jeopardize its democratic institutions, today this contingency is, at best, very remote."

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Instead, they largely proceeded from the undemonstrated assumption that the Soviet Union had become—or was in the process of becoming—a status quo power, and that it could now be expected to act with growing restraint. When, in the face of contrary evidence, this assumption began to wear thin, many fell back on the argument that even if the Soviet Union was intent upon expanding its influence, and would employ its growing military power to this end, the forces of resistance thrown up by a determinedly pluralistic world would ultimately frustrate its efforts.

Applied to areas of secondary interest, which also happen to be areas that are not contiguous to the Soviet Union, the merit of this argument may not prove to be of crucial concern. When applied to areas of primary interest that are also adjacent to the Soviet Union, or very nearly so, it is. With respect to these areas, among which the Persian Gulf is the prime case, the reliance on pluralism was and is little more than an expression of hope.

The degree of security that only yesterday was commonly taken for granted also rested on the assumption that continued Western access to the raw materials—above all, energy resources—of the developing world could be assured, and on terms compatible with substantial economic growth of the industrial democracies. Ironically, Vietnam and the debate the war precipitated appeared to many to confirm this assumption. America had entered the war, it was held, largely out of an excessive preoccupation in the 1960s with the Third World. An eminent commentator articulated the new understanding in noting that by any power calculus the states of the Third World "have no vital relation to the economic or strategic position of the developed countries. They do supply raw materials. But even here the typical observation concerns not their power as sources of such supply, but rather their weakness as competitive hewers of wood in the markets of the industrially advanced countries."[3]

These words were written when the storm was already gathering. In respect to the one transcendently important raw material, oil, demand was already pressing hard on supply. Rather than choosing to increase supply, and to remain competitive "hewers of wood," the producers chose to combine and to impose a fourfold increase in the price of their oil. At the time of the increase, some producers also initiated a limited embargo against states whose policies in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war were considered objectionable. Neither of these measures provoked significant Western re-

[3] John Kenneth Galbraith, "Plain Lessons of a Bad Decade," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1970–71, p. 37.

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action. Both challenged the foundations of the postwar order as no other event had since the 1940s.

Quite apart from the constraints on economic growth that OPEC price rises placed on the industrial democracies, the failure in 1973–74 to respond to the Arab oil embargo raised from the outset the issue of right of access to the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf. Obscured for a time by the preoccupation with the economic side of the crisis, the issue of access became apparent with the Iranian revolution, which shut off most of the production of a major producer. In swift succession, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan revealed the potential external threat to Western access, while the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran illuminated yet another aspect of the indigenous threat to what remains of the Western position.

It is in the coalescence of these two momentous developments—a military balance increasingly favorable to the Soviet Union and the steady erosion of Western power and position in the Persian Gulf—that the essential dimensions of the American security problem are to be seen today. The point has often been made that in its origins and subsequent course the energy crisis had very little to do with the Soviet Union and that, indeed, the Soviets have been—at least, until recently—quite cautious and tentative in taking such advantage as they might have from the decline of the Western position in the Gulf. Though on balance this point is well taken, at present it is not possible to separate the issue of Western access to the Gulf from the military power the Soviet Union is able to bring to bear in order to inhibit and, it may be, to openly challenge the attempted reassertion of Western power in this vital region.

III

In light of these considerations, if we are to judge the significance of the present debate over foreign policy by way of comparison with the past, it is to the late 1940s that we must look and not the late 1960s. The prospect that was virtually dismissed by most observers only a short time ago has nevertheless materialized again. The fear that was entertained at the outset of the cold war—that the Soviet Union might succeed in extending its sway over Western Europe—is once again entertained.

Nor is this fear any less plausible today than it was in an earlier period, and this despite the great changes that have since transpired. The military balance was no more favorable to the Soviet Union in the late 1940s than it is today. If anything, it was less

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favorable then, the still prostrate condition of Western Europe notwithstanding. For if the American strategic capability then was miniscule as compared with what it is today, it was still considerable, while the Soviet capability of striking directly at the United States was nonexistent. Were the worst to have come, Western Europe would have been the helpless prey to Soviet conventional forces. At the same time, Soviet industrial and population centers would have been the helpless prey to the strategic power of a still physically invulnerable America.

True, in the late 1940s, Western Europe was not only still economically prostrate but politically and psychologically vulnerable. It was this vulnerability that some saw at the time and continue to see in retrospect as the real threat held out to Western Europe, and not the threat of Soviet arms. Undoubtedly, the ravages of a brutal war, the shock of defeat, and the pervasive conviction that Europe was historically spent, led to a profound crisis of self-confidence that found expression in an acute sense of vulnerability. Even so, an important part of Europe's sense of vulnerability could not be distinguished from the threat of Soviet arms. Nor, in fact, did most Western Europeans make the distinction.

In circumstances that in many respects are so radically changed, this sense of vulnerability has revived today. The oil crisis has accentuated it as perhaps no other factor, including the relentless buildup of Soviet arms. Were Western Europe to be denied the oil of the Persian Gulf, its economic life would come to a sudden halt. The intense awareness of this accounts for the willingness of Western European states increasingly to accept almost any economic or political terms producing countries may impose on them rather than to run the risk of being cut off from their oil supplies. There is no apparent reason to believe that this subservience would not be shown in far greater degree toward a state that controlled the oil of the Persian Gulf while, at the same time, holding a military position in Europe superior to that of the Western alliance. In the 1940s, the Soviet Union could threaten Western Europe's physical security, but only if prepared to endure American reprisals to which it could not directly respond. Today, the Soviet Union, if once in control of the Persian Gulf, could dispose of Western Europe's economic life. A militarily superior position in Europe would simply reinforce a control that the United States would be powerless to contest.

What is significant, then, about the present debate over Amer-

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ican foreign policy is its unexpected familiarity. At issue are essentially the same security interests that were at issue in the years immediately following World War II. If the locus of the now most likely threat to those interests has shifted from Europe to the Persian Gulf, the vital interests at stake in the Gulf remain unchanged from the vital interests that were earlier at stake in Europe. None of the participants in the present debate seriously questions this, for no one seriously argues that the loss of Western access to the Gulf could eventuate in anything short of a mortal blow to the post-World War II structure of America's global interests. What is disputed is the Soviet intention to challenge Western access. But this dispute is not unlike the dispute that arose in the 1940s over Moscow's intentions toward Europe. Short of intention materializing through action, the present controversy is likely to prove as inconclusive as its predecessor.

The parallel thus apparent between the immediate postwar years and today is striking. Like any parallel, it can be pushed too far. The differences in the circumstances attending Western Europe in the late 1940s and the Persian Gulf today are also striking. Whereas Western Europe was relatively stable, despite appearances to the contrary, the Persian Gulf is a nightmare of present and potential instability. And whereas Western Europe on balance welcomed the American "intervention," the states of the Persian Gulf are still very far from doing so. It is, above all, the latter difference that has received considerable emphasis and that vitiates, in the judgment of many observers, if not the parallel drawn here then at least the prospect that a comparable response to that made in an earlier period is possible today. In this view, the states of the region hold it within their power to deny Western access and to defeat any attempt to force them to grant access to their oil supplies.

But this judgment is almost certainly misplaced. The Gulf today constitutes a power vacuum that will eventually be filled, whether by the one or the other superpower or by both. If, contrary to all reasonable expectation, this vacuum does persist, its very persistence would indeed herald a transformation of revolutionary proportions in the international system. The outcome would confirm what has now been contended for more than a decade—that certain traditional forms of power, above all, military power, have been substantially deprived of their former utility.

Were this contention to be borne out by events, the Western predicament in the Persian Gulf would very likely issue in the altogether grim prospects that have been recently outlined in

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these pages by Walter Levy.[4] Rather than from the Soviet Union, the great threat to the stability and security of the West would come from the very vacuum that the West must continue to rely upon but which it cannot effectively fill. In these circumstances, the military power of the Soviet Union would presumably prove as impotent as that of the West. But in these circumstances as well, the military power of the Soviet Union could in general be safely neglected. For what this power could not do in the Persian Gulf, it could also not be expected to do in Western Europe.

IV

If we instead assume the persistence of a more traditional world, we have little alternative but to respond to a conventional security threat in the way that states have regularly responded to such threats. An imbalance of military power, present or prospective, must be met by countervailing military power. We have no choice when faced by threats that, if permitted to go unmet, could result in sacrificing interests on which the nation's economic well-being and the integrity of its basic institutions depend. The purist may cavil even at this restricted meaning given to necessity in foreign policy, but short of circumstances in which an insoluble conflict between physical security and the other attributes commonly identified with security is demonstrably apparent, it will suffice.

The case for considering our immediate options *today* as very narrow is difficult to contest. Admittedly, it is still contested, as the continuing debate over America's proper policy in the Persian Gulf testifies. Even so, the shifting nature of that debate also demonstrates the compelling force of vital interest once a threat to it becomes inescapably clear. At each successive stage in the unfolding of the threat to Western access to the oil supplies of the Gulf, resistance to measures once dismissed as either unnecessary or impossible has steadily weakened. Confronted with the stark alternatives of risking loss of access, or of deploying military power to prevent such a loss, the Carter Administration had no choice in the end but to respond to a vital interest.

[4] Cf. Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1980, pp. 999–1015, for the prospects that Levy believes await the West if there is not a very substantial change in the world's dependence on Middle East oil. Yet such change is, for all practical purposes, ruled out in the foreseeable future. In its absence, Levy concludes, "the world, as we know it now, will probably not be able to maintain its cohesion, nor be able to provide for the continued economic progress of its people against the onslaught of future oil shocks—with all that this might imply for the political stability of the West, its free institutions, and its internal and external stability." One must search diligently to find an equally bleak and forbidding assessment of the future in the almost 60 years of publication history of *Foreign Affairs*.

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Its response was marked by ambiguity. In implementation, it was faltering and tortuous. But whatever criticism one may make of it, there has been a response. Moreover, under the impact of events that have left little room for doubt over the straitened position of the West in the Persian Gulf, this response gathered momentum. A comparison of the American position in the region in the fall of 1979 with the nation's position in the late fall of 1980 reveals the extent of the change that has taken place, a change that was clearly uncongenial to President Carter and that he resisted until events left him no meaningful choice.

More generally, the compelling force of vital interest has left us no meaningful choice in deciding whether or not we will respond to the continuing arms buildup of the Soviet Union with an improved military position of our own. The manner and emphasis, the pace and magnitude, of the response continue to elicit controversy. The diplomatic consequences that some fear rearmament to hold out provoke even greater controversy. These and still other considerations notwithstanding, a majority among elites and public alike now accepts the imminent prospect—if not the present reality—of an overall arms balance that favors the Soviet Union. The need to redress this actual or prospective imbalance is also broadly accepted.

The wellspring of this consensus must be traced to the growing conviction that the United States has steadily moved throughout the past decade toward an insolvent foreign policy, whether in the Persian Gulf—where commitment was not in accord with interest and where the means to sustain interest or commitment were almost totally lacking—or in Western Europe—where credibility of commitment was increasingly called into question by the growing inadequacy of the necessary means. The remedy for a foreign policy that has come close to insolvency—because the means to secure vital interests are inadequate—is plainly to restore the necessary means. In the two most critical areas of concern to the United States, the necessary means—not the only means but the necessary means—are military. This point deserves particular emphasis with respect to the Persian Gulf. Though it is here that the need is greatest, it is also here that the temptation persists to find a substitute for this need.

The experience of a decade, however, has amply demonstrated the truth that should have been apparent from the outset: there is no reliable substitute for Western power in the Gulf. The continued search for such a substitute—whether in the form of another American surrogate, of alignment with the West by means

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of a regional arrangement, or of collective nonalignment—is entirely vain. The conditions of domestic instability and of intraregional rivalries that characterize the Gulf render any and all of these schemes either impossible to achieve or without real value even if apparently achieved.

Nor is there any plausible reason for believing that these schemes would prove feasible and effective if a satisfactory settlement of the Palestinian issue were achieved. A settlement of the Palestinian issue would not materially lessen the need for Western power in the Gulf. It would not do so because it would not remove the many sources of conflict and instability in the region. Of the major events that have shaken the Gulf in the past two years and that have threatened Western access—notably the fall of the Shah and the Iraqi-Iranian war—none have had more than a peripheral relationship to the Palestinian issue. The continued insistence upon seeing in a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict a critical part of the solution to Western vulnerability in the Gulf has become the refuge of those who do not believe there can be an effective reassertion of Western power and that, this being so, we must clutch at such straws as best we can.

A recent variation on this view holds that Arab states of the Gulf—particularly Saudi Arabia—would be more receptive to an American military presence if the Palestinian issue were to be satisfactorily resolved.[5] Those urging this view seem oblivious to the notorious fact that there is no consensus among Arab states on what a "satisfactory" solution would consist of and that such a consensus is not likely to emerge. The argument that the receptivity of the Gulf states to an American presence depends on the politics of the area is surely right. But it does not follow that the Palestinian issue is the key to a favorable attitude of the Gulf states toward a Western military presence on their territory. Instead, the key is a restoration of American credibility, a restoration that will not be furthered by an America that is seen to be pressuring Israel on the Palestinian issue *in order to* improve its standing in the Arab world. If anything, such pressure is likely to have the opposite effect from what its advocates claim it would have. The Saudis will see it not as an indication of American credibility but as further evidence of the weakness of our position.

Although the conditions of solvency have been increasingly placed in question even in Western Europe, in the Persian Gulf

[5] See David Watt, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Leaders Who Face the Facts," *The Economist*, October 11, 1980, p. 26.

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their fulfillment has until very recently never been seriously attempted. Now the task can no longer be avoided. Yet it is bound to prove far more exacting than the effort required for Western Europe. This is so not only because the current military advantage of the Russians in the Gulf region is considerably greater than it is in Europe, but also because the purposes for which American power might have to be employed today in the Gulf are more complex and ambiguous, and the conditions of employment more difficult, than in Europe. Whereas in Europe the purpose of American power is either to deter or to defend against Soviet armed aggression, in the Persian Gulf the purpose is to ensure access to the region's oil supplies.

This being so, we can have no single standing and identifiable adversary in the Gulf; the threat to access may arise from any number of possible sources, of which a direct Soviet armed intervention, though the most serious, is only one. More likely, a threat to access will arise primarily from developments indigenous to the Gulf, though the Soviet Union may play a peripheral role even here. The diversity and ambiguity of the circumstances in which force may have to be threatened or employed imposes both political and strategic dilemmas—political dilemmas in that the use of American power may have to be undertaken in response to internal politics of a Gulf state, and strategic dilemmas in that American forces may be required to act in circumstances impossible to foresee.

What is still more sobering is that the Western position of conventional inferiority with respect to the Soviet Union raises the issue of nuclear deterrence as it has not been raised for many years. In the limiting situation—a determined Russian assault in the Gulf—we must either rely on the threat of responding with nuclear weapons or concede that as matters now stand there is no effective response we can make. To acknowledge this unpalatable truth is not to cast doubt on the need for making a serious effort to strengthen conventional forces in the region. Without such an effort, a strategy of nuclear deterrence in the Gulf would not only encounter the now familiar problems of credibility arising from our European experience, it would meet the additional difficulty resulting from a variety of circumstances which are absent in Europe but which largely define the condition of the Gulf. In these circumstances, a nuclear tripwire would either lack credibility or simply prove irrelevant.

These considerations do not mean that there is no proper role in a Gulf strategy for the threat of nuclear escalation. Instead,

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they point to the conclusion that this threat must be reserved for the limiting situation. If it is argued that even here the threat will fail to carry the persuasiveness that it has carried in Europe, the reason must be either that we do not have the same interest in the Gulf that we have in Europe or that, though having a comparable interest, we do not have the conventional forces needed to give the requisite credibility to nuclear deterrence. And since the former reason cannot be sustained, given Western Europe's critical dependence on the Gulf, it is the latter that is evidently intended. But the dependence of a credible nuclear threat on a substantial conventional force structure is not questioned here. Clearly, the experience we have to date supports the need for a substantial ground presence if a nuclear threat is to be credible. What is questioned is the view that the Gulf can be successfully defended against a major Soviet assault by conventional forces. It cannot be done at present. Nor is there much likelihood it might be done in the immediate future.

A viable strategy in the Persian Gulf, then, must have as its goal the creation of a conventional force structure that can effectively deal with the contingencies that may arise short of a determined Russian assault. If such a force were established, it would still not remove the possibility of the limiting situation arising, but it would severely reduce this prospect. It would represent a very great improvement over our present position. As matters now stand, however, establishing it will prove quite difficult, largely because of the persisting obstacles to deploying conventional military power, other than naval forces, in the region.

These obstacles to the permanent stationing of ground forces and land-based aircraft, if not in, then immediately proximate to, the Gulf, are not insurmountable. They are not dictated by the unchanging "realities" of the region. Instead, they are the result of a decline in power and position that has made the kind of relationship needed to entertain such forces a liability for most governments in the area. They reflect the low estate to which American power has sunk in a decade, while making extraordinarily difficult any attempts at the effective restoration of this power within a reasonable period of time.

Whether the constraints on the deployment of American power can be overcome in the near future must remain an open question. What does seem reasonably clear is that there is no apparent way by which we can conform to these constraints and still respond adequately to the deepening crisis in the Gulf. A permanent and

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much larger naval combat presence in the Arabian Sea could effectively meet some of the disabilities thereby imposed, though by no means all. Even then, the creation of such a presence will itself require considerable time. This being so, we must choose either to resign ourselves to a future over which we can have but limited control, or attempt to break out of constraints that hamper a more effective response than is now possible.

V

If this is the realm of necessity for American foreign policy today, what are the implications of responding to necessity? First and foremost, what kind of relationship can we reasonably expect to have with the Soviet Union? A candid answer is that the measures required to redress the arms balance and to improve the Western position in the Persian Gulf will strain our relationship with the Soviet Union in the immediate future. Still other issues may also intervene to compound the difficulties and dangers that are now all too likely to mark the relationship. In any case, the outlook is bleak.

The principal reasons for this are clear enough. Moscow is quite likely to view a significant effort at rearmament as an attempt not merely to redress an arms balance but to reestablish an overall position of superiority. Moreover, whatever the Soviet leaders may say about their determination to match any American effort, they are bound to entertain serious doubts over their ability to do so in the longer run. They may well be skeptical over the willingness of this nation to accept for long the sacrifices substantial rearmament would entail—certainly their skepticism finds ample support in the doubts entertained by many American observers—but they must harbor no little apprehension over the results of our rearmament if given sustained public support. Even if the Soviet government were nevertheless willing and able to match the American effort, the result would severely strain the Russian economy and, in the bargain, might even produce serious domestic unrest. Yet if Moscow should fail to respond to the American effort, the result, again in Russian eyes, might well be seen as the beginning of the end to pretensions of global power status.

These considerations alone provide ample grounds for pessimism. To them, however, must be added the structural causes for conflict that are provided by the Persian Gulf. The observation has been regularly made that the instability characteristic of much of the Third World provides the single most significant, and

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seemingly intractable, source of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. But it is not the points of contention and conflict *generally* in the Third World that have brought the superpowers into potentially dangerous confrontation today; it is the growing competition in the region of the Persian Gulf that has done so. It is the Gulf that forms the indispensable key to the defense of the American global position, just as it forms the indispensable key without which the Soviet Union cannot seriously aspire to global predominance. Alongside the stakes accruing from control of the Gulf, the contest in other regions of the Third World can have but peripheral significance.

The intrinsic importance of the Gulf thus acts as a magnet that, for different reasons, neither superpower can resist. The competition for control of the area is about as certain as anything can be in politics. So long as it persists—and it probably will for some years to come—it will hold out the constant prospect for dangerous confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

With the advantage of hindsight, a number of observers now find that this prospect might have been largely avoided had American policy accepted the Soviet Union as a partner in the Middle East peace process. Instead, by seeking to exclude Moscow from a Middle East settlement, we succeeded only in provoking renewed Soviet determination to improve its position in the areas around the Persian Gulf.

This argument, however, indicates an unwillingness to acknowledge that the Gulf cannot be bought by a policy conceding the form in the hope of retaining the substance. Quite apart from the notorious difficulties raised by including the Russians in the peace process, how would this inclusion have diminished their aspirations in the Gulf? Presumably including them would have been an acknowledgement of the equality upon which they are so insistent. But unless this acknowledgment could also be expected to yield tangible consequences in the Persian Gulf, it would represent in the end little more than an empty gesture. Is there any plausible reason for believing that the Soviets would have been satisfied by such a gesture, or that they might be so satisfied today?

It is, of course, the prospect of a very difficult and dangerous relationship with the Soviet Union that is the principal objection to a policy whose first priority is the restoration of American power generally and, above all, in the Persian Gulf. Yet unless one argues that such restoration is simply unnecessary there is no viable alternative to it. The risks it gives rise to can only be

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weighed against those that must be run through failing to respond to a still growing Soviet strategic and conventional arms momentum.

VI

If the risks inherent in the Soviet-American relationship today cannot be exorcised by the simple refusal to acknowledge their existence, is there nevertheless substantial reason to believe they can be kept to a moderate threshold? While pursuing a restoration of American power and position, and while once again drawing lines which the Russians are expected not to violate, can we still keep the relationship short of one that is under constant strain? Is it plausible to expect a U.S. policy that will involve, in the phrase of Robert Legvold, "containment without confrontation"?[6]

Clearly, this would be a far more attractive prospect than the one indicated in these pages. What would a U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union look like that might be expected to lead to this happier relationship? Mr. Legvold argues that it must consist of two principal elements or, in his words, "must proceed on two tracks: one of firmness, military strength (but not by seeking military superiority), and a will to act (requiring a public readier for the possibility); the other of cooperation, the extended hand, and a renewed interest in dealing with problems jointly rather than in turning problems against each other."[7] The first track would provide the means of a refurbished policy of containment and draw the lines of such policy. The second track would provide the incentive for the Soviet Union to accept, though perhaps not without occasional lapses, the first. It would include "an economic policy founded on cooperation," "arms control efforts as a significant and carefully coordinated element in a national security policy that does not rely only on arming," and "a serious attempt to open the one area of détente that never got started, namely, crisis management."[8]

This is clearly a prescription for a return to the policy of the early 1970s, though a return without the illusions of these earlier years. Legvold's "sound, resurrected détente" is a détente that is based on power and a willingness to use that power. It does not assume that Moscow will refrain from seeking "marginal advantages" in the Third World, but rather accepts that Moscow will

[6] Robert Legvold, "Containment Without Confrontation," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1980, pp. 74–98.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 93.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

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be so tempted and that the temptation must be countered by a combination of threats, rewards and a growing recognition—encouraged by institutionalized procedures—of mutuality of interest in managing the inevitable competition. The earlier détente presumably failed because it was too soft where it should have been harder and too hard where it should have been softer. A resurrected détente can proceed on the basis of this experience and can do so without having to contend with the domestic constraints of the early to middle 1970s.

Is it reasonable to believe that Legvold's détente would enjoy a better fate than its predecessor? One must doubt that it would. This is so even if we freely grant the assumption that this détente would not suffer from the domestic constraints attending the implementation of the earlier détente. For the principal question the Nixon-Kissinger policy raised—what would induce the Soviet Union to become more moderate, one that no longer sought to exploit opportunities and take advantage of instabilities?—must also be raised by current proposals for a resurrected détente. Moreover, this question must be raised in circumstances much less auspicious than those of an earlier period.

Whereas the détente of 1972 was undertaken at a time when this country was still considered to enjoy a position of net superiority in the arms balance with the Soviet Union, today this no longer holds. And whereas the détente of 1972 was undertaken at a time when the temptations held out by the Third World appeared to have receded, today they have sharply risen—above all, in the one most critical area of the Third World. Finally, Soviet insistence upon being treated as an equal of America, with all that this implies in the various areas of competition, has markedly increased. The time when Moscow could be appeased or fobbed off with the symbols of equality has passed.

Against these considerations, what are the incentives that might induce Moscow to accept an American-inspired definition of moderate behavior? The belief that a more cooperative economic policy might do so is surely a slender reed to rely on. Those who continue to do so have yet to demonstrate how such a policy, once free of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and other impediments, could promote more than a modest relationship without creating more *economic risks* than benefits for the United States. They would also have to indicate the benefits—whether in trade, providing credit facilities, or technology transfers—that the Russians do not already enjoy in increasing measure by virtue of their economic relationships with West European countries. And even if these

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propositions could be persuasively demonstrated, they would still have to indicate why the Soviet Union might be expected to do what it has never before done: to subordinate high policy to such benefits as an improved economic relationship might bring. In this regard, it may be recalled that the first serious test, and failure, of the promise of détente, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, preceded the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.

The emphasis placed by advocates of a new détente on a continuing and even greater effort toward arms control is easy to understand though difficult to credit. It is easy to understand since the SALT process has come to be seen as the principal achievement of the old détente. In the course of the 1970s, this process has even been increasingly viewed as constituting the principal ongoing method of political communication with the Soviet Union, the jeopardizing of which would measurably enhance the prospects of nuclear war. Not surprisingly, this view has become the more insistent as the normal forms of communication have atrophied in the wake of Afghanistan.

Yet the emphasis placed on the SALT process remains difficult to credit. In the last eight years this process has not hindered the Soviets from pursuing substantially the same arms buildup we have every reason to believe they would have pursued in its absence. Nor did Moscow's stake in SALT prevent it from exploiting those situations in the Third World that opportunity presented. We have, of course, no way of knowing what the Soviet Union might have done in the Third World without SALT. But it is special pleading to point to Afghanistan as an example of what might have occurred earlier had it not been for Soviet interest in arms control. There are many reasons that account for Afghanistan. The Soviet calculation in late 1979 that the cause of SALT II had been lost—at least for the time being—could only have been one such reason and likely a subordinate one.

If we put aside economic policy and arms control, there remains the area of "crisis management," of dealing jointly with problems arising from superpower competition in the Third World. Without question, this has been, as Legvold and others remind us, the area in which the old détente never got started. It is also the area that more than any other proved fatal to the old détente. The reasons it did so, however, must surely tell us something about the prospects held out by a new détente, for these reasons are clearly no less relevant today than they were in the early to middle 1970s.

If the Soviet leadership was unwilling then to acquiesce in a definition of equality that, in its eyes, denied Moscow the sub-

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stance of equality, it is all the more unwilling to do so today. An improved military position has given added weight to Soviet insistence upon equal rights in the Third World, while the rising opportunities for exploiting instabilities have made the claim almost compelling in its attraction.

On the American side, though the arms balance has steadily moved in an adverse direction, there is an increasing disposition to resist Moscow's claim to equal rights not only because of a general change in the climate of opinion—a change resulting in part from the experience with the old détente—but also, and more important, because of the rising fear that the claim, once acknowledged in principle, would soon be applied to regions of critical interest to this country.

In these circumstances, the prospects for crisis management must be rated as very low. Nor is it apparent why in these circumstances crisis management is intrinsically desirable, even if presently unobtainable. Clearly, it is desirable if such management may operate within a framework of state relations to which the parties can meaningfully subscribe. Within this framework, the competition of the great powers for position and advantage has been difficult enough to manage. Without it, the search for crisis management—in effect, for mutually agreed "rules of the game"—must either prove barren or lead to quite undesirable results. For the search itself necessarily presumes the basis for the desired goal, else the effort to fashion reliable patterns of mutual restraint must prove feckless. Unfortunately, the evidence that this basis exists is no more convincing today than it was in the period of the cold war. It is only the belief that it exists which has increased.[9]

VII

The renewed search for détente with the Soviet Union, this time a détente without the illusions and excessive expectations attending the old détente, reflects the fear that in its absence we will be tempted to return to something akin to the policy of containment that prevailed from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s. In turn, that fear finds a two fold expression. In one, it is that if we attempt to

[9] A telling sign of this belief in the past year has been the fashionable analogy drawn between 1914 and 1980, with its evident implication that the Soviet Union is today's Wilhelmenian Germany, a revisionist power, to be sure, but one whose revisionism is nevertheless limited by adherence to the same framework of state relations as its competitors. The progression of thought from the early 1970s, then, is this: whereas in these earlier years the Soviet Union was seen by many as an increasingly status quo power in the literal sense, now it is seen as revisionist, though revisionist in the conventional meaning of the term.

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resurrect the containment of yesterday in the conditions of today, we may well tempt the Soviets to exploit their present position of strength in a manner that will lead to an ultimate confrontation. In the other, it is that if we attempt and even partially succeed in resurrecting the containment of yesterday, we will tempt ourselves to repeat the excesses of yesterday. Thus, whether we fail or succeed, the alternatives to a new détente are seen as forbidding.

There is no need, however, to accept these as the only alternatives to a new détente. The Soviet-American relationship may take yet other expressions and hold out less forbidding consequences, even in the short term. What American policy cannot avoid, save at the risk of sacrificing its global position and gravely jeopardizing its security, are the measures outlined earlier in this essay. But these measures form no more than a limited policy of containment. They respond essentially to the same security interests that an earlier policy of containment responded to in the years immediately following World War II. Even so, a policy of moderate containment today would necessarily differ from the moderate containment of the late 1940s because we cannot regain the relative power advantage we once enjoyed. Certainly there is no way by which we can recapture the immunity from direct attack we once enjoyed. Nor can we determine the behavior of our principal allies in the manner we once could.

These changes, not to speak of the changes that have occurred in the once-passive Third World, require us to recognize that today we could only pursue the methods and even the aspirations which characterized an earlier period of containment at very great cost and effort, and even then with no more than a modest prospect of success. If this is so, the containment of today and tomorrow, unlike yesterday's containment, will have to deal with the Soviet Union in a manner that those who presided over containment in the past were often reluctant to accept. The containment of today and tomorrow will have to make concessions and compromises in areas of contention where concession and compromise were once spurned. And if it is at all prudent, a refurbished containment will, wherever possible, avoid measures which at once sharply exacerbate the relationship with the Soviet Union and make the prospect of its future amelioration virtually impossible.

Nothing would be more likely to have these effects than a military alliance, even if only de facto, with China. Yet this is the direction in which American policy has been inexorably moving in the past year or so. If it is carried forward much more, it will

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soon seal the Soviet-American relationship in a fixed and truly dangerous mold by making it hostage to our relations with China. Nor will it matter that this is done from a position of growing strength rather than, as in the recent past, from a position of relative weakness.

The promise of a policy of limited containment envisaged here is not the promise of détente—even of a "sound, resurrected détente." It suggests far more competition than cooperation. It finds the sources of this competition primarily in the structural causes of conflict between the superpowers rather than in the still profoundly different visions of the world and of the state system that the two respectively entertain.

Even so, the great ideological divide that continues to separate the Soviet Union and the United States remains an important source of conflict. When combined with the structural causes, the result gives the Soviet-American relationship greater continuity with the past than is commonly acknowledged. It is, indeed, this continuity in change that prompts some to insist that a policy of moderate containment will not work and that the logic of our position requires a resurgent America in pursuit of goals reminiscent of the later period of containment.

VIII

The case for recognizing the central importance of the ideological stakes of the conflict has been most forcefully and acutely made by Norman Podhoretz.[10] It is not sufficient, he has argued, to treat the Soviet-American rivalry in the manner of conventional great power contests. The "new nationalism" that has arisen in reaction to the visible decline of American power (though needed and healthy) has a tendency to do just that. Podhoretz finds in this reaction little awareness of the deeper meaning of the conflict. Yet unless a deeper meaning is given to Soviet-American rivalry—now more serious in its implications than perhaps it has ever been—he fears that the requisite base for carrying us into and sustaining a new period of global containment will prove lacking. The threat that ought to rouse us but that is still missing from a long overdue reaction to a policy of strategic retreat is communism. Without an awareness of the all-embracing threat that the

[10] Norman Podhoretz, *The Present Danger*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980.

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advance of communism implies, the change we are witnessing today will lack direction and purpose. He writes:

> In resisting the advance of Soviet Power . . . . we *are* fighting for freedom and against Communism, for democracy and against totalitarianism. Yet it is precisely this sense of things that the new nationalism thus far lacks . . . . Without such clarity, the new nationalism is unlikely to do more than lead to sporadic outbursts of indignant energy.[11]

It is in Podhoretz's outlook that we may find perhaps the clearest advocacy of a resurgent America committed again to the goals of a policy of global containment. Directed not only against Soviet expansion, but against the coming to power of communist governments generally, this policy would be restrained only by considerations of prudence. But if the constraints of prudence are to be taken with greater seriousness than in an earlier period, they are not to be used as an excuse for a policy indistinguishable from moderate containment.

If we contrast the alternative that Podhoretz presents with the requirements of a policy of limited containment, it is apparent that in choosing between them we are destined to retrace an old argument. For they are strikingly similar to the alternatives held out in the years that followed World War II. The two principal versions of containment that vied with one another then promise to become once again the major source of contention today.

Though the earlier debate ultimately turned on two different views of the requirements of American security, it is important not to exaggerate the differences between them. The circumstances of the late 1940s made the application of containment roughly identical with a balance-of-power policy. Yet even then, containment in Europe was from the outset undertaken for reasons that went beyond security, narrowly construed. Here, as well as in the case of Japan, the intent was not only to prevent these centers of industrial power from falling under Russian control, but to ensure that they would remain—or become—democratic societies. From the outset, then, the policy of moderate containment expressed a security interest that went beyond a conventional security interest in balance-of-power terms to identify security with the internal order maintained by states. Though modest, it still implied a scheme of things that went beyond the order implicit in a balance of power. This scheme cannot be equated with the universalist

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 100–01.

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pretensions of the Truman Doctrine; but it also cannot be equated with a narrow and traditional conception of security.

In a word, the differences between the two initial views of containment were relative, not absolute. Had this not been the case, it would have been much more difficult than it was to move from the narrower and more conventional view of security characteristic of the early years of containment to the broader view that came to prevail in the period following Korea. Still, these relative differences were important. They carried distinctive implications not only about the kind of world we needed for our security but also about the kind of world we wanted. Indeed, in both views, it was virtually impossible to distinguish need from want.

This inability to separate need from want in the evolution of containment is scarcely unusual. It is a common characteristic of all great nations. For the latter, the ultimate expression of security can rarely be found in its physical or economic dimensions, but must instead be found in the moral-psychological—or, if one prefers, the spiritual—dimension. What else can explain the insistence that security cannot be limited to "mere" physical security? And what else can explain the insistence that although the nation's physical being may remain inviolate and its economic base secured, the nation "itself" may not survive? In failing to take these questions seriously, we misunderstand the meaning not only of great power behavior, but of our own as well.

In abandoning isolationism in the 1930s, we responded not only to a perceived threat to our physical and economic security. We also recoiled from the prospect of a world in which America's political and economic frontiers would become coterminous with her territorial frontiers, a world in which societies that shared our institutions and values might very possibly disappear—in sum, a world in which the American example and American influence would become irrelevant. In such a world, it was argued, America could no longer realize her promise, since a hostile world from which America was shut out would inevitably affect the integrity of the nation's institutions and the quality of its domestic life. The issues of physical security and economic well-being apart, it was to prevent this prospect from materializing that the nation abandoned its interwar isolationism, intervened in World War II, and, in the years following the war, adopted a policy of containment. And it has been to prevent this same prospect from materializing that we have been willing to incur the risk of physical destruction through nuclear war, rather than to abandon interests which would not jeopardize our physical existence if once lost.

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This experience does indeed indicate that the initial and indispensable stimulus prompting the exercise of American power has been a perceived threat to the nation's physical security or material well-being. But it also points to the inadequacy of conventional security calculations in sustaining the exercise of American power. Once the initial threat has brought forth a response, America has needed a broader rationale for the effort and sacrifice required to sustain the exercise of power. When it has not been forthcoming or when it has been discredited, the result has been drift and uncertainty. So it was that in the early stages of containment the response that was initially evoked, largely as a result of conventional security considerations, was sustained and even expanded by what came to be a still broader motive for policy. When that broader motive was discredited, as it was by Vietnam, even the narrower and conventional security policy became difficult to sustain.

IX

The American experience would thus appear to support the view that our alternatives today are either a policy of a resurgent America intent once again on containing wherever possible the expansion of Soviet influence—as well as the expansion of communism generally—or a policy of moderate containment that may prove inadequate to sustain the power and discipline even to protect interests on which our essential security depends. For if the latter is less demanding, it is also considerably less appealing in the promise it holds out: not of a world moving progressively under American leadership toward the eventual triumph of liberal-capitalist values, but of a world in which America would have to abandon expectations that only yesterday she confidently held. We would have to reconcile ourselves to the prospect of a world of which a large, and perhaps increasing, part outside the industrial democracies would resist American influence.

If that prospect is viewed with alarm, it is not only so viewed by the proponents of a resurgent America. Even those who decry the call for a resurgent America and insistently remind us that we no longer have the power to shape the world according to our desires appear uneasy over accepting the prospect of a world in which American influence would decline. This, at least, is what they have repeatedly declared. The officials of the Carter Administration, including the President, were no doubt quite sincere in expressing the desire to see the developing world move in a

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manner that would ultimately prove congenial to us. To be sure, they advocated the need for America "to get on the side of change." But they did so presumably in order to guide and to manage the great changes they found sweeping the world. Through different and more congenial methods than those that were often employed in the past, they nonetheless aspired to achieve the goals of the past.

This strategy inevitably failed. The goals of the past could not be achieved while foreswearing the methods that once attended those goals. Even a policy of moderate containment cannot escape incurring the risk of intervention. Clearly, it cannot do so in the Persian Gulf; and circumstances there may prove even more ambiguous than those attending past interventions. It will not do, then, to charge that a resurgent America will be an interventionist America. Any policy of containment must accept the risk of intervention, and in circumstances that we may find in many ways undesirable.

Still, there are risks and risks, and it would be disingenuous to deny that the risks, and costs, likely to attend a return to something resembling the former policy of global containment would be anything less than considerable. The circumstances in which such a policy would have to be undertaken today are much less auspicious than they were a decade and a half ago. Nor is it reasonable to expect a substantial change for the better until the military measures discussed earlier have been successfully undertaken. This will require several years, though, and even then the outcome will not necessarily yield advantages in the overall military balance that a policy of a resurgent America would require. For that policy presupposes a position of clear military superiority; it cannot be prudently undertaken from a position of parity or even from a position of slight advantage.

What might the Soviet Union be expected to do in the face of a policy that wherever possible intends to resist its every move, and that undertakes to develop the necessary means to do so? I am not speaking here of a policy intent on preserving interests outside this hemisphere, which for the United States are indispensable to its entire position in the world, such as the Persian Gulf. For the Soviet Union these interests are indispensable as the key to global predominance. The measures required to implement such a policy are not without risks. Confronted even with these measures, the Soviet leaders must anticipate the time when they will no longer enjoy their present military position. Moreover, they can have no assurance that, having once taken these mea-

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sures, we will forego the temptation to achieve a position of military superiority. But if the risks inherent in the attempt to redress the present military balance are substantial, how much greater would they be if accompanied by a commitment to a policy of global containment?

In the present circumstances, then, a return to the expansive version of containment, if seriously intended, is likely to place us on the most dangerous of courses with the Soviet Union. For that policy must in effect convey the message to Moscow that the clock is to be set back at least 15 years, that the status of equality accorded the U.S.S.R. by the late 1960s is henceforth to have a largely honorific significance, and that the United States no longer intends to accept the Soviet Union as a global power. Quite apart from the reaction of Soviet leaders to what they would see as a renewed determination to treat them as a regional power, what effect would this have on our principal allies?

If the experience of the past year is any indication, the answer is reasonably clear. At best, it would further exacerbate the existing crisis in the Western alliance. At worst, it might lead to an open rupture and to the greatest diplomatic defeat for this country in the postwar period. Disagreement within the Atlantic Alliance has almost always been greatest over issues that have not been specifically European. In truth, the alliance has seldom effectively functioned as an alliance with respect to these issues, even when the issue in question has vitally affected alliance interests. Of these, the energy crisis and ensuing differences over the proper Western policy to be pursued in the Middle East afford the most dramatic and important examples.

Of course, one may argue that these differences are largely the result of a markedly declining confidence of Western Europe in American leadership, discipline and will, and that a resurgent America dedicated again to global containment would, in demonstrating these qualities, restore this badly impaired confidence. Without question, a more consistent and resolute American leadership would restore a measure of European confidence and elicit a greater degree of cooperation. It is, after all, scarcely surprising that given the character of American policy in recent years, Western Europe did not greet the hardened position toward the U.S.S.R. in 1980 with enthusiasm. If this shift were to prove abortive, or if it were not to be followed up, America would risk losing a great deal. But Western Europe would risk losing everything.

In these circumstances, and with a vivid memory of the Amer-

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ican record since the mid-1970s, what is perhaps surprising is that West European resistance to shifts in American policy this past year was not more pronounced. At the same time, the effective reassertion of American power and leadership may yet prompt a quite different reaction—and sooner than is commonly expected. It will do so, however, only if the Europeans are persuaded that the United States is pursuing a policy that does not risk confrontation with the Soviet Union over interests deemed extraneous to the Western alliance. This task of persuasion has been difficult enough in the Middle East, where Western Europe's interests are manifest but where American policy has been seen to jeopardize those interests because of Washington's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict and—to a lesser degree—even on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Yet how much greater would European opposition be to a policy that, in seeking to deny the extension of Soviet power and influence in areas of no intrinsic concern to Western Europe, threatened to take Europe back to the conditions of the 1950s?

To the risks that a policy of a resurgent America would likely incur must be added the costs. How great those costs would be, when added to those of a more modest policy, is difficult to assess. Certainly they would be substantially greater, if only because a policy of global containment implies military superiority over the Soviet Union. They would also be substantially greater because this more ambitious policy holds out a greater promise of intervention. It would be reckless to assume that interventions in the future will prove less costly than those in the past. The Third World has not become more passive since the 1960s. Instead, it has become almost everywhere more resistant to great-power attempts to exercise the control or even the influence that was once part of the order of things.

This being so, the risks of intervention, when measured in terms of domestic support, have not diminished but, if anything, increased. They have increased not because of the many, though dubious, "lessons" that have been drawn from our experience in Vietnam but because of one indisputable lesson. It is that success is the great solvent of serious public disaffection over foreign policy, and particularly over military intervention. Had the intervention in Vietnam succeeded within a relatively brief period, it is reasonable to assume that significant opposition to the war would not have arisen. Unless future interventions can find a justification in security interests that the public finds compelling,

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they will have to enjoy relatively quick and cheap success. Yet the prospects for satisfying these requirements are today less favorable than ever.

Given these considerations, could a policy reminiscent of the later period of containment be expected to command the necessary support at home? Could it elicit the broad domestic consensus required to sustain it over the long term? There are no easy answers to these questions. It is reasonably clear, however, that the domestic support required for a return to the policy of a generation ago does not yet exist. Instead, in the emergence of a "new nationalism" we find a public that at once rejects the guilt and withdrawal of the post-Vietnam period while reluctant to embrace again the enthusiasms of the pre-Vietnam period. Though it has become increasingly supportive of greater defense efforts, it has also remained cautious of the purposes for which American arms might be employed. Accordingly, though it is supportive of existing commitments, it has also remained cautious over endorsing new commitments—witness the less than overwhelming public response evoked by the Carter Doctrine.

To date, then, the new nationalism appears thoroughly self-interested. It is precisely this trait that leads observers like Norman Podhoretz to conclude that the new nationalism lacks "a sense of things." Yet what it lacks is not an anti-communist disposition as such, but the anti-communist disposition of yesterday and, of course, the willingness of yesterday to act on the basis of that disposition.

Whether the prevailing public mood of today can be sustained remains to be seen. It may be that it cannot. Expressing as it does an outlook supportive of a modest policy and based on calculations of self-interest, it is, as already noted, different from our experience since World War II. To this experience, moreover, must be added the attractions of investing great significance in conflicts that bear only marginally on our core interests. If, however, the new nationalism could be sustained, if it could avoid the disenchantment and withdrawal that followed Vietnam as well as the enthusiasm and involvement that preceded Vietnam, it would not need the intellectual guidance that many believe it must have. Indeed, the foreign policy elites might well benefit by taking their cue from the new nationalism rather than by endeavoring to instruct it. The essential elements of a viable consensus on foreign policy need not be further sought after. For the moment, at any rate, they are apparent in the prevailing public mood.

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X

If a domestic consensus can be sustained in support of a policy of moderate containment, as outlined earlier in these pages, what is the great objection to its acceptance? Though described as moderate, it is not, after all, an inconsiderable enterprise. To redress the overall arms balance, to ensure Western access to the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf, and generally to restore confidence abroad that America has the understanding and the discipline to maintain a solvent foreign policy, seems a substantial enough undertaking. Why, then, should we consider taking on more unless it can be shown that the more is essential to our security?

These questions bring us back to the difficult, perhaps even insoluble, distinction between need and want. It is clear what we generally want to happen in the Third World (and it is the Third World that we are talking about). Yet it is also in much of the Third World that our distinction between need and want has often been the most tenuous, just as it is here that containment in the past has enjoyed the least success. The issue a refurbished policy of global containment must raise is not whether it should be applied to those areas where need is or should be apparent to all, as in the region of the Persian Gulf, but where it is plausible, at best, only if unverifiable assumption is piled upon unverifiable assumption.

The argument may be illustrated by reference to an area, Central America, that seems almost certain to provoke rising concern and controversy in the coming period.[12] In Central America there are no vital raw materials or minerals whose loss might provide the basis for legitimate security concerns. Yet Central America bears geographical proximity to the United States, and historically it has long been regarded as falling within our sphere of influence. As such, we have long exercised the role great powers have traditionally exercised over small states which fall within their respective spheres of influence. We have regularly played a determining role in making and in unmaking governments, and we have defined what we have considered to be the acceptable behavior of governments. In Central America our pride is engaged as it cannot possibly be engaged in Africa or in Southeast Asia. If we do not apply a policy of a resurgent America to prevent the

[12] In considering the Central American example, I have benefited much from conversations with my colleague, Professor Piero Gleijeses. These conversations were all the more instructive in that Professor Gleijeses reflects the perspective of the Left, while I of the Right.

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coming to power of radical regimes in Central America, we have even less reason to do so in other areas where conventional security interests are not apparent. Reasons of pride and historic tradition apart, it is here, if anywhere, that we enjoy clear military superiority and may expect to retain such superiority in the future. In Central America, then, one risk of an ambitious containment policy would be absent.

Would a return to a policy of the past work in Central America? Providing that we exercise some care in defining what we mean by "work," there is no persuasive reason for believing that it would not. The measures required to ensure success may prove unwelcome and embarrassing today since we can have no assurance that indirect methods of intervention will prove sufficient. We have now passed the period of overthrowing an Arbenz in Guatemala, when disposing of governments to which we took offense was a quite easy undertaking. Today we must expect to deal with a far more determined and effective opposition. The price promises to be markedly greater, and it will have to be paid not only in the actions we take but in the reaction of others—particularly, though not only, in Latin America—to our actions.

Moreover, this price cannot be trimmed by halfway measures, that is, by an opposition to radical movements that still fails to prevent their taking power, or, more important, that fails to remove them should they achieve power. The expected result of such halfway measures will only be to create the conditions for another Cuba. Radical movements or radical regimes must be defeated. Yet even if we pay the necessary price for defeating them, we cannot be sure how long our success will endure. Success is likely to prove precarious not only because the defeated may well continue to enjoy broad support, but because the victors will have to do what has to date been impossible for them to do—enlist the support of centrist elements. Unfortunately, these elements no longer exist in Central American states. Right-wing governments will have to be given steady outside support, even, if necessary, by sending in American forces.

It can be done. But why should we do it? If one replies that our security requires doing it, we still have to determine the nature of the security interests at stake. One presumably relates to Mexico. Is it reasonable to assume, however, that the course of Central America will seriously influence the course of Mexico? Most outside observers think not, believing instead that Mexico's future will be determined by that nation's internal policies. Certainly the

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Mexicans do not think so, else it would be difficult to explain their current policy toward Central America. It does not seem unreasonable in this instance to accept the Mexicans' assessment of their interests.

There remains, it is true, the broader relationship-of-interests argument. If, it runs here, the Soviet Union observes our passivity to events in our own backyard that signal the loss of American control, what conclusions might it draw about our probable passivity in other, far more difficult, areas? The argument cannot simply be dismissed. Yet its persuasiveness depends, in the final reckoning, on what we do or fail to do in areas where vital interests clearly are at stake. If we remain passive in these areas, what we do in Central America will have only marginal significance. The eagle that kills the deer in Central America will not frighten the bear in the Middle East.

It is not need that would prompt this course but want—a want, moreover, which the Soviet Union would not only accept but probably endorse, since it would be seen to help legitimize much of its own behavior. The only other coherent policy is to observe a hands-off position toward the events now occurring in Central America, a position that implies stopping military aid to El Salvador. Should further radical regimes come to power, we would accept the outcome. More, we would give them reason to maintain a normal relationship with the Soviet Union, rather than to follow in the footsteps of Cuba. Such inducement, of which the present economic aid to Nicaragua forms an example, may be seen as a mere euphemism for blackmail. I have no objection to the term. But then blackmail is a commonplace in the relations of states. Having put up with the spectacular instances of it that we have seen in the past decade, to balk here would truly be a case of straining at the gnat while swallowing the camel.

If we were instead to swallow the gnat, and perhaps a few others as well in the years to come, it would not signify that we liked this diet. It would only mean that we recognized at last that we are in a position where we can afford to view changes we do not welcome with the equanimity they deserve.

What we cannot view with equanimity is that the states of Central America enter into a relationship with the Soviet Union that resembles the relationship with Cuba. Geographical proximity has not lost its significance. At issue, then, is not whether Central America continues to form a part of this nation's sphere of influence. Instead, it is the nature of the influence we should seek to exercise within our sphere and how best such influence

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may be preserved. It is between those who define our sphere of influence to include the internal order of states, and those who do not, that there is a clear difference in principle. That difference ought not to be confused with the preeminently practical judgment on the policy best suited to prevent the kind of intrusion by an outside power we should clearly aim to prevent.

In the Central American case, our claims are rooted in geography and history. If these claims ought not to extend to the internal order of states here, there is still less reason for extending them elsewhere in the Third World. The strictures earlier made with respect to the Persian Gulf do not contradict this conclusion. In the Gulf, we are necessarily concerned with internal order because this issue cannot be separated from a vital interest in access to oil supplies. The same vital interest bids us oppose the extension of Soviet influence in that region. Were it not for this interest we could view changes in the internal order and, for that matter, the extension of Soviet influence, with relative detachment. Not with utter indifference, but with the relative detachment that holds out the best promise of avoiding the excesses which have characterized American foreign policy in the past.

XI

There is no fate that decrees we must repeat these excesses of concern and withdrawal. Having experienced the consequences of both in the past two decades, we ought to have learned that the result of both is to lead to the insolvency of policy. A period of withdrawal and of passivity has come to an end. If it is to be succeeded by a period of an America everywhere resurgent and activist, we will only risk jeopardizing interests that are critical to the nation's security and well-being.

The restoration of those interests will prove no small task. Once done, the great object of American foreign policy ought to be the restoration of a more normal political world, a world in which those states possessing the elements of great power once again play the role their power entitles them to play. In the case of our principal allies, this disparity between latent and actual power has, if anything, grown rather than diminished. If not substantially reduced, the disparity is almost certain to lead to still greater difficulty in alliance relationships, and this quite apart from the manner in which America conducts her foreign policy.

For the principal difficulty that characterizes alliance relationships today goes much deeper than issues of style or even of

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substance. It reflects instead the frustration, and resentment, of those who are now able to assume responsibility for their security but have yet to do so. If they were at long last to do so, the political world as we know it today would be transformed. A third of a century after World War II, that transformation is surely long overdue.

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Claudia Wright

IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR

On U.S. Army maps the area of Iraq and Iran on either side of the Shatt al Arab River is shown in white, indicating uninhabited marsh and swamp. A warning indicates that "border demarcations are subject to international dispute." It was here, at the tip of the Gulf, variously called Persian or Arabian, that a British expeditionary force first landed in 1914 to drive the Turks from Mesopotamia, and to establish ultimately the independent state of Iraq as it is known today. The expedition's political adviser, Sir Percy Cox, warned his superiors that "the position of our ships in the [river], from an international point of view, is undoubtedly a weak one."

Cox's warning echoes ironically through more than 60 years of disputes between Iraq and Iran, together with Turkey, the European powers, the United States and the United Nations, all of which have been involved in the contention. For in this inhospitable part of the world, neither geography nor international law permits any power to feel secure. So long as that has been the case, military conflict was bound to recur—with ever-increasing seriousness as the oil became more precious and the military forces on each side of the Shatt al Arab grew more potent.

Iraqi maps of the region show Iraqi territory in pale gray and Iran in dark gray. But a large zone, corresponding roughly to the Iranian province of Khuzistan (or Arabistan as it is termed in Iraq), is marked out separately in alternating shades of gray. With a population of ethnic (and linguistic) Arab stock that has coexisted uneasily with the Iranian majority of the country, the area has been a battleground for ambitious regional potentates since ancient times. The Shatt al Arab river is both a natural border line for Khuzistan, between modern Iraq and Iran, and a strategically vital means of access for the cities on both sides.

For Iraq, the Shatt al Arab is only one of its geographic

Claudia Wright is the Washington correspondent of the London *New Statesman*, and a frequent writer on Arab affairs, traveling often in the area. Her report, "Iraq—New Power in the Middle East," appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1979/80.

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

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vulnerabilities in the area. Another feature of the map is that, between Fao and Umm Qasr, Iraq has less than 50 miles of coastline on the Gulf—most of it unusable for shipping. The main port, Basra, is nearly twice that distance away from the Gulf, up the Shatt al Arab, and even in the best of times it has a three-month cargo bottleneck. Umm Qasr, the Iraqi naval base, lies on the border with Kuwait, and can only be reached by sea through a narrow passage between the Iraqi shore and Kuwaiti islands. The approach to Fao and the entrance to the Shatt estuary is commanded by Iranian artillery and naval posts on and around Abadan island.

From the Iraqi point of view, hostile hands are always potentially around the country's throat. Like Jordan at the Gulf of Aqaba, Iraq at the Persian Gulf must share its access to the sea with a non-Arab state and traditional enemy. Iraq is also the only member of OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) whose oil exports cannot reach the outside world without crossing foreign territory in the north (Syria, Lebanon and Turkey), or without coming so close to Iranian territory in the south that it cannot be said to enjoy territorial security at all for its principal means of survival.

This simplified geopolitical picture of the area illustrates Iraq's strategic predicament—it cannot ensure domestic prosperity without relying heavily on the goodwill and cooperation of a large number of neighbors who depend on Iraq substantially less than Iraq needs to rely on them. When it is internally weak, it must make friends with as many of its neighbors as it can. And when, as recently, Iraq has grown stronger, its ability to put pressure on one neighbor is limited by the willingness of the others to support it or remain neutral. Iraq's international calculations are also complicated by having to deal at once with so many bordering states, at least three of which have recently threatened to disintegrate into conditions of internal chaos and civil war—Syria, Turkey and Iran. (Lebanon, which used to be an active trading partner and port outlet for Iraqi oil, also remains in a parlous condition.) In military terms, Iraq must also calculate that it is within range of fighter-bombers and ballistic missiles from Israel, as well as of U.S. aircraft operating from NATO bases in Crete and Turkey. The Soviets are also within striking distance.

Thus, Iraq's calculation of the tactics necessary to protect its oil resources can easily be thrown off by external developments it can scarcely anticipate, let alone control. There is a strong incentive

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to take preventive measures, diplomatically, economically and militarily.

II

The war which began in September was thus a rational, though not inevitable, result of Iraqi security concerns that were heightened by the deterioration of the Shah's authority from early 1978 onward and the advent of the revolutionary regime in Iran.

In October of 1978, the anxious Shah told Baghdad he wanted Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini evicted from Najaf, where he had been in exile since his expulsion from Iran in 1964. Baghdad did as the Shah requested, indicating just how compliant Iraq was even at this relatively late stage in the country's recovery from the Kurdish war. That war had ended with the Algiers Pact of 1975, in which Iraq had agreed to trade its claims in the Shatt al Arab for Iranian assurances to end support for the Kurdish insurgency.

In February 1979, the Iraqi government welcomed the Khomeini revolution. But relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly after the middle of the year, when remarks by Iranian clerics renewed traditional Iranian claims to Bahrain, and urged the Shi'ite communities of the Arab Gulf states to rebel against their ruling regimes. Iraq itself reportedly arrested dozens of Shi'ites in Najaf for planning demonstrations, and several were executed.

In October, following Shi'ite demonstrations in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein issued his first attack on Iran, warning that "Iraq's capabilities can be used against any side which tries to violate the sovereignty of Kuwait or Bahrain or harm their people or land. This applies to the entire Gulf." On the conditions for Iraq's relations with Iran, he added: "The Shah occupied three Arab islands in the Gulf. If the revolution is an Islamic one, then why have they not returned the islands to their Arab owners?" That same month, Baghdad's ambassador in Lebanon told *An-Nahar* (Beirut) that Tehran "should restore all Iraq's rights in Shatt al Arab by voluntarily agreeing to amend the Algiers agreement and deal with the Iranian nationalities with a spirit . . . which rejects fanaticism and persecution."

After attacks by Iranian Revolutionary Guards on the Iraqi Embassy in Tehran and the Khurramshar Consulate, and the occupation of the Iraqi Consulate in Kermanshah, negotiations between the two sides were abandoned, and there was a steady escalation in the number and seriousness of border incidents.

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In retrospect, the fall of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's government in November 1979, and its replacement by a Revolutionary Council dominated by clerical factions, was the turning point in Iraqi-Iranian relations. With Bazargan's removal the Iraqis lost confidence that the Iranian revolution would be either sufficiently stable internally or flexible externally to contemplate renegotiating the 1975 border agreement. Worse, some factions within the Council seemed intent on destabilizing the border with Iraq to divert public attention from Iran's own provincial conflicts, and to make Iraq appear responsible for instigating the Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Baluchis and Khuzistan Arabs with whom Tehran would not compromise.

It was also apparent that while Bazargan and his Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Yazdi, could rely at one time on Khomeini's support for negotiating concessions to Iran's agitated provincial minorities, the new President, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, was much too dependent on the clerics to do so, and was also willing to go along with the clerical forces' plans for instigating Shi'ite subversion across the Gulf and in Iraq. Looking at the balance of the political forces in Tehran at the end of 1979, Iraq decided it would be better off with the return of some of the anti-Khomeini forces in exile, led (nominally at least) by former Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar.

In the first half of 1980, Iraq and Iran launched cross-border raids, artillery duels, aerial dogfights, and political assassination attempts against each other. Iraqi "agents" were regularly blamed in the Iranian media for the rising toll of violence in Iranian Kurdistan and Khuzistan. Yet Iraqi officials still indicated privately that they expected to resolve their differences with Khomeini.

Two events then began the countdown to war. One was the attempt by U.S. military forces on April 24 to rescue the hostages taken in the American Embassy five months before. The attempt suggested to the Iraqis that the United States would either try again, with far greater military force, or negotiate the release of the hostages on terms that would substantially restore American support to the Iranian military.

Then, on July 10, Iranian authorities appear to have foiled an attempted coup by elements of the Air Force, based near Tehran, and by army, navy and police officers in Khuzistan, with the apparent aim of installing Bakhtiar in power. There is no telling what role the Iraqis played, but Iraqi officials acknowledge Bakhtiar as a "friend" and broadcasts on his behalf beamed at Iran

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had been conducted for months (and still are) from a source located in Iraq.

Once the plot had failed, in any event, Iraq had little hope that the Iranian opposition within the country was strong enough to topple the Khomeini regime. Help would have to come from the outside.

By this point, too, Iraq calculated that in military terms Iran was weaker locally and more isolated internationally than had ever been the case before. In the past, border demarcation disputes between Iraq and Iran had always involved the European powers, Turkey and Russia—and in 1975, indirectly, the United States—and the outcome had generally favored the stronger of the two sides, backed by the strongest of the outsiders. Now Russia and the United States were out of the play, although each might come back at any time. With central authority apparently disintegrating in Iran, and a purge in July of the remnants of the regular Iranian armed forces in Khuzistan, the opportunity presented itself for Iraq to turn the clock back to the favorable border situation it had enjoyed from its independence to the unfavorable agreements of 1937 and finally 1975—and in the process to humble the revolutionary regime, destroy any appeal it might have for Iraq's Shi'ites, and quite possibly create conditions in which it would be overthrown.

III

But there was one further requirement. Baghdad had to be confident that a military move against Iran would be actively supported—or not opposed—by Iraq's neighbors and allies. That condition would in turn put a limit on whatever territorial objectives an Iraqi assault on Iran might aim at.

In February 1980, Saddam Hussein made a pitch for broad Arab support (excluding Egypt) for his "pan-Arab charter." Essentially that offered promises of noninterference in each other's internal affairs and exacted commitments to reduce and eliminate superpower influence in the region. Most of the Arab states readily, if half-heartedly, supported the charter. It did not amount to a plan of action against Iran, however.

Iran presented a different problem for each of the Arab states. On the positive side, most Arabs were initially relieved at the elimination of the Shah and justifiably optimistic that the Islamic revolutionary regime would actively support the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Arab cause against Israel. But

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in the year following the revolution it had done very little.

Once the Revolutionary Council had taken over from Bazargan, the Gulf rulers quickly felt threatened by the combination of sectarian appeals and criticism of their dependence on the United States that were beamed at them from Tehran. It was also obvious that none of them could expect to negotiate with Tehran on the highly contentious issues of territorial rights and limits in the Gulf itself.

The stakes there were far greater than the islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb, which the Shah had taken from the Emirs of Sharja and Ras al-Khaima in 1972. Virtually every one of the Arab Gulf states had had territorial disputes over the past 20 years with the Shah's regime. Since 1934 the Pahlavi regime had asserted a right to a 12-mile "zone of maritime supervision." Then in 1959 Iran extended its territorial waters to the 12-mile limit. The Arabs were in no position to contest the claim militarily. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Shah was also able to extract agreements from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Dubai and Sharja dealing with the demarcation of the continental shelf, fishing zones, and island sovereignty—many of them vague on the exact location of boundary lines and of doubtful legality on the limits of sovereignty.[1] And until he formally renounced his claim in 1970, the Shah had threatened Bahrain with annexation.

While the Gulf sheikhs had complained that the Iranian protectorate of the Gulf was an unwarranted exaction, they were content with the dividend it provided—the Shah would not plot with their opponents to overthrow them. The Shah's successors, however, decided to expand the Pahlavi protectorate, at the same time as they canceled the dividend and called on the sheikhs' traditional Shi'ite opponents to topple them.

In May 1980, the Crown Prince of Kuwait and the King of Jordan visited Baghdad for talks. They were followed closely by the Emir of Ras al-Khaima and an emissary from the President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Baghdad's emissaries were unusually busy traveling in the area at the same time. The purpose, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Taha Yasin Ramadan, said privately at the time, was "to put backbone" in the Arab states. Then, on August 5, President Saddam Hussein made his first state visit to Saudi Arabia.

[1] See Charles G. MacDonald, "Iran's Strategic Interests and the Law of the Sea," *Middle East Journal*, Summer 1980, pp. 302–21.

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The ostensible purpose of the visit was to discuss the Israeli decision to complete the annexation of Jerusalem. But in the communiqué and in Iraq's follow-up consultations with the other Gulf states, the emphasis was on "the present situation in the Islamic world," the euphemism adopted for Iran. Toward the Iranian threat, the Hussein-Khalid communiqué "enjoin[ed] that peripheral differences should be discarded and ranks should be closed."

For some time the Iraqi approach to Riyadh has been couched in terms intended to attract the Arab nationalism of the younger, secular-educated members of the royal household and government technocrats, without antagonizing the equilibrium of the ruling circle commanded by King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd. The result of the August negotiations was that in public the Saudi position was one of benevolent acquiescence in Iraqi plans. In private—though expressed in public by the Saudis' acknowledged spokesmen in the Gulf, the Qataris—the position was more active support covering a range of Iraqi requests in the event of war with Iran.

But until the war began and Iraq pressed its requests, no one in Riyadh or elsewhere in the Gulf could be sure which way the Saudi leadership would spring, publicly or privately. Despite considerable coaxing from Baghdad, the Saudis remained anxious that an open conflict between the Arabs and Iran would provide new opportunities for the Soviet Union—in Iran, as it continued to deteriorate, and in Iraq, if it got tied down in a costly war. To guard against that contingency, Riyadh believed it essential to retain its "American option"—the possibility of an American intervention on the Saudis' behalf—whatever the other Arabs thought.

Jordan's position was more straightforward, by a fraction. King Hussein was not as sensitive about either the Americans or the Russians as Khalid. He had rejected the Camp David framework, and Washington's aid inducements were of diminishing value beside the expanding economic ties between Jordan and Iraq. Port, transportation, banking and investment links have grown rapidly, and have buttressed Jordan's need for border stability with Syria. In the foreseeable future, Jordanian support for a pan-Arab stand against Iran, with the risks and costs underwritten by the Iraqis, appeared in Amman to be a reasonable bargain.

Iraq's proposals evolved through the midsummer negotiations into a plan for stepwise escalation of pressure on Tehran. Although the Arabs felt certain the Iranians would not agree to renegotiate

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any of the Shah's agreements, there was a strong desire to give them every opportunity to do so. Iraq was committed to a preemptive war and relatively indifferent to the reaction of Iraqi Shi'ites or public response abroad. It agreed with its allies that only after all efforts to negotiate with Iran had been exhausted would it strike across the border militarily. Even then, Iraq undertook to limit military action while offering negotiations. An all-out invasion of Iran was never contemplated. The plan to capture Khuzistan on which these Arab nations agreed was proposed as the last stage in an escalation, for which Iranian intransigence would appear responsible in the Arab and Western worlds.

Baghdad also had to reckon with attitudes that could shift once the assault on Khuzistan had begun. Emirate officials expressed concern that if the Iraqi forces appeared to be digging in for a very long occupation of Khuzistan, Iranian propaganda might succeed in convincing the Arab Shi'ites of the Gulf that a "satanic" Saddam Hussein was indeed planning to annex the province and overthrow Iranian Shi'ism. In that event, Gulf support for Iraq, among the masses if not among the ruling elites, might evaporate.

The paradoxical combination of Iranian expansionism and Islamic radicalism had caught many Arabs off balance. Even as the expansionist threat drove the Gulf sheikhs to make common cause with Iraq—which had itself been no less of a threat in the past—the call for revolution led many of the sheikhs' Arab opponents to side with Khomeini. Thus Iraq's decision to build an entente with the sheikhs and the House of Saud sparked criticism from the Arab Left, particularly from the Palestinian movement. This criticism came on top of at least two years of bitter fighting on other issues between Iraqi-supported factions and others in the PLO, and between Baathists and supporters of the Iraqi Communist Party in Lebanon and South Yemen.

Finally, Syria occupied a special place in Iraq's calculations. Since Saddam Hussein's 1979 purge of several high-ranking colleagues in the Revolutionary Command Council and Cabinet, there had been open rhetorical warfare and some subterranean violence between the Iraqi and Syrian branches of the Baath Party.[2] These rifts helped motivate and focus Arab criticism of

[2] That conflict had sectarian overtones because the Assad regime in Damascus is predominantly Shi'ite (Alawite), while its opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Iraqi leadership are predominantly Sunni. On the significance of these sectarian issues in Iraq and Syria, see my "Iraq—New Power in the Middle East, "*Foreign Affairs*, winter 1979/80, and Nikolaos van Dam, "Middle Eastern Political Cliches: 'Takriti' and 'Sunni rule' in Iraq: 'Alawi rule' in Syria—A Critical Appraisal," *Orient Zeitschrift des Deutchen Orient-Instituts*, January 1980.

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Iraq's entente with the Gulf sheikhs without being able to influence it much. But had President Hafez al-Assad's strength not been divided between Lebanon and guard duty in areas of serious opposition at home, Iraq would have been obliged to weigh more seriously the possibility of Syrian opposition to war with Iran.

This opposition was anticipated when in August the Iraqi authorities expelled the Syrian mission in Baghdad. The Iraqi mission in Damascus was evicted immediately afterward, and when Aziz Rashid Aqrawi, a high-ranking Iraqi Kurd, defected from Baghdad to Damascus, he was given a platform by the Syrians to attack Saddam Hussein for "leading the reactionary Arab axis to compensate U.S. imperialism for what it lost as a result of the Iranian revolution's triumph." Reports appearing in the Western press at the same time suggested that Syrian military aid and advisers had been sent to Iran.[3]

In their mutual interest, Damascus and Baghdad have always put limits on their attacks on each other. About one-third of Iraq's oil exports flow into the Syrian refineries and port terminals of Homs and Baniyas, representing a profitable source of Syria's export earnings. Syria's dams and irrigation policies can control the water of the Euphrates on which Iraq depends for its dates and other crops. Iraqi financial aid is a vital element in Syria's current budget, and Syrian defense expenditures produce a useful defensive screen between Iraq and Israel.

Early in the fighting, the Syrian government announced that it had agreed to an Iraqi request to reopen the oil pipeline that crosses Syria to Tripoli, Lebanon—closed down in 1976 by Iraq after a dispute over transit fees. Officials also said they would facilitate oil shipments through the main Syrian pipeline to Baniyas once the Kirkuk pumping facilities had been replaced after Iranian bombing. Although Iraq has begun to shift much of its import trade to the Jordanian port of Aqaba, apparently no

[3] It is difficult to assess how far Syrian support for the Tehran regime had gone. Iraqi officials have claimed that Soviet-made military equipment, supplied from Damascus or Tripoli, and Syrian and Libyan personnel were captured during the early fighting in Iran. Syria and Libya have denied these allegations.

What apparently happened was that the Syrians and Libyans agreed to provide small arms for use by the Revolutionary Guards in border areas, particularly Khuzistan, where the American-supplied regular Iranian army was undermanned. The July purge of the officer corps in Khuzistan also led the Iranians to request Syrian and Libyan advisers and instructors, who were dispatched in small numbers and not told exactly where they were going. According to the Syrians, the "gesture" was made because of a long-term hope that Iranian strength could be revived and turned eventually against Israel. The outbreak of war caught Syrian and Libyan personnel in Iran in a position from which they could not withdraw—they were not there on Syrian orders to fight Iraq.

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obstacles were put in the way of movement of Iraqi goods through Tartus and Latakia, which are important entry points from Europe for machine imports and food headed for Baghdad.

As the war actually developed, Iraqi fear of attacks on the pumping stations—plus the fact that it had ample fuel and financial reserves—caused Iraq to suspend all its oil flow, including the trans-Syria pipeline. But Syria apparently remains willing to have that line operate, if Iraq should decide to re-open it—as it did in mid-November for the northern pipeline to Turkey. (Bazra has of course been blockaded by the war, and oil exports through Gulf terminals have been virtually eliminated at least for the duration of the fighting.)

The Syrian-Libyan merger proposal, announced in September just before the war, and the signing of the Syrian-Soviet friendship treaty which followed soon after, have had little influence on Iraqi calculations—the former because Libya has virtually no influence with the Arab states (little to begin with in Syria), the latter because the Syrian-Soviet treaty simply formalizes a de facto relationship that has been in effect for years, in which neither signatory puts a great deal of confidence. The treaty has not, in Damascus' view, brought about a change in the "quality" of its relationship with Moscow.

Rhetorical attacks and the breaking of diplomatic relations are therefore about the limit of what Syria and Libya have put up against the Iraqi move into Iran. The links between these Arab states can be mended as invisibly as Libya's Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi's break with Yassir Arafat and the Fatah faction of the PLO in December 1979, and in the meantime the mutual recriminations will have about the same nuisance value.

In sum, Iraqi diplomacy during 1980 created an Arab entente that brought together Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the smaller Gulf states in support of Iraq taking military action against Iran. These nations were in general support of the Iraqi objectives of rectifying the territorial problems of the Shatt al Arab, working toward return of the islands Iran had seized, and humbling the Iranian regime so that it would no longer be capable of disruption in the Gulf. But there were also limits to their support: none wished to see the war widened, nor had any faced up to the possibility of a prolonged war or sustained Iraqi occupation of Khuzistan. It was an important diplomatic achievement for Iraq to generate this degree of support, but it was not without limits or conditions as the war might develop.

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IV

Iraq's initial war plan was as simple as the classic siege tactics of ancient Mesopotamia. It was to destroy Iran's oil sources, refineries and transportation routes, and by cutting these off from the rest of the country to put the political regime in Tehran in a vise from which neither it nor the Iranian people could break free. Iraqi military actions were also designed to drive Iranian civilians (ethnic Arabs in Khuzistan) from the battlefield and not make them casualties. And, in keeping with the hope or expectation of political change in Iran in which the Iranian Army might play a constructive role, the Iraqis consistently sought to minimize close contact with the Iranian regulars and to distinguish between them and Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards.[4] Finally, the Iraqi tactics sought to reduce their own casualties, in particular by making maximum use of artillery and avoiding frontal infantry assaults.

In their first move, which began on September 9, the Iraqis pushed across the central border closest to Baghdad, capturing an area from Qasr-i-Shirin to Ilam, and neutralizing the Iranian air base at Kermanshah. This eliminated a persistent source of artillery attack and strafing raids, and added some protection to Baghdad. Before the Iraqi move, the foreign ministry in Baghdad called on Iran to withdraw from the border zone it contended the Shah had conceded to Iraqi sovereignty. The Iranians refused to respond, and the day before the assault, Iraq warned that its attack was imminent. There was still no response.

In their second move, the Iraqis crossed the Shatt al Arab in an assault on the key cities and oil installations of Khuzistan, from Dizful in the north to Ahwaz, and against Khurramshar and Abadan in the south. Once again, Iraq claims to have attacked only after Iranian commanders had begun fighting on Iraqi vessels in the Shatt and on Iraqi positions on the western bank. Saddam Hussein's announcement on September 17, revoking the 1975 demarcation of the Shatt borderline, followed a similar statement by General Fallahi, the acting chief of the Iranian general staff. The escalation by both sides went almost exactly according to the Iraqi plan.

After some initial successes, the Iraqi offensive appeared to bog down, and enthusiastic claims of the Iraqi information services that towns had been captured were repeatedly confounded by

[4] A typical example of Iraqi battlefield propaganda is reported as saying: "Men of the Iranian Army are asked to raise their weapons upside down when the Iraqi Army advances. This is because you are not our objective; Khomeini's guards are our objective. We know you have been harmed by Khomeini's guards and that you have been insulted and humiliated."

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later reports of continued resistance. Those Western reporters who looked for a *blitzkrieg*, German or Israeli style, registered their disappointment, together with the judgment that Iraqi military commanders had underestimated Iranian resistance, or failed to maintain their momentum. They missed the classic Clausewitzian design, to which Iraq's senior officials constantly adhered in their interviews—the war was an extension of the politics of border negotiations by means of a military siege.

By mid-November, the essential objectives of military action had largely been achieved, though at a cost in casualties undoubtedly greater than had been anticipated. Iranian resistance was persistent, and the Iranian air force turned out to be capable, for a time, of damaging attacks on Iraqi oil facilities. But the main Iraqi military aims had been met by the capture of Khurramshar and the investing of Abadan, and Iraqi forces were laying siege to Ahwaz and were in a position to threaten the capture of Dizful.

Moreover, the siege of Khuzistan and the rapid exhaustion of manpower and fuel for Iranian armor and air forces put Iraq within easy reach of the road and rail links that connected Tehran to the rest of the country and to Bandar Abbas, on the southern end of the Gulf, which was the only Iranian port open to shipborne imports of fuel, food and spare parts from the West. Baghdad could choose to suspend further military operations or expand them, depending on how Iran chose to act. Even if Iran opened up an air corridor into Tehran for arms and other supplies, the Iraqi air force was in a position to interdict the flow before it reached the capital, or as soon as it began the road or rail journey south toward the front. On its own, Iran could not manage either an air or shipborne resupply effort large enough to initiate a credible counterattack in Khuzistan.

But Iraqi military action clearly failed, at least through mid-November, in obtaining the political results Saddam Hussein had hoped for. The regime in Iran held together, with a surge of national unity overshadowing the continued jockeying for power between the Islamic Revolutionary Party and the more moderate forces associated with Bani-Sadr. (As this is written, that struggle appears to be going clearly in favor of the IRP.) And above all the regime has showed no sign of readiness to renegotiate any of the border problems.

On the contrary, the initial Iranian response was to accuse Iraq of promoting the escalation of border conflict into open warfare in the interests of both Israel and the United States. In response to several efforts to arrange mediation through the United Nations

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and the Islamic Conference, the Iranian position was unanimously and adamantly negative. While there continued to be signs of division among the political factions in Tehran on this, as well as on the issue of the American hostages, the pressure of the Iraqi assaults did not allow any subtlety in the Iranians' negotiating position. Their condition for opening talks was an unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces to within the borders observed since the 1975 agreement.

In the face of this implacable Iranian position, the Iraqis were able to convey more apparent flexibility. They accepted third-party mediation from the Nonaligned Movement, and offered a cease-fire in place if the Iranians would reciprocate. They negotiated the evacuation of foreign nationals trapped by the fighting between the lines or in occupied territory.

More specifically, Iraq's stated terms for negotiations are an agreement to a new border treaty to restore Iraqi sovereignty to the whole of the Shatt al Arab waterway—in effect, a reversion to the pre-1937 status—and the pledge of nonintervention in each other's affairs. It has been acknowledged by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Dr. Hammadi, that the complex issues of demarcations in the Gulf and the sovereignty of the Gulf Islands could "wait until later."

Yet there remains a fundamental doubt as to what Iraqi objectives may have been, or may now become. Although its actions to date are consistent with the objective of using its territorial gains to put political pressure on Iran for border rectification in the Shatt al Arab and elsewhere, those actions also put Iraq in position not only to take most of Khuzistan and hold it indefinitely, but conceivably to dismember and annex it, sponsor Arab dissidents to establish an autonomous administration, and thus cut Iran off permanently from its oil resource.

Before the war, Minister Hammadi, when asked (by this writer) whether any part of Khuzistan was claimed as Iraqi territory, responded, "We have no territorial claims in Iran." Similar statements were made in October by top Iraqi officials, but by the end of the month First Deputy President Taha Yasin Ramadan, asked what would become of Iran's oil once Iraqi forces had captured Abadan and the surrounding region, responded: "It will become Iraqi oil until a solution is found. Arabistan's oil will be Iraqi as long as Tehran refuses to negotiate."

So the situation seemed in late November to have reached an impasse, with the internal political dynamics of both countries set firmly against any compromise. Unless Iran received some new

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and clear form of encouragement from the outside, Baghdad was in a position, by the onset of winter, to let weather and economic deprivation take their physical and political toll in Iran, and in the meantime to hold on to its gains or slowly extend them.

Could something happen to change the balance? This depends on the postures of the two superpowers, to which we now turn.

V

There is no evidence that despite its long-established ties with the Soviet Union, Iraq had Soviet help or encouragement to act. To judge from an unusual pattern of surveillance-satellite launchings on August 26 and September 29, the Soviets may have had advance warning of Iraqi intentions, but they were unwilling or unable to do anything about them. There were no reports in the first two months of the war of a significant Soviet or Eastern bloc resupply effort on Iraq's behalf. Tariq Aziz, a Deputy Prime Minister, flew to Moscow on September 22, but the purpose of his visit was to brief Iraq's Eastern allies, not, according to Aziz, to seek help. Given the careful preparations and stockpiling in which Iraq had engaged before going to war, it seems evident that Iraq has not been dependent on continued Soviet military supply lines, although it has needed civilian supplies that have come through various routes, including the use of Aqaba in Jordan.[5]

Conversely, there have been reports of Moscow's willingness to tilt in Iran's direction. But while it is in the U.S.S.R.'s interest to increase its influence with Tehran, it is hardly likely to make an abrupt move that risks turning the majority of Arabs, including both Iraq and Yemen, against it. Whatever trickle of arms may have come from Soviet-related sources (such as North Korea), it has not been of consequence.

It is possible that the Iraqi initiative caught the Kremlin almost as unprepared as the White House, and was no more welcome. For more than a year before the Afghanistan invasion and in the year since then, the Soviets have appeared to pursue a very cautious approach in their Arab relations. The visit by Syria's President Assad to Moscow in November 1979 ended prematurely because Assad reportedly felt snubbed by Brezhnev and because Moscow would not agree to Syria's requests for advanced elec-

[5] On November 15, Tariq Aziz paid a second visit to Moscow. While this visit may have included an explanation of Iraq's military supply situation, it does not appear that anything more than small spot shortages have yet arisen or that the Soviet role has changed.

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tronic countermeasures equipment and anti-aircraft missile systems for use against Israeli aircraft. Similar requests by Yassir Arafat and the PLO have also been turned down. Advanced Soviet aircraft and tanks shipped to Syria were kept under the close control of Soviet military advisers.

In Iraq's case there have been few signs of change in a relationship with the Soviet Union that Saddam Hussein has characterized as "a real rather than a merely formal relationship." Just as Iraq has criticized Soviet policy in the past—for the buildup of military installations in Yemen and for aid to the Ethiopian regime's war against the Eritrean Liberation Front—official condemnation of the Soviet move into Afghanistan was unqualified and unanimous. Senior Iraqi officials were divided, however, in their assessment of long-range Soviet designs for the region. One RCC member, who would not talk for attribution, said in May that "Soviet strategy aims at Iran, Pakistan, and then to take the Arabian Gulf region under their control. Arab oil is a serious issue in Soviet strategy." In this line of thinking, the Iraqi move in Iran is a preemptive strike against Soviet ambitions, as much as anyone else's.

But on the level of economic ties, there is no doubt about Soviet-Iraqi closeness. In 1979, Soviet exports to Iraq reportedly totaled $1.77 billion. This figure would put the Soviet Union ahead of all other countries as Iraq's major source of imports. While Iraq's oil sales to the U.S.S.R. appear to have dropped in 1979 to 70,000 barrels per day, down more than 40 percent from the 1978 level, its oil sales to Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, which can no longer get the same level of oil supplies from their own wells or from the Soviet Union, continued to rise.[6]

The Iraqi-Iranian conflict comes on top of several other regional problems facing the Kremlin. Not only has the situation in Afghanistan failed to show marked improvement from the Soviet point of view, but intensive diplomatic and economic efforts directed toward Turkey and Greece have failed to dissuade the leaders of either government from easing their differences, signing new defense pacts with the United States, and moving away from the independent, nonaligned position toward which both countries had appeared to be heading for some time.

[6] In November 1979, Iraq and the Soviet Union concluded a new agreement providing for Soviet assistance in oil-field development, and for a "new program that insures the availability of Soviet petroleum equipment and spare parts to the Iraqi government."

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In these circumstances it would be understandable if the Kremlin preferred to stay its hand, watch the progress of the war, and avoid having to choose between two countries, which, unlike Somalia and Ethiopia, have a direct impact on the Soviets' territory and economic welfare. The Iraqi military tactics have prolonged the Kremlin's hesitation and perhaps stimulated some impatience. Calculated ambiguity is likely to remain the most profitable course for the Kremlin to follow. The present balanced Soviet position has avoided having to choose, and has also avoided—at least to this point—any serious complications in the Soviet relationship with Syria or as between the various Arab states. The Soviet position with the Arab nations has neither been advanced nor significantly impaired.

Yet as the situation develops the Soviet Union may see opportunities to play a role in bringing peace. Through its strong economic and other ties to Iraq, the U.S.S.R. might be in a position to offer further assistance to Iraq with the express or implicit (but not publicized) suggestion that Iraq withdraw from Khuzistan. And then, using the major Soviet advantage of being able to communicate privately with Iranian leaders, the Soviets might depict their action as one that assisted Iran. It is even conceivable that the Soviet Union might envisage being included in some form of mediation commission, which would have the effect of furthering its status in the whole Middle East.

Further down the line, there is the question of what will happen in Iran in terms of a successor regime. While it is too early to speculate on the possibilities here, the Soviet Union can never lose sight of one of the major stakes in the Gulf—whether a future Iranian regime will be oriented toward the Left and toward the Soviet Union, or whether it might move in a pro-Western direction. In a situation where hostilities had ceased—even though there had been no peace agreement—the Soviets would undoubtedly seek to use every avenue of influence to maximize the former possibility.

VI

The Iraqi decision to go to war with Iran, backed by a solid Arab entente, with the aim of crippling Iran militarily and eliminating its political dominance of the region once and for all—this was not a move that a Washington Administration, preoccupied with internal and external *communist* threats to Iran,

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could anticipate or readily cope with.[7] In his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, President Carter had warned that "an attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." The Iraqi-Iranian conflict clearly threatened the oil flow of the Persian Gulf and in that sense endangered vital U.S. interests, but with such traditional American friends as the Saudis, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan in support, it could hardly be characterized as "outside interference."

In its enthusiasm for pressing the merits of the Camp David accords on a reluctant Arab world, Washington had been slow to spot Iraq's role in building an Arab consensus behind both the opposition to Camp David and the eventual strike against Iran. Once this began, the U.S. posture at the outset appeared to be evenhanded, with no blaming of Iraq and a steady rhetorical and private emphasis on stopping the fighting as quickly as possible and preventing it from spreading. One senior American Senator is reported to have said: "This is one war we do not need to be involved in."

But the problems of American policy, even in the first phase of the war, were not that easy. If the war had spread to the lower Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz—the lifeline that serves not only the West but many developing nations—it could have threatened tanker traffic at least to the point of making insurance rates prohibitive. Such action by Iraq was hardly conceivable in light of its ties to the Gulf oil-producing states dependent on the Strait. But it was thought in Washington that Iran might lash out in some fashion, or that some provocative action might be taken by third parties.

The U.S. and Western response apparently was to increase naval forces in the area on the basis of bilateral consultations. Happily these forces were kept "over the horizon" and it does not appear that any form of convoy was ever contemplated. Any such action would surely both have divided the allies and been perceived by Iraq as a move in support of Iran, with its remaining port of Bandar Abbas on the Gulf.

In the event the waterways of the Gulf, including the Strait, have remained open. This has been due, however, to the guaran-

[7] On the dominant influence of this line of thinking, particularly on the part of the National Security Adviser, see the series of articles on U.S. policy toward Iran in *The Washington Post*, October 25–30, 1980, by Scott Armstrong.

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tees of the combatants and their respect for world needs, rather than to any real impact of the Western actions. Those actions have been largely irrelevant, although equally they have avoided the obvious pitfalls that would attend any attempt to use naval action for this purpose.

At least as serious, as it was perceived in Washington at the outset, was the danger that Iran might conduct air attacks on other Gulf states, which were supporting Iraq in political terms and were then reported briefly to be providing military aid and sanctuary for Iraqi forces (including dispersed aircraft). In late September, after a trip around Europe that had been attended by reports of other military consultations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, David Jones, arrived in Saudi Arabia. The details of the negotiations between General Jones and Saudi officials that resulted in the despatch of four AWACS (Airborne Warning and Command System) aircraft to the Saudi Gulf base at Dhahran are likely to remain obscure. A formal Saudi request was made, and Washington's response to provide an early warning and "tripwire" defense for Saudi Arabia was consistent with its neutral stance.[8]

But neither the Iraqis nor the Iranians saw the move in this light. Iraqi defense officials were concerned that the Saudis were allowing the United States to monitor Iraqi military movements and communications, but their criticism was muted. The Iranians claimed that the AWACS were providing the Saudis with intelligence on Iranian movements that was passed on to Iraq.

Although the AWACS aircraft have operated so far without incident, their deployment was a risky move. It might be remembered that in an earlier era of electronic surveillance, just before Israel invaded Syria on June 9, 1967, an American listening ship, the *U.S.S. Liberty*, was attacked in international waters off Egypt by Israeli jets. Thirty-four Americans were killed. If Iraq or Iran took the same view of the AWACS as the Israelis did of the *Liberty*, and acted as the Israeli Air Force did, would it be anticipated that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown would react as Robert McNamara did in 1967 with the statement: "These errors do occur"?

As of mid-October, the dangers of the war widening seemed to

[8] Gulf officials have later said off the record they did not believe there was a Saudi consensus in favor of the AWACS request. Prince Sultan, the Saudi Defense Minister, was clearly unenthusiastic about it in a statement made to the Riyadh newspaper, *Al-Hazirah*, on October 4. He said that "the Kingdom's security had not been threatened . . . and (we) had not requested the early-warning aircraft as a result of threats from any side. . . . We do not feel that there was any danger to our security which requires this, nor are there any threats from any quarters."

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have receded, and Washington had stuck to its evenhanded posture without serious recrimination from either side. Then, however, three weeks before the American election, it became evident that the Iranian regime might be moving seriously to settle the hostage issue. At the beginning, Iran's leaders had made the public claim that the United States had been behind the Iraqi military action. Presumably they either ceased to believe this or were persuaded that, in the more pressing situation they now faced, the hostages could be used to obtain American support.

And at that point, hardly by coincidence, U.S. spokesmen began to speak of the military conflict as an "aggression" by Iraq, and the question directly arose (through a response by President Carter himself) whether a hostage settlement might include the release of several hundred million dollars' worth of military equipment to which Iran had acquired title under the Shah. These developments added up clearly in the eyes of Iraq and other Arab nations to a "tilt" on the part of the United States in favor of Iran.

Then, on the very eve of the U.S. election, Iran finally tabled its conditions for the release of the hostages, and these were responded to as "a positive basis" by the United States. Undoubtedly, immediate U.S. acceptance of the terms would have further strengthened the Arab view of a U.S. "tilt," and this was avoided for the moment.

Nonetheless, the question of release of the military equipment still hangs heavy, and the U.S. choice is an extremely difficult one. While the equipment has a large financial value, it is not at all clear to what extent it would be helpful in continuing the war and ousting Iraq from its gains. Nor is it clear how the equipment could be moved to Iran, or whether such a move might incur specific Iraqi action against the ships or planes used. Thus, the practical question contains all manner of doubt and uncertainty in itself.[9]

Yet, even if the equipment might be of little decisive value, the

[9] For the Iranians, the most immediately useful supplies include spare parts for F-4, F-5, F-14, and C-130 aircraft, air-dropped munitions (including anti-personnel cluster bombs), tank and howitzer ammunition, and some 8,600 Dragon anti-tank missiles. The Carter Administration has been very close-mouthed on the subject of where these supplies are located and whether they would be made available at once as part of a hostage agreement; there have been suggestions in the press that only "non-lethal" items might be released. On the other hand, Iraq and other Arab nations have noted the possibility that much of this matériel can be shipped out of U.S. military stocks already in Western Europe. Shipping points from U.S. military bases are plentiful, and intelligence sources have pinpointed Greece as the most likely staging area for a major resupply effort. The practical effectiveness of this weaponry depends on whether there are enough pilots and tank crews to mount fresh assaults, whether fuel for aircraft and tanks is available, and whether reinforcements for Khuzistan can be interdicted by Iraqi action.

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symbolic impact of its release by the United States could be very great. The resolution of this issue will have an enormous effect on how Iraq and other Arab nations perceive the whole U.S. stance, not only for the future but reading backward, to the beginning of the war.

No matter how the United States hedges in further negotiations with Iran on the hostages, it is hard to visualize the predicament being avoided entirely—unless the United States manages to persuade Iran that in the present circumstances it must adhere to the kind of position it took in the India-Pakistan wars, namely that it would not send further military equipment to either side at least until hostilities ceased. Such a position, of course, could undercut not only the early release of the hostages but any possibility of the United States resuming normal relations with Iran—and thus being in a position to interpret (if not to affect), at first hand, crucial future developments in Iran. The stakes either way are very great in this choice, and it is at least fortunate in hindsight that it was not made in the emotional atmosphere of the last month of a presidential campaign.

But there is one further implication of a possible hostage settlement that has passed almost unnoticed in the United States. Inevitably, such a settlement would involve a lifting of the American embargo against Iran, in which other Western nations have participated at least to the extent of withholding any military supplies as well as large categories of civilian supplies for Iran. With the embargo lifted, Iran would almost certainly seek to increase its civilian imports, and might also attempt to acquire key spare parts and other military items from NATO nations. Again the symbolic effect of such an increased flow might be out of proportion to its practical impact—and in Iraqi eyes much of the blame would attach to the United States.

Finally, if the internal situation in Iran becomes more desperate in the months ahead, will there not be pressure for some kind of humanitarian relief effort? Could such an effort be mounted initially by other Western nations that maintain their ties with Iran, or might there be a role in such an effort for both the United States and conceivably the Soviet Union? And could it be managed in such a way as to separate humanitarian relief from support to Iran for continuing the war?

What the United States must not do, in any event, is to suppose that any action it may take on the hostage problem or by way of relief to Iran will serve to put useful pressure on Iraq to withdraw from Khuzistan. The whole sequence of American actions has

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appeared to Iraq and to the Arab states as reflecting a bias against them. The United States has no useful leverage on Iraq, and it must reckon that any actions it takes concerning Iran will be viewed with maximum suspicion by the Arab entente.

If U.S. policy is to limit damage and foster a return to political stability and economic normality, then a continued tilt toward Iran makes no sense at all—not even if it is intended to prevent the annexation of Khuzistan. The way to pursue this last objective is to encourage Iraq to withdraw. The only basis on which withdrawal can be negotiated is through the willingness of both Iraq and Iran to make concessions. But a U.S. tilt can only encourage Tehran to believe it can break the Iraqi siege, and to refuse to settle for anything less than a military victory the Prophet himself could not command in the circumstances.

Washington's apparent preference to abandon neutrality, while continuing what Iraqi and many other Arabs see as a direct military involvement in policing the Gulf, also undermines whatever interest Washington might have in dividing Iraq's Arab supporters or persuading them to pressure Baghdad for concessions and an early withdrawal. In calculating Washington's benefits, much is lost if American options and choices appear too predictable in the Middle East. Mistakes, misspoken official remarks, and false starts—in addition to the usual array of misinformation and dirty tricks on all sides—can convey the right amount of uncertainty as to which side Washington is on, and what actions it is likely to take. Much more is lost—irretrievably—if Washington behaves in a predictable and anti-Arab fashion.

Willingness to abandon the Camp David framework for a Palestine settlement, and now neutrality on the Arab claims against Iran, are the tests by which Washington's attitude toward the Arabs will be judged. The diplomatic price of a long-term accommodation between the United States and the Arabs has therefore doubled. If Washington balks again, as it has done on the Palestine negotiations, this can only harden the resolve of the Iraqi-led Arab entente to score a decisive victory in Iran.

VII

To assess the future course of the war, from its present situation, requires—as the preceding arguments suggest—an assumption as to U.S. negotiations with the Iranian regime concerning the hostages. If, as may well be the case because of the financial complications alone, those negotiations drag on for months—or if agreement is reached but the release of U.S. military equipment

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to Iran seems clearly to be delayed and on a small scale—then the repercussions of Iran receiving American support, of a "tilt" becoming in Iraqi-Arab eyes a downright intervention, will be avoided or at least minimized.

In that event, Iran will continue to stand essentially alone, probably using some of its external assets to increase the flow of civilian supplies and save the economy from falling into truly desperate straits. Short of a change of regime (unlikely unless the Ayatollah should pass from the scene)—and perhaps not even then—it remains extremely hard to visualize Iran being prepared to compromise in a way that would satisfy even Iraq's minimum demands. In a very real sense, the war aim of Iran's clerical leaders has become nothing less than the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the only event that could even for the moment restore to some degree a balance of humiliation. For at least months to come, Iran will be, if not a basket case, at least wracked by dissidence in the provinces and a continuing power struggle at the center, in which the search for scapegoats will play a large part.

How would Iraq react to a continued impasse? In domestic terms, the war has caused some disruption, excitement and loss of life, but there is little evidence yet of substantial sacrifice. If Aqaba, Latakia and Tartus remain open for imports, and the northern oil fields are returned to full operation, there is not likely to be a popular backlash against the Revolutionary Command Council or Saddam Hussein. Iranian air attacks have helped raise and sustain morale; the rotation of the popular militia for non-combatant duties in the occupied areas has limited the strain on the regular armed forces; and the activity of the newly elected National Assembly has helped to focus public opinion, reinforce the credibility of the political leadership, and maintain stability.

It should be understood that for all the false bravado, the Iraqis correctly believe that their war against Iran is the first major victory by an Arab army over a non-Arab state in modern history. Iraq's military prowess has long been the butt of Western (and Egyptian) scorn. The war against the Kurds ended in 1975 in a Pyrrhic victory, and in Iraq's brief engagements against Israel in 1967 and 1973 the results were humiliating. Iraqi pride in its present achievement should not be underestimated. Indeed, it is widely shared throughout the Arab Gulf states, where a sense of grievance against Iranian imperialism has been nursed for more than two generations.

Iraqi officials talk of their readiness to continue a protracted war "until a viable and durable political solution will have been

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found," as one senior official put the position privately. He does not yet admit that what may be durable in Iraqi eyes may not be viable in the Iranian perspective, and vice versa. First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan has indicated the time scale in which the war is viewed by the Revolutionary Command Council: "For more than one year without the population feeling any effect. We could sustain it for two years or even more by imposing a few restrictions, and our people are prepared to accept them."

There continues to be confidence among the Iraqi leadership that the political solution to the territorial disputes will follow an internal shift in Tehran. If this fails to materialize and the costs of the war sink in, there may be divisions within the leadership between those in favor of staying in place and limiting military action to the Khuzistan region, and those who favor extending the war over a wider area.

Temperamentally, Saddam Hussein is cautious and deliberative and not taken by momentary enthusiasms. He can readily restrain the battlefield optimism of his commanders in their present positions. However, if military resupply enables Iran to exact a higher casualty toll on Iraq's siege forces, or if public expectations of decisive and relatively bloodless victories find expression in the National Assembly and the ranks of the Baath Party, then Hussein will probably widen the war if he can. Ramadan, a former regular soldier and now commander of the popular militia, has answered the question of how far Iraq is prepared to go, with this warning: "We will also strike at all points of military importance within Iran. After that we will see."

But an escalation of the war from Khuzistan toward Tehran itself may deepen Iraq's entanglement without delivering the "viable and durable political solution" it seeks. More likely would be the continuation of air attacks on key targets in Iran, keeping hostilities going at a low level but without attempting to widen the territory held by Iraqi forces.

What, then, of the Arab entente which Iraq has brought into being? If the war is protracted without negotiations, Iraq will find itself in de facto occupation of territory it professes not to claim. Over time the distinction between Baghdad's original objectives and its current position may be erased, and that may encourage Arab defections from the Iraqi camp.

Iraqis are used to isolation in the Arab world, and in the past have been stolidly indifferent to their Arab critics. The geopolitical realities dictate, however, that Iraq cannot allow its relations to

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deteriorate with too many of its neighbors at once. To this point neither Saudi Arabia nor Jordan has expressed anxiety about the direction of events or the possibility that a victorious Iraq would threaten them. Equally, neither is in a position to mediate effectively—as Iraq itself did successfully in the much smaller Yemen war of early 1979. But over time there could be an influence from this quarter in favor of some degree of Iraqi withdrawal.

As for the impact of the war on relations between the Arab states and Israel, in the last two years Iraq has of course been the successful promoter of the rejection of the Camp David accords. Baghdad has maintained that the states of the Arab League are in no position to confront Israel militarily. It argued instead for strengthening the League's ability to act in concert, and for collective diplomatic and economic measures to isolate Israel, break its trade links with Europe, and sabotage the credibility on which it depends for aid in the United States and elsewhere.

In terms of these objectives, the war cuts two ways. It has solidified some of the Arab states but divided others. On balance, Saudi Arabia's current backing for Iraq is a bigger gain than the loss of Syria and Libya. And Jordan has been even more clearly in support of Iraq during the war.

Much now depends on the course pursued by the new Reagan Administration. If it abandons the Camp David framework and seeks instead to create a negotiating forum in which Jordan and the PLO might participate, and if a Labor Government were to come to power in the 1981 Israeli elections, then the focus would be heavily on Jordan. Would King Hussein, having made his commitment to support Iraq, then be in a position to negotiate on the issues of the West Bank and Gaza, in defiance of Iraq's deeply held views? One can only speculate on this; for the moment the Arab-Israeli conflict has receded from Arab attention, and the circumstances in which it might be readdressed are too uncertain for clear prediction.

But this does not mean for a moment that the burden on the U.S. relationship with the Arab states of American support for Israel will be any less than it has been for years. Even during the past year, such American actions as its resistance to PLO observers at the World Bank meeting, its holding back on tanks for Jordan and on licensing the use of American engines for naval vessels being built in Italy for Iraq, and its stalling of Saudi Arabia's request for new equipment for its F-15 aircraft—actions that in Arab eyes reflected American bias in favor of Israel and against the Arab states—have done much to further Iraq's case for an

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Arab entente. Arabs are very skeptical that a new Reagan Administration will deal fairly and equally with both sides, and the incubus of American commitments to Israel will continue to haunt whatever openings with the Arabs Washington might attempt.

Finally, there is the crucial issue of the impact of the war on oil supplies and prices. Just how serious the damage to both countries' oil facilities has been is difficult to assess and impossible to predict. Apart from the destruction of the Abadan refinery, which may never be rebuilt, aerial photographs provide no clear analysis of the extent of bomb damage to the underwater and underground oil lines, the refineries, and the petrochemical plants on either side. Both Iran's and Iraq's southern installations are estimated to require from 6 to 18 months for repairs, once the fighting stops.

The damage done to Iraqi oil fields and terminals, while not as serious as the damage inflicted on Iran, has undermined some of Iraq's leverage among the African and Indian Ocean states with whom it has lobbied hard to deny the superpowers their bases, and to adhere to a nonaligned and anti-Israel foreign policy. In the past, Iraq has been able to offer these states reliability of oil supplies, together with interest-free loans to reduce the impact of OPEC price rises. As of mid-November Iraqi oil is once more flowing in small quantities to Turkey and Western Europe through the northern outlets, but Third World clients, including major powers like India, have had to scramble.

Apart from such specific impacts, the overall loss of oil from Iraq and Iran has not yet produced a worldwide shortage, given the decisions of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (motivated in part by their entente relationship with Iraq) to raise production. But the prospect of the war dragging on, with the continuing chance of further damage to oil installations and the oil flow, has already led to anticipatory rises in spot market prices, and this could well spread as it did in 1979 after the Iranian revolution cutoffs. While it does not look at the moment as if the war would produce a third "oil shock" on the scale of those of 1973–74 and 1978–79, its effect will undoubtedly be to raise further the pace of the real oil price increases that would have come in any event.

Meanwhile, the proposal for firm and unified OPEC price policies that has been urged jointly by Saudi Arabia and Iraq is in abeyance. And with that goes any early prospect for a common OPEC strategy for indexing price rises systematically to the movement of international trade indicators and currency movements. It will take some time for the situation to settle down to the point where this key item on the agenda between producers and con-

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sumers (and the broader North-South agenda) can be tackled coherently.

VIII

Thus, the war has already had a disastrous impact on Iran and a deeply unsettling effect on Middle East stability and all that goes with it. Even in the short term, the prospect of a continuing war could produce temptations for superpower actions that would bring on some sort of confrontation.

And in the longer term, the consequences of the war could be even more devastating. The hatred left by the war in Iran—and its potential divisive effect among the Arab states—can hardly fail to sow the seeds of eventual further conflict in the area, even if the two principal actors in the war become too feeble or preoccupied to start something new.

In any circumstance, Iran faces not only a critical period of economic deprivation but also—more now than before—the longer term problem of establishing a viable regime without immense internal convulsions. Iran was weak and isolated at the start of the war, and now it is even more so—as well as inflamed with a new set of passions for revenge that can hardly find effective expression for a long time to come. Even if the Iraqis were to withdraw from Khuzistan, this would still be true, with the additional problem to be solved of restoring crude oil production there. To what extent Iran will be able to obtain foreign assistance for this remains to be seen.

What, then, does this mean for the role of the superpowers in the region? It means, above all, that while each may see short-term opportunities, these can be seized only with great accompanying risks. The sharp fault line that has now developed between Iraq and its supporters on the one hand, and Iran on the other, with little likelihood of being eased, means that anything that either superpower does on either side of that fault line risks serious negative impact on its positions and influence with those on the other side.

From the Soviet standpoint, the difficulties may be less than for the United States—because of the specific legacy of anti-American feeling both in Iran and in many Arab states—but they will be considerable. The Soviet operation in Afghanistan may benefit to some extent from Iran's preoccupation with Iraq and its own internal troubles, but this effect will not be great. Nor would the Soviets be likely to feel that they had a new and freer hand, for example, to punish Pakistan for permitting support for the Afghan

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rebels there. The Islamic Front that manifested itself last winter in denouncing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—and then in the spring denouncing both that invasion and U.S. hostage rescue attempt in Iran—was always tenuous and is now in disarray. But the Soviet Union must still reckon with substantial hostile reactions to its continued presence in Afghanistan.

The real question is whether the Soviets could improve their position in Iran without offsetting damage to their influence on the Iraqi-Arab side. Clearly a deeply troubled situation in Iran offers possibilities of some turn favorable to the Soviets—but it is too early to say whether there may not be at least an equally powerful trend in the other direction, especially if Iran sets itself to recreate a strong military establishment.

For the United States, restoring any kind of normal relations with an embittered Iran will present enormous problems. Whatever the United States does to assist Iran will have little chance of undoing the legacy of passionate anti-American feeling brought on by the past and unleashed in the last two years.

But there is a wider lesson for American policy that could be drawn from the war. In almost any circumstances, the United States would have been hard put to play a constructive role in stopping or limiting the war. But the actions taken by the United States under the Carter Doctrine—including the development of the Rapid Deployment Force and the arranging of base facilities for American forces in the area—have served to give a military flavor to American policy in the area that has greatly heightened Arab suspicions.

The plain fact is that Arab states, including those who did not support Iraq, are vehemently opposed to any attempt by the United States to act as any kind of policeman of home-grown conflicts in the Gulf. As King Hussein said in early October, the region "does not need an outside umbrella and protection for the interests of this or the other side. The peoples of the area can resort to their [own] umbrella."

This does not mean that the Arab states wish any of their own number to take on the role of Gulf policeman. The fundamental point is that there cannot be a policeman when there is no consensus on the rules for him to apply. And the Arabs believe that during the Shah's period in the role, he used it, with at least tacit American support, to assert untenable claims in Iran's favor, and that these must now be corrected.

The Carter Doctrine and the measures taken under it may indeed have some useful deterrent value vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

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However, not only have they proved irrelevant to a serious regional conflict that had no Soviet stimulus, but their military thrust has buttressed Iraq's argument to its fellow Arabs that the Carter Doctrine and the RDF were imminent threats of intervention as Saddam's pan-Arab charter defined it, and were intended against the *Arab* states.

Thus the war is being waged by Iraq, not only to disable the Khomeini regime from ever exercising the former Shah's role (under the Nixon Doctrine) as the Gulf policeman, but in part also to dissuade the United States from stepping in to play this role itself. One of the war's early lessons might therefore be that the United States should consider disavowing any application of the Carter Doctrine for this purpose.

Finally, the war illustrates that the single most important American (and allied) objective in the region, the security of oil supplies, probably cannot be protected by the United States, no matter how powerful the military force involved. Even a thick air defense probably cannot stop sneak air attacks, and early warning systems and other high technology do not prevent long-range artillery from wreaking its intended havoc. Oil fields are another case of the Vietnam War irony that, to take or hold them, you end up destroying them.

IX

In sum, this has been, and remains, much more than "just another war" in the series of regional conflicts that goes back over the last 40 years. It has already left lasting scars and a much more acute sense of the vulnerability, divisions and weakness in the area. To the West, this demonstration can only heighten already intense concern over the stability of oil supplies; to the nations of the region, intensified antagonisms have now arisen that to them will appear central. It is indeed like the pre-1914 series of conflicts and confrontations in the Balkans—with the enormous difference that the Balkans were not then vital in economic terms to the major powers involved there.

Overall, it is just conceivable that the war and its aftermath will demonstrate to both superpowers that the risks of fostering alignment within the area may be greater than the benefits. This would be a very thin silver lining. The central conclusion remains that the war has been a disaster for the region, and underlines the continuing precarious dependency of the rest of the world on the Middle East and its future.

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Michel Oksenberg

CHINA POLICY FOR THE 1980s

For nearly a decade, perhaps the single most successful foreign policy the United States has pursued has been our new relationship with the People's Republic of China. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's memoirs make clear, President Richard M. Nixon and China's leaders took bold advantage of their common adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union and terminated the Sino-American enmity which had so damaged our countries in the previous two decades. The Nixon Administration fashioned a bipartisan China policy which, despite occasional lapses, has been carefully pursued ever since.

Particularly since the formal establishment of diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979, our two nations have energetically created the framework for a mutually beneficial strategic, economic, scientific, cultural, and diplomatic relationship. Strategically, particularly in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, each nation now appears to be genuinely taking into account the views of the other, so that, when possible, our separate actions will be mutually reinforcing.

In economics, not only have claims-assets, trade, aviation, maritime, and textile agreements been signed, but the Joint Sino-American Economic Commission has now had its first meeting. Jointly headed by a Chinese Vice Premier with leadership responsibilities for economic affairs and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, it will meet periodically to devote high-level attention to emerging economic issues of mutual concern.

In the scientific domain a similar Joint Sino-American Scientific Commission, chaired jointly by the President's Adviser for Scientific Affairs and by the head of the People's Republic of China's (P.R.C.) State Scientific and Technological Commission, meets annually to survey our burgeoning official scientific exchanges. Almost every agency in the U.S. government has begun to develop

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Michel Oksenberg is currently Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan and a Research Associate at its Center for Chinese Studies. He was a member of the staff of the National Security Council, with a responsibility for matters relating to China, from January 1977 to February 1980. He is the author of *The Dragon and the Eagle* (with Robert Oxnam) and other works.

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constructive relations with its Chinese counterpart. No less than 16 agreements have now been signed involving scientific cooperation. Culturally, the International Communications Agency and the Ministry of Culture have established the basis for expanding cultural contact. And, commencing with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's visit to China in January 1980, a series of visits between our military establishments has begun to break down the suspicion and ignorance that two decades of confrontation had produced.

The private sector mirrors developments in the public sector. To cite a few examples, two-way trade for 1980 totaled nearly $4 billion, a doubling of the 1979 total. China has become one of our largest purchasers of agricultural commodities, and the United States is now China's third largest trading partner, after Japan and Hong Kong. Whereas in late 1978 few P.R.C. citizens were on American campuses, now there are over 5,000 Chinese visiting scholars and students. Indeed, the range of private activities has grown beyond the capacity of the three organizations which the U.S. government endorsed in 1971-72 to the Chinese as capable of managing unofficial relations in specific areas: the National Council on U.S.-China Trade for business; the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China for academic exchanges; and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations for cultural exchanges. Today, leading foundations, corporations, church organizations, universities, travel agencies, and so on have established their own direct ties with the Chinese. Given China's isolation of the 1960s and early 1970s, its suspicion of the outside world, and the two decades of Sino-American hostility, the extent and rapidity of change is striking.

But how tangible and enduring are these developments? Do they echo Soviet-American détente of the early 1970s or earlier eras of Sino-American amity, both of which proved ephemeral? In spite of what has transpired, there remains a fragility to Sino-American relations, attributable to several sources.

Part of the difficulty stems from the rapid growth itself. Many thoughtful Americans are hesitant to go further out of concern that the United States is acquiring a major new partner in world affairs—some would claim an ally—without adequate forethought as to the long-term implications. In a sense, our China policy until the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979 was the product of a carefully charted road map as to how and why China policy could serve our national interests. The subsequent two years saw the completion of the normalization process. Now, the question

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that confronts the United States is precisely to what use we wish to put our new relationship, and the Chinese appear to be in a similar stock-taking mood.

Another source of the tentativeness is perceptual. Each side fears that the other is not fully committed to a long-term relationship, that the other is motivated by tactical considerations, and that the other is biding its time to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, in both nations the new relationship is susceptible to political challenge. Beijing's opening to America has not been uniformly accepted in China, either out of concern for the disruptive effects an American involvement in China's development would have ideologically and socially, or out of doubts about the security benefits to be derived from an American connection. Nor has the China opening elicited universal support in the United States. Witness the widespread complaints about a China "tilt." And although the Taiwan issue was subtly handled in the Shanghai Communiqué and in the normalization agreement, some leaders on both sides seem reluctant to accommodate the needs of the other on this delicate and sensitive matter.

But perhaps the greatest reason for the fragility is the uncertainty on both sides as to precisely what the relationship is to entail and what its limits are to be. The relationship needs to be defined in positive terms that will be found credible and acceptable. The Soviets consider, or profess to consider, the relationship provocative not because of its current substance, but because they fear it may become an aggressive anti-Soviet alliance. Our friends and allies, particularly Japan and the five members of ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) wonder how far we intend to go with China and what the implications will be for them.

It is not credible to say we will continue the relationship at its present level, because, clearly, it is likely to continue to grow. One of the key tasks, then, must be to define and put in place a China policy which the public and Congress can support and which our friends and allies will recognize as contributing to overall stability and to their security. In addition, sufficient substance must be given to the relationship so that all our NATO allies, the ASEAN nations, and India accept it as a major, irreversible, and positive (or, in the case of the U.S.S.R., minimally threatening) element of world affairs.

II

Three questions immediately pose themselves. What kind of relationship is China capable of and willing to develop? What

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precisely is the American interest and what principles must guide our policy to achieve our interests? And what are the major issues we now must face to achieve our objectives?

An intimate link exists between the Chinese domestic scene and China's ability to sustain an opening to the United States, and China's leaders confront numerous impediments to fostering a substantive relationship. China suffers from a severe shortage of trained manpower capable of dealing with Americans. The Cultural Revolution's disruption of the educational system, coupled with the prior political persecution of many who had exposure to the West, means that the Chinese who have the requisite linguistic skills and cultural and scientific backgrounds are frequently in their sixties and seventies. (There is, of course, a similar severe paucity of talent in the United States of people sufficiently familiar with Chinese contemporary society and proficient in the language.) Scientifically, the Chinese capacity to absorb foreign technology is limited. Bureaucratically, China's America specialists are overburdened with receiving visitors, handling correspondence, designing exchange programs, training a younger generation, touring or studying in the United States, and continuing their ongoing administrative, research, or teaching activities. The situation has reached such serious proportions that higher level officials have placed travel and other restrictions on their activities to ensure that enough America experts are on hand for substantive work at any one moment in time.

Nor does the bureaucratic structure of China facilitate expanded contacts with the outside world. Coordination among different organizations is notoriously difficult to achieve, and frequently requires passing the issue up the hierarchy until the chains of command intersect, which all too often only occurs at the vice premier level. Even then, implementation of a State Council injunction can be lethargic. In addition, ministries, provinces or corporations, all of which have strongly circumscribed authority, have exhibited a tendency in dealing with American corporations or educational institutions to commit themselves to courses of action prior to ascertaining whether organizations with a veto power over the action will go along. Agreements are apparently reached only to discover some other base has to be touched.

Such problems must be viewed against the bigger picture of our common security interests with China. Nonetheless the building of strong governmental relations depends upon the accumulation of countless links between our private sector and Chinese organi-

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zations. And it seems as if Chinese bureaucratic practices are going to pose some major obstacles in pursuit of this goal.[1]

Another limitation is the shortage in foreign exchange. The Chinese cannot financially afford at this juncture the level of contact they desire. For understandable reasons, the Chinese tend to squeeze as much technological information out of American companies as possible without any major compensation offered. Students on Chinese government stipend in the United States live on near-subsistence budgets. To circumvent foreign exchange problems as much as possible, the Chinese seek offset arrangements in all sectors. In scholarly exchanges, they desire to absorb in-country expenses of American visitors, and to have the U.S. agency absorb expenses of Chinese in America. In business deals, the Chinese seek barter, shared production, and other similar arrangements.

Finally, the Chinese military capacity is limited and basically defensive in nature. Even though China has the world's third largest defense budget and is currently developing an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability, the country does not have power to project far beyond its borders for sustained periods of time. In a military sense, China remains more a regional than a global power, though to be sure its immense size means that the uses it makes of its regional power may have global significance.

The U.S. government, in sum, must bear in mind the limited manpower, attitudinal, structural, financial, and military capabilities of the Chinese as it seeks expanded Sino-American relations. At the same time, Washington must recognize the enormity of the task which China's leaders have undertaken since Mao Zedong's death in 1976 to set their nation more firmly on the path of economic development.

In 1977-78, an excessively optimistic leadership felt that the rapid development of a modern, industrial infrastructure—steel mills, railroads, coal mines, oil wells, refineries, electronics—would ensure sustained growth. By mid-1979, a sobered leadership had concluded that before this infrastructure could successfully be put in place, at least three years would have to be devoted to institu-

[1] For example, an agreement between an American consortium and the appropriate central ministries to construct an international trade center in Beijing encountered the recalcitrance of the Beijing municipal authorities to provide the land and infrastructure support under city control at reasonable cost. The U.S. government has yet to obtain a permanent consulate in Guangzhou or a site for an enlarged Embassy in Beijing. Some American universities that have offered awards to Chinese students find the scholarship winners unable to obtain visas from Public Security officials, despite the endorsement of their universities.

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tional reforms, and to correcting such problems in the economy as inadequate energy supplies and transportation facilities. And by late 1980, an even more sobered leadership announced that the process of institutional reform would take longer than initially anticipated.

To tick off the envisioned reforms is to realize why the readjustments require a protracted period of time to achieve them:

—The percentage of national income to be reinvested is to drop from a high of 38 percent in 1978 to about 25 percent in the mid-1980s. China cannot afford the purchase of foreign weaponry in the quantities needed to equip its forces from these sources, nor are its defense industries presently capable of absorbing Western state-of-the-art production technology.

—The Chinese Communist Party is to lose some of its day-to-day immersion in the administration of government and of the economy, yielding to technically proficient managers.

—Invigoration of representative institutions is contemplated as a check on bureaucratism.

—Profits are to be used in evaluating management performance, and bonuses are to be used to reward productivity.

—Statutes are being promulgated in a number of areas to introduce regularity and predictability to Chinese life. Criminal, marriage, and tax laws are but three examples of the unprecedented effort since 1949 to introduce a fuller legal system to China.

—The price structure is to be revamped, though the criteria for resetting prices remain to be settled. In any case, the marketplace is to have an increased role in allocation of resources.

Whereas in 1977-78 the thought had been to recover from the disasters of the Cultural Revolution by returning to the political and economic system of the mid-1950s and early 1960s, the objective has become the creation of a new system for China, still socialist, but incorporating changes that in some ways may go beyond the innovations of Hungary and Yugoslavia.

Such a restructuring inevitably involves a massive redistribution of power and authority. To be sure, there are a lot of winners. The science bureaucracy, including the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, now plays a crucial role in the policy process. Provincial and municipal level officials in Guangdong, Fujian, Tianjin, and Shanghai have increased authority to deal directly with foreigners and derive revenue from external trade. Localities with favorable climate and

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soil can expand their acreage devoted to more lucrative cash crops (cotton, sugar cane, tobacco, rapeseed, and so on); they can reduce the acreage devoted to grain, contrary to what Beijing previously required in order for them to be self-sufficient in cereals. Intellectuals, officials purged during the Cultural Revolution and before, and those with relatives abroad no longer are politically persecuted.

But at the same time, there are losers. Many who rose to power during the Cultural Revolution—and over half of all Party members were recruited after 1966—are now politically suspect. The army gives evidence of friction with the civilian power structure over the low priority given to military modernization and over the loss of power which the military had acquired during the Cultural Revolution. Two of the core bureaucracies of Mao's political system, the public security apparatus and the propaganda apparatus, find themselves with more circumscribed roles. And the police are accused of committing many atrocities toward the end of the Cultural Revolution. The Ministry of Metallurgy and the machine-tool building industries have received criticism for mismanagement, and their investment funds have been cut back. Military industries are under order to increase their production for the civilian sector. Adding to the potential instability is the ubiquitous dynamic of the development process itself: population increase, unemployed urban youth, and rising expectations for an improved standard of living.

The net effect is that the bold policy initiatives pursued since 1977 have created a disparate range of possible opponents. Barring a catalytic event that could bring an unholy alliance together, there is no reason at this point to believe these separate elements can combine to reverse course. For one thing, Deng Xiaoping appears to have made progress in bringing together a leadership committed to the new course. As a result, delay, foot-dragging, and sabotage will be the main techniques of opposition. Yet the regime does face a delicate passage from a Soviet to a market socialist system, and the transition requires not only political acumen but increased productivity. An improved standard of living and enhanced national security will be necessary to keep the reforms on track. Should these reforms come under political challenge or eventually not produce the promised results, their foreign policy corollaries of increased trade and openness to the outside world will also become vulnerable.

The considerations we have just outlined do not imply that the

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Chinese are likely to abandon their effort to improve Sino-American relations. On the contrary, the Chinese quest for foreign technology and capital and the continued Soviet military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border are likely to continue to propel the Chinese in America's direction. But there are constraints and an element of tenuousness in the process.

Another point also needs to be made. Whether China continues to approach the United States in a constructive spirit, as is likely for the immediate future, or relapses to a more isolationist frame of mind, China will increasingly affect our national existence. Barring collapse of the Chinese political system, an unlikely prospect, China is going to acquire increasing military strength and very gradually gain a capacity to project its might well beyond its borders. Its expanding economy will have a significant impact on world energy, food, textile, and metal supplies. In sum, for the remainder of the century a central issue on the American foreign policy agenda will be how to respond to the entry of China as an active nation on the world scene. There is no alternative but to continue to respond to this challenge in a positive frame of mind and to shape the relationship in as constructive a fashion as possible.

III

In the 1980s, however, the handling of the American side of Sino-American relations will be a task qualitatively different from what it was during the normalization process. In a sense the easy part has been done; the more difficult part awaits us. Meticulous management of the relationship will be required if its full potential is to be realized.

Above all, the United States must maintain a well-defined sense of its interests and weigh each step forward in this light. As a corollary, we should not delude ourselves that we are building "friendly" relations with China, though on occasion it may be necessary to describe our relations in that way. Friendship implies a warmth and affection that China's leaders do not feel toward us as a nation. Self-interest, not sentiment, motivates them.

Moreover, they will use our expressions of friendship against us, indicating that since we think of them as friends, we should treat them as such. Excessive professions of our friendship will imply to the Chinese a greater sense of American obligation and beneficence toward them than we are prepared to offer. Failure to deliver will then lead to Chinese accusations of betrayal and

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hypocrisy. Of course, within a national framework of self-interest, individual friendships can flourish.

Our self-interest dictates that we eschew seeking an alliance with China. The United States is entering an era in world affairs which requires a degree of diplomatic agility and suppleness which additions to our existing alliance system would impair. Nor does China seek an alliance with us. Moreover, we do have potential conflicts of interest in Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. But our two nations can cooperate extensively and share an interest in each other's security without developing the automatic obligation that an alliance would entail. Washington has sought, and should continue to seek, meaningful consultation with China on world affairs, explicit understandings about how each of us will act on those issues where our interests converge, collaboration in the maintenance of regional stability, and constructive relations in bilateral affairs.

For China to play a responsible international role, it must remain a unified and independent country capable of deterring any who might seek to impose their will upon it. China contributes to the global equilibrium simply by governing its huge mass effectively and thereby removing itself as a potential focal point of great power competition. A weak or divided China would become a source of international instability, as it was from the 1860s to the 1940s.

We also have an interest in Chinese participation in all international organizations and in various multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations. Many of the issues which transcend national boundaries—population control, food supply, energy supply, nuclear nonproliferation, protection of the environment, arms control, underground nuclear testing, use of the sea—cannot be adequately addressed without constructive Chinese involvement. While the past few years have seen positive developments in several of these fields, energetic efforts will have to be made to elicit Chinese understanding and cooperation in all these areas.

Certain developments would not be helpful to American interests. Significantly heightened Sino-Soviet tensions, for example, would bring with them greater risk of Sino-Soviet conflict, provide more opportunity for North Korea to play off Beijing against Moscow, and complicate our arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Chinese development of an ICBM has at least ambivalent implications for us, complicating Soviet defense planning on the

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one hand but potentially threatening us and our East Asian allies on the other. In either case, arms control agreements with Moscow would become more difficult. And while we seek a secure China, our interests would not be served were China to enhance its security by undue exacerbation of Soviet-American tensions.

Our East Asian regional interests with respect to China are more tangible. Chinese support of the Japanese-American alliance, the keystone to East Asian peace, is essential. We can legitimately expect Beijing to contribute to the maintenance of stability on the Korean peninsula. In particular, Chinese participation in four-power talks about the future of Korea is a desirable goal. As was stated in the Shanghai Communiqué and reiterated in our recognition communiqué, we have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves. In Southeast Asia, our interests are served by a China that contributes to the emergence of independent nations not threatening to their neighbors, especially in the Indochina peninsula. Chinese assistance in a timely and appropriate solution to the Kampuchean situation will be important for continued Sino-American cooperation in Southeast Asia.

Bilaterally, it is in our interest that American firms win a fair share of the gradually growing China market. Over the next five years, a number of major capital projects are likely to be undertaken: petroleum exploration and development, coal and nonferrous metal mines, a nuclear power plant, communication satellite and ground stations, and commercial jet transport, to name a few. Our government should work cooperatively with American business and with the Chinese, as the French, Germans and Japanese do, so that American firms can compete effectively for the China market.

Our interest is also served by our natural scientists, social scientists, and humanists improving their understanding of China through extended research in the P.R.C. If other countries are using political means to direct Chinese purchases their way, Washington should be equally vigorous. Should American scholars or journalists encounter major obstacles in doing research in or reporting from the P.R.C. while Chinese scholars and journalists enjoy nearly unlimited access to our society, Washington must be willing to redress the balance.

To be an attractive partner in bilateral relations, China's modernization effort must be successful. It is in our interest that China remain basically self-sufficient in agriculture and be able to pay

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for its food purchases. In recent years China has been purchasing roughly 10 percent of the wheat that is traded internationally and about 35 percent of the fertilizer purchased by all developing countries. Were an impoverished China to suffer severe agricultural setbacks and become a major claimant on charitable food supplies, the implications for emergency food relief programs and potentially for refugee agencies would be staggering. Not only is the success of the agricultural modernization program important, but so too is the potential for China's emergence as a significant supplier of fossil fuels and non-ferrous metals to world markets. And to attain all of these goals requires the training of an adequate manpower base in the natural and social sciences.

In this regard, our concerns with respect to China are similar to our interests in other developing countries. Whether they meet the basic aspirations of their people for an improved livelihood and whether they are reliable trading partners will decisively shape whether we live in a stable world in the years ahead. That is why Chinese accession to the World Bank, to the International Monetary Fund, and other international financial institutions was so much in our interest. The United States has seen China since 1971 almost exclusively in the East-West or balance-of-power context. While that perception is valid, our interests with China fall into the North-South context as well. Hence, the eloquent statement by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at Harvard in June that our national interests demand an expanded effort to foster economic growth among the less-developed countries applies to China as well.

IV

Beyond the question of our interests, a number of other management issues confront us. The quest for reciprocity is high on the list. The United States enjoys considerable advantage in wealth, level of technology, and military might, while the richness of China's cultural heritage is unique. Achieving immediate reciprocity in each facet of the relationship seems to be an impossible goal.

The United States should seek overall symmetry, rather than a specific balance in each dimension of the relationship. For instance, we currently enjoy a trade balance in our favor, while the flow of technology is in China's favor. The pursuit of recipocity must not be mindless. Yet the problem of reciprocity remains, and

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it is intensified because the Chinese definition of reciprocity differs from ours. To the Chinese, reciprocity is achieved when they treat Americans in China as they handle other foreigners and when Chinese are accorded the same privileges in the United States as those obtained by other aliens from non-hostile countries. But in practice this results in American diplomats facing severe travel restrictions and inadequate living arrangements and our scholars being denied many research opportunities—while Chinese diplomats enjoy free travel and their scholars have wide access to university libraries. The American definition of reciprocity, of course, is different: Americans should be treated in China as Chinese are treated in America. Many negotiations, including those for consular and civil aviation agreements, have encountered great difficulties in attaining mutually satisfactory reciprocal arrangements, and the China desk at the State Department deserves praise for the extent of reciprocity achieved to date.

To the extent we are successful in obtaining reciprocity in our sense of the word, we may create new problems within China. Private Americans seek travel rights, access to information, and so on that their Chinese colleagues are denied in their own society. These privileges, reminiscent of treaty port rights of an earlier day, easily reawaken anti-foreign feelings. Or we obtain agreements that are more favorable than those the Chinese have reached with other countries, whose representatives then complain to their hosts about the favoritism Americans receive. These considerations mean that even when pressing for reciprocity, the United States must remain sensitive to Chinese pride and the Chinese people's determination to retain their sovereignty.

Another precondition for a successful relationship must be to try to keep Chinese expectations realistic. To repeat, Sino-American relations cannot be nurtured through rhetoric that engenders temporary good feeling but which we do not intend to live up to. The Chinese have a tendency either to allow their expectations to soar or, more likely, to feign high expectations in order to force greater performance from their partner. With some exceptions from 1971 on, the American record has been good, but as we extend the relationship to the military sphere, it may prove tempting to suggest that the relationship will extend to areas we subsequently may not reach. The same thing holds true for funding commitments that foundations, corporations, or universities may be contemplating. Establishing the credibility of the American word, in short, will remain a central task in the foresee-

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able future, and this requires neither arousing Chinese expectations nor failing to deliver on previous commitments.

At the same time, we must keep our own expectations about China realistic. The definition of American interests outlined above sets forth important but limited objectives. We have not projected a large market for American commodities. We have expressed no hopes for major Chinese assistance in directly countering Soviet influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Similarly, no advantage was perceived in transferring state-of-the-art technology which the Chinese would find difficult to absorb. The Chinese are unlikely to be able to contribute more than they already do to the maintenance of a global balance of power, though it is important that they sustain their role. At best, therefore, we should consider Chinese military capability a supplement to, and not a substitute for, the American military presence in the Western Pacific. The burden of maintaining stability in Northeast Asia cannot be shifted from our shoulders. Indeed, it is a key part of the counterweight we offer to the Soviets which makes us attractive to the Chinese.

A realistic sense of the potential and limits of our China connection should enable us to eschew the temptation to serve as a fount of wisdom for China. In childhood, Chinese acquire the habit of learning through emulation of models. To search for role models is a deeply ingrained habit. As Sino-American relations flourish, the Chinese will be tempted to cast us in some respects as a model worthy of imitation, be it in how to conduct elections or to run a university or to undertake a census. The Chinese are well aware of the flattery that results from such emulation, and many Americans are all too prepared to gratify themselves in this way. After all, in an era filled with self-doubts and foreign rejections of us, it is nice to find someone who thinks we still merit study.

The danger is that the emulative effort will fail, and that the Chinese will attribute the failure not to their own incompetence in implementation but to the inadequacies of the model. Be it the advice offered on factory management or cost accounting or a tax code or how to run an airline—all activities in which Americans are presently engaged—the Chinese must be discouraged from simply borrowing from another culture and encouraged to build upon indigenous practices. We have encountered the same issue countless times in other developing countries, and we should seek to avoid mistakes we have made so often in the past.

Finally, we must not permit our China relationship to accrue to the benefit of a limited sector of the Chinese society or depend on

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the political welfare of a few leaders. It is important to extend the benefits of the American tie from the coastal regions to the interior, and to seek contacts with a wide range of Chinese leaders, not only in Beijing but in the provinces. Vice President Mondale's visit to Xian and Defense Secretary Harold Brown's visit to Wuhan, both cities in the interior, and the designation of Wuhan, Chengdu, and Shengyang as the locales of our additional consulates are part of this broader purpose. So too is the effort to establish contacts with China's military bureaucracy, for until Secretary Brown's trip its exclusion from the Sino-American relationship meant we had not yet reached one of the most important organizations in Chinese society.

It is fascinating to observe how such diverse institutions as government agencies, foundations, business corporations, universities, and news media are already encountering the set of challenges we have just outlined. As long as the strategic setting is unchanged and the official relationship remains positive, the shaping of Sino-American relations is now shared by the public and the private realms. Whether the relationship proceeds with a keen sense of the American interest, whether symmetry is achieved, whether expectations are kept realistic and American credibility established, and whether the relationship becomes broadly based in China will be determined largely by the literally hundreds of decisions which the public and private sectors make on these issues.

V

The American government faces other, very difficult issues in the conduct of China policy. As Washington gropes toward a coherent strategy toward the Soviet Union following Afghanistan, it must decide how to integrate our China and Soviet policies. Washington's preference since 1971 has been to improve relations with both China and the Soviet Union simultaneously. In reality, of course, our relations with Beijing have become closer than with Moscow. Rather than imagery of a China "tilt," however, it is more accurate to note that both China and the United States are eager to move forward, while our Soviet relations have deteriorated in the face of Soviet assertiveness from Ethiopia to Afghanistan to Indochina. To retard development of Sino-American relations because Soviet-American relations have soured would be to punish Beijing for Moscow's aggression.

Nor should our policy be captive to such ill-defined concepts as

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triangles, evenhandedness, and balance. Recalling the evolution of our policy on this issue is worthwhile. Through the Kennedy and Johnson eras, China was seen as a more dangerous long-term adversary of the United States than the U.S.S.R. At that time, we enforced an embargo on U.S. trade with China and in the multilateral Coordinating Committee (COCOM) were unwilling to license third-country sales of high technology to China that we allowed for export to the U.S.S.R. The Nixon Administration abolished the China differential, claiming we should treat Moscow and Beijing in an "evenhanded" manner in exports. Soon, evenhandedness was extended to apply to our overall approach to the two communist states. That is, what we would do for one we would do for the other.

During the first year of the Carter Administration, evenhandedness gradually gave way to "balance." The concept of evenhandedness was found to be too mechanical and confining. For example, working-level bureaucrats in export controls interpreted the term evenhandedness to mean that an item licensed for Beijing would have to be licensed for Moscow. The different technological levels and differing capacities of the two countries to divert an item from military to civilian use could not be taken into account. This was too rigid a doctrine. The Administration came to recognize that the way in which we sought to improve relations with the two would have to take into account the differences between the two countries and the threats they posed to us.

Even the concept of "balance" was stretched when the Administration moved ahead in the summer of 1979 with most-favored-nation treatment for China without seeking to extend it to the U.S.S.R., though it was then still hoped that MFN status for the Soviet Union could be placed on the congressional agenda in the near future. The imbalance on MFN was seen as something that would be of limited duration. But Afghanistan dashed these hopes.

There is an even more fundamental reason for not seeking equidistance in a triangular relationship among Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. As Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs Richard Holbrooke noted in his June 1980 speech on China policy, the concept of a "strategic triangle" is somewhat misplaced. As we have already noted, Chinese military might generally, and nuclear capability specifically, do not begin to approximate Moscow's or our own. In terms of capacity to assume global responsibilities, China is not in the same league as the United States, the U.S.S.R., or even Western Europe and Japan. In the military-

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security realm, China currently does not pose the imminent threat to us that Moscow does. We do not have the same pervasive conflicts of interest with Beijing that we have with Moscow. If we are to treat China for what it is, a regional power and a major developing country, a balanced policy toward China and the Soviet Union—implying a desire for equidistance—makes little sense.

However, even as we reject the idea of balance as a single controlling guideline, we must recognize that our relations with the two are interrelated, and we must consider how our relations with one affect the other. This does not mean one relationship should be made subservient or hostage to the other. Rather, we must neither deal with China in ways that unnecessarily provoke Moscow nor move toward Moscow in ways that needlessly damage our China connection. We must recognize that certain necessary actions toward one may so harm our interests vis-à-vis the other that we would wish to undertake compensatory moves.

The actual integration of our Chinese and Soviet policies must occur on a day-to-day basis, and the best that can be done is to distill some principles from the foregoing discussion to guide our policy:

—First, we must continually reiterate that we seek not an alliance with China but expanded consultations, cooperation, and collaboration where our interests converge.

—Second, we must not employ our China relationship tactically against the Soviet Union. Any commitments we might undertake to China, such as willingness to make military equipment sales, cannot be retracted when Soviet-American relations improve. Nor should we consider extending our ties with China as a means of punishing Soviet transgressions elsewhere unless the new steps stand on their own merits.

—Third, we must not manipulate China and the Soviet Union against each other. Our interests would not be served by greatly lessened or heightened Sino-Soviet tension, and in any case, our ability to affect Sino-Soviet relations is marginal.

—Fourth and relatedly, as we develop our relations with China, we must not provoke that which we seek to deter. We should not develop our relations with China in ways that might inadvertently provoke Soviet aggression against China.

—Fifth, we must take adequate account of the "China factor" in our arms control discussions with Moscow. To limit the arms race in Western Europe, for example, only to see the Soviets redeploy these arms to Siberia, means we would be expecting

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China to bear the cost for increased stability in Europe, and this it may not be willing to do, unless we offset the burden in other ways.

—Sixth, we must exercise discipline in comments about China. In speeches and in off-the-cuff and background remarks we must avoid needlessly provoking the Soviets and confirming journalistic suspicions we are "China-card playing."

Our entire posture, in short, must give credibility to the proposition that we are determined to build a long-term relationship with China not in order to tactically threaten any third power but out of a straightforward recognition that our interests in a more stable balance of power will thereby be served.

VI

Cultivation of our security relations with China, development of our economic relations, and maintenance of unofficial relations with Taiwan within the framework of the recognition agreement with the P.R.C. are three issues which will confront Sino-American relations for the foreseeable future. In all these areas, the task in the months ahead is not so much to chart new ground as to ensure that existing arrangements reach their full potential. Pursuit of existing policies seems the appropriate course.

In the military realm, in order to help remedy destabilizing deficiencies in the Chinese defense posture, the United States has agreed to sell the Chinese dual-use technology with military applications, and military support equipment—radar, communications gear, transport equipment—but not weapons. So far, no deals have been consummated in either the military support equipment field or high-level technology intended for military use.

The advisability of selling weapons to China has been widely debated in the press and the Congress. Four schools of thought can be discerned. First are those who are strongly opposed, because of adverse Soviet and allied reactions. Others are basically opposed, but could see merit in marginal adjustments to the existing guidelines in order to permit transfers of less sophisticated technologies that would enable the Chinese to make more efficient use of their current defense capabilities. A third group believes in constraining sales, but argues that our interests would be better served by permitting the case-by-case application of our general policy on arms transfers, and the considerable economic and technological barriers, substantially to limit transfers of arms,

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rather than relying on our current political strictures. Finally, others support sales in order to help stabilize the Sino-Soviet military balance or to respond to Soviet intervention elsewhere.

To an extent, the whole issue has been distorted, because all sides agree that the Chinese cannot afford purchases on a scale that would significantly alter the Sino-Soviet military balance. It therefore appears that no immediate change in policy need be made until the Chinese have consummated some transactions within the current guidelines and provided us a better sense of the efficacy of these sales. Furthermore, a decision on significantly expanding the guidelines to include weapons would require a thorough study of all related factors, including the firmness of the Chinese commitment to maintain stability in East and Southeast Asia.

In the economic realm, the United States has agreed to provide credit to the P.R.C. through the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank. It is not unrealistic to believe that credit extension through these institutions could total as much as $5 billion by the mid- to late 1980s. Loan opportunities for worthy development projects are likely to exceed that figure. Moreover, the Chinese will be pressing for concessional interest rates from the International Development Association and for development assistance from U.N. agencies. They may even become interested in U.S. Agency for International Development involvement in China. And the 16 science and cultural exchange programs—particularly the student-exchange program—are seriously underfunded, particularly in light of their likely benefit to the United States.

Given the pressure to balance the federal budget and rising congressional resistance to the international financial institutions, the opportunity does not occur in the most propitious circumstances. Moreover, unless significantly expanded, international financial institutions' funding for China could come at the cost of other developing countries, which would not be in our interest. Yet the U.S. government, particularly the Office of Management and Budget, has yet to accept the budgetary implications of our new relationship with China. In fact, this, and not weapons sales, may be the single greatest challenge to expanding our relations with China at present. Development of an Administration position and close consultations with the Congress will be required in order to ensure that the government's funding ability matches our interests in the Chinese modernization program and in U.S. business capturing a fair share in the China market.

Finally, Sino-American relations could once again be shattered

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over the Taiwan issue. Due to certain American campaign rhetoric, Beijing is going to be watching the United States vigilantly to see whether we abide by our recognition agreements. As the negotiating record makes clear, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan cannot be made official without gravely damaging U.S.-P.R.C. relations.

Other pitfalls could await us. Beijing-Taipei relations are not our affair as long as they are handled peacefully. Hence, we should avoid succumbing to pressures to become a middleman in Beijing's search for an accommodation with Taipei, but we should not discourage Taipei from engaging in contacts with the mainland.

Weapons sales to Taiwan must also be carefully handled. Such sales are required in order to sustain a military balance in the region. The quantity and quality must deter Beijing from military adventure while not reaching levels that would encourage Taiwan to provoke tensions in the Taiwan Strait for its purposes. With the reduced level of tension in the Strait and with China's evident problems in constructing a new-generation jet fighter, no immediate reason appears to exist to decide on the sale of an improved version of the F-5E to Taiwan. In short, the Taiwan relationship is going well, and while the new Administration may feel pressure to introduce changes, any alteration could risk the delicate arrangements which normalization achieved.

VII

In sum, China should continue to occupy a central position in U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future. With the normalization process completed, we can begin to treat China for what it is—a basically non-hostile, genuinely independent, developing, regional communist power. We share many interests, and China is not a security threat to us.

To be sure, our relations will encounter moments of tension and upon occasion we may be on opposite sides of particular issues. But normalization has yielded a historic opportunity to build an extensive, substantial relationship with China. The interests at stake demand that we allocate the necessary resources to meet the challenge.

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Chester A. Crocker

SOUTH AFRICA: STRATEGY FOR CHANGE

Something strange is occurring in the U.S.-South African relationship. At a time when our two societies need each other more than before, it is becoming unclear which one is more effective in exploiting divisions in the other. After nearly 20 years in which successive Republican and Democratic administrations have established some modest guidelines for U.S. policy, it has become fashionable to question whether the United States even has a policy toward South Africa. The fragile centrist consensus that so urgently needs to be strengthened among Americans instead founders in a fog of stereotypes and polarized perceptions about the country. On their side, South Africans are so enmeshed in their own internal ferment and so disenchanted with the recent American performance (globally as well as in southern Africa) that they view the United States increasingly as an object for manipulation, an ineffectual and reactive power.

With Zimbabwe's independence and Namibia's uncertain but inexorable movement in the same direction, Americans have to come to some minimal level of agreement about the question of South Africa. The problem is that the land of apartheid operates as a magnet for one-dimensional minds. How do we overcome the disturbing tendency to treat this troubled land as a political fire sale to be ransacked for confirmation of previously held convictions?

The beginning of wisdom is to recognize that Americans need to do their homework and become less gullible in responding to the dissonant babble of voices from South Africa. A working familiarity with the country's major actors and institutions would help. South Africa is a vast and varied country, and one rarely meets the residents of Cradock or Koopmansfontein. Instead, one meets the urbane business elite, embittered black exiles, white

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Chester Crocker is Director of African Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University and Associate Professor of International Relations at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Among his recent publications is *South Africa into the 1980s*, coedited with Richard E. Bissell.

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refugees forecasting Armageddon, or slick hucksters of the status quo peddling a message of krugerrands, the Cape route and chrome reserves. More attention must be focused on those South Africans—the Afrikaners and the African majority—who are shaping and challenging the current order.

Another hurdle is coming to grips with our own parochialism. South Africa is an alien place where people dwell on potential or actual threats to their economic, political and physical survival and where they bargain on the basis of well-founded distrust. In South Africa, most players are speaking to multiple audiences—across borders, across ethnic lines, and within the group. It is worth the effort to become adept at reading between the lines of political rhetoric, much as observers of any other important country do.

The many changes occurring today in South Africa are inherently ambiguous. Nonetheless, it should be possible at least to agree that black politics are characterized by an increasingly confident experimentation with various strategies for challenging white control, while white politics are demonstrating a degree of fluidity and pragmatism that is without precedent in the past generation. The combination does not make meaningful evolutionary change certain, but it does make it possible for the first time in decades.

II

In deciding the course of American policy, we need to have some consensus not only about what is going on in South Africa but also about basic U.S. objectives, the American interests at stake, and the broad principles of policy effectiveness. Clearly, the fundamental goal is the emergence in South Africa of a society with which the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship, without constraint, embarrassment or political damage. The nature of the South African political system prevents us from having such a relationship now. That goal will remain elusive in the absence of purposeful, evolutionary change toward a nonracial system. Consequently, a basic U.S. objective should be to foster and support such change, recognizing the need to minimize the damage to our interests in the process, but also recognizing that American interests will suffer inevitably if such change fails to occur.

This statement of the problem rests on a number of straightforward premises. As a multiracial democracy, the United States cannot endorse a system that is racist in purpose or effect. Second,

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the nurturing of institutions we value—democracy, pluralism, stable and decent government, nonracialism, a strong market economy—ultimately hinges on how change occurs and who participates in it. Third, the circumstances in South Africa do not justify giving up on the hopes for evolutionary change (as distinguished from a revolutionary cataclysm). Besides, the option of U.S. disengagement hardly exists in practice, except in the strictly limited sense of dissociating ourselves from specific acts or policies. By its nature and history South Africa is a part of the Western experience, and an integral part of the Western economic system. In addition, the exigencies of U.S. domestic politics virtually rule out disengagement.

The task, then, is to steer between the twin dangers of abetting violence in the Republic and aligning ourselves with the cause of white rule.

What part can the United States play in the achievement of change? The evolution the United States wants to see is unlikely to occur all by itself; external events and policies have always played a role in South African history, and are more likely to as internal power relationships become more equalized. Pressure for change should be a central ingredient in American policy, and that pressure must be credibly maintained if we are not to send misleading signals to South Africans. But pressure is not enough. Also required is a clear Western readiness to recognize and support positive movement, and to engage credibly in addressing a complex agenda of change.

In the past neither U.S. pressure nor U.S. support has been credibly organized, while policy oscillations have done little to engender respect for America's sense of purpose. Contrasts between administrations have been mainly a matter of style and tone. Yet even where the contrast has been relatively sharp, as it was between the Nixon-Ford and Carter periods, the difficulties in wielding carrots and sticks (or "radishes and twigs," as skeptics would have it) are reflected in mixed signals. Positive elements of the initial Nixon stance of active communication with Pretoria were soon overshadowed by White House unwillingness to push the policy publicly and energetically. What ensued was a two-track policy—a public posture of abhorrence for apartheid alongside de facto acquiescence in the policies of Pretoria on the one hand, and movement toward a tacit and confidential working relationship over the Angolan, Rhodesian and Namibian conflicts on the other. Ultimately, the conduct of South African policy "in

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the closet" backfired both at home and abroad. Constructive engagement was never seriously attempted.

False signals and the creation of unreal expectations (among various constituencies in South Africa) also characterized the Carter period. After strident assertions that Washington would not trade a moderation of pressure on South African internal issues for Pretoria's cooperation on Rhodesia and Namibia, the Administration did the opposite. After 18 months of verbal flagellation and lectures from the American pulpit, U.S. officials tempered their public statements almost to the point of inscrutability, because the initial stance was counterproductive on all fronts. As for results, the picture is decidedly mixed. Police behavior appears more civilized, but Washington helped the National Party (NP) achieve its most massive electoral victory ever. U.S. adherence to the U.N. arms embargo has had some symbolic value, but its main result has been to accelerate dramatically Pretoria's drive for military self-sufficiency. Pretoria's wrist has been slapped by a few modest trade restrictions that have made some Americans feel better while other Americans lose jobs.

With all its oscillations, however, Washington's South Africa policy *has* shifted substantially over the past 20 years. The trend toward increased distance in the relationship and a higher level of pressure for constructive change is unmistakable during this period. The designers of apartheid have failed to sell it to any but their own constituents, and our rebuff helps to explain the rethinking process now underway in South Africa.

On the other hand, however, we have forfeited significant influence over South Africa through our lack of appreciation of internal South African dynamics. Often this takes the form of a mistaken assumption that American and South African clocks are synchronized—that our impatience signifies the imminence of the revolution.

Clearly, U.S. interests lie in strongly encouraging South Africans to get on with deciding their future. How can we do so? It is striking how seldom policy discussions focus analytically on the specific consequences of proposed American actions. In the first place, we continue to suffer from an inflated notion of American power, despite considerable contrary evidence. The recent American experience, most notably in Iran, should have made it clear that effective coercive influence is a rare commodity in foreign policy. There are many things the West could do to South Africa in the interests of "bringing about change," but would such actions in fact produce the intended result? We might reduce its growth rate by curtailing trade or investment. Comprehensive

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sanctions backed by naval power could wreak major damage on its economy (and on U.S. and allied economic interests there). They might even spark a sustained uprising, a drastic decline in white living standards, and an outflow of emigrants. But this, presumably, is not the goal. South African capacity to cope with destructive actions is finite, but their ability to pervert our purposes and produce unintended and unforeseen consequences is not.

In the second place, too often our focus is on the wrong issue: the ultimate goal, instead of the process of getting there. The dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a new nonracial order is not going to take place through a sudden dramatic act, or result from one concession in one deal. Hundreds of decisions, drawn-out negotiations, and quite probably a combination of violence and politics will precede the dawn of a new age for South Africans. As a matter of logic, it is likely that major change will be preceded by lesser forms of change of the kind now occurring. Yet U.S. policy remains preoccupied with the goal of obtaining "full political participation," often presumed to be the outcome of a preceding "national convention" at which all politically relevant groups would be represented. A corollary Western reluctance to address (at least in some channel) the question of short- or medium-term goals is rapidly becoming a form of escapism—playing into the hands of those who believe that only a bloody upheaval can do the job.

The time has come for Americans interested in South Africa's future to address the question of what useful role the United States can play in helping all South Africans think ahead toward a different future. Since the power to coerce Pretoria is not in American hands, the limited influence available should be carefully husbanded for specific application to concrete issues of change. If this means that the United States becomes engaged in what some observers label as only "amelioration," so be it, provided that the process is open-ended and consistent with a nonracial order. In the end, events in South Africa will determine the basic parameters of American policy, and it is to these that we now turn.

III

Much of the Western policy debate revolves around interpreting the significance of what is now taking place in South Africa. The effort to develop a more effective policy would be wasted unless conditions on the ground warranted it. The ambiguity of these

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developments is best illustrated by two contrasting images that emerge from "the facts."

Proponents of the first image begin by stressing that over the past five years the obscure politics of Afrikanerdom have become more pragmatic and seemingly rational, less tribal and ideological. Leading Afrikaner (and other white) elites now openly confirm that the early architects of separate development (apartheid) policy—men such as former Prime Ministers D.F. Malan and Hendrik Verwoerd—have produced an unworkable monster. Afrikaans-speaking journalists cheer on politicians like Prime Minister P.W. Botha who proclaim that controlled change toward some "new dispensation" has become essential. Petty or social apartheid is recognized as offensive and "hurtful" to the black majority, while grand (territorial) apartheid is seen as an economic failure and a political cul-de-sac, if not a nightmare. Although this new white consensus is challenged on the Right, it appears to have substantial strength among key elites and leading institutions. The long-delayed prospects for political change have opened up.

Continuing with this first image, the new political climate has been accompanied by the clear victory of rational economics in government thinking. A group of tight-fisted Friedmanites has overturned South Africa's state capitalist and welfare-state traditions (at least for whites). The private sector will now be set free to become the engine of job creation and black socioeconomic advancement, and the state's role in managing the economy will wane. Artificial (i.e., political) barriers to black economic opportunity and the mobility of labor and capital are being removed. Botha's overtures to the private sector—still largely in non-Afrikaner hands—have accompanied freer foreign exchange, labor and capital markets. Such thinking lies at the root of recent policy shifts concerning black labor and freedom of movement in white areas, but the process even extends to questioning the policy of confining black citizenship rights to tribal homelands—the cornerstone of grand apartheid.

Moreover, the economy shows a potential for sustained growth that could undergird change toward a more equitable order. Africa's most diversified and dynamic economy weathered painful recession and political uncertainty in 1976–77, to emerge in better shape than before. Real growth is running at around seven percent this year. South Africa has the requisite industrial base and resource endowment to thrive in an interdependent, politically insecure, and resource-hungry global economy. Its business and

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financial elite includes skilled, internationally minded leaders who can capitalize quickly on market or policy shifts in other countries and on new technologies. The bulk of capital is generated internally. Pragmatic adjustment to regional change and global economic turbulence enables South Africa to prosper despite a degree of political isolation. Finally, the economy's depth and breadth assure that its growth will not be hampered by the gradual decline in gold output in the years ahead; in fact, soaring gold prices have hardly affected gold's share of total exports during the 1970s—a clear indication of balanced export growth.[1]

A second interpretation of the facts points in another direction. According to this image, a strong economy could be used not to support evolutionary change but to strengthen white control and distract attention from the need for change. In the socioeconomic sphere, promise continues to run far ahead of performance. Tangible change in such areas as elective black urban councils, labor law reform and trade-union rights, black home-ownership rights, multiracial sports, and access to public facilities has been implemented unevenly—often by permits that only qualify current policy. Such changes have been largely motivated by the need to respond to pressure or disruption and, while more than cosmetic, do not begin to address such central socioeconomic questions as the enormous black housing backlog in the "white areas," the grossly inequitable education system, or the liberation of black free enterprise.

Nor has the government's insistence that blacks can exercise political rights only in the "homelands," which comprise 13 percent of South Africa's land area, diminished. The poverty, hunger and unemployment of the homelands is almost universally recognized as the most striking indictment of official policy. Up to now, nothing significant has been done to improve conditions in these rural dumping grounds for those who fail to find a niche in the white economy. Black South Africans still face the loss of their South African citizenship, and the hated influx control policy, whereby large numbers of blacks are shipped out of white areas daily, or jailed for being there illegally, still stands. Questions can also be raised about the practicality of Pretoria's new embrace of free-market economics. How can the private sector generate the 300,000 new jobs that are needed each year just to avoid increased black unemployment—unless something dramatic is done to in-

[1] Gold accounted for some 35 percent of 1979 exports, compared to the 1972–79 average of 31 percent.

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crease the attractiveness of labor-intensive investment? In the fields of housing and training, government and business are passing the responsibility back and forth like a hot potato.

Proponents of this second image also raise the question of white motivations. The Botha government has committed itself to a moderate reformist course whose end remains utterly unclear. Ideology may have been replaced by pragmatism, but toward what object? The majority of South Africans (and outsiders) are being asked to take a lot on faith from Afrikaner Nationalists whose quest for "cultural survival" over the past 32 years has translated into the domination and coercion of everyone else. This current ferment is very likely another occasion when official promises will be followed by paralysis. It could also be an elaborate smokescreen for a limited co-optation strategy aimed at wooing urban black and rural homeland elites into collaboration with the whites. At best it would signify only minimal change in the distribution of political power and economic rewards.

All the moves taken so far are consistent with a posture of continued defiance and repression of demands for basic decency and meaningful change. As evidence, one could cite the strenuous effort by Pretoria to gird its loins for continued conflict and a possible rupture with the West. Huge investments in military self-sufficiency, industrial diversification, and energy self-reliance are clearly targeted at minimizing the potential impact of current and future embargoes. Why has South Africa spent such sums to become a world leader in synfuels development and one of the leading arms producers in the Southern Hemisphere?

Finally, the second image stresses the major obstacles to serious change within Afrikanerdom: a recalcitrant apartheid bureaucracy still wedded to Verwoerdian principles, the absence of an alternative political blueprint to sell to the rank and file, and strong political and regional splits within the governing National Party itself precisely over the feasibility and desirability of controlled change leading to some form of power-sharing with the black communities. How can would-be reformers—assuming they exist—meet the argument of the *verkramptes* (conservatives) that such a process will degenerate into uncontrolled revolutionary violence and, perhaps, white political abdication? Analogies from American experience do not fit, and Rhodesian or Algerian ones are not especially comforting. Such fears underlie recent activities of the *WitKommando*, a white terrorist group; however, they are also shared by parts of the Dutch Reformed Church; by the rightist splinter Herstigte Nasionale Party; by some white trade

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unions; by the new head of the Broederbond; and by many in the powerful Transvaal wing of the NP itself, led by arch-*verkrampte* Andries Treurnicht—a politician-theologian whose name translates as "grieve-not," but who is known more playfully as "Dr. No."

IV

"Half full or half empty"? There is, as we have just seen, much evidence for both images. Which of the two is nearer the real picture of underlying trends requires that one dig deeper into the South African reality. Basic to any such deeper analysis is an ingredient missing in most reporting on South Africa, namely the importance of Afrikaner nationalism—as distinguished from white racism and apartheid—as a distinctive and determining feature in the political equation.

The identity whose "survival" is at the core of Afrikaner politics is in part racial, but it includes other important ingredients. In light of what they have said and done, it would be difficult for blacks in South Africa to interpret Afrikaner nationalists as anything other than racist in the black-white sense. Yet conflict with the English-speaking whites was the main impetus behind national consciousness during the formative years of their drive to gain and consolidate power in all of South Africa. The Afrikaner nationalist experience is unique: in the long history of European migration, they are the only ethnic-cultural group to have formed a distinctly new nation and waged a successful nationalist revolution in their new land.

Despite their 325 years in Africa, this nationalism is barely 100 years old, tracing its origins to the creation of the two Boer republics ultimately defeated by Britain in the bloody conflict of 1899–1902. After South Africa's independence in 1910, nationalist politics became a domestic issue focusing on the drive for formal recognition of the Afrikaans language, social and economic welfare of poor whites impoverished by war and uprooted by urbanization, and opposition to the dominance of English capitalism and to the continued imperial link. Ultimately, the goal became the ethnic mobilization of Afrikanerdom to take over the country's political institutions as the best route to advancing group interests.

This strategy was victorious in 1948—not long ago in the consciousness of a people. At one level, the revolution was remarkably successful in meeting its own goals. Political domination at the national level is total. National Party rule has succeeded in

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dramatically improving the economic status of its ethnic followers, and in transforming Afrikanerdom into a primarily white-collar nation. Afrikaner-English income and education differentials have narrowed rapidly, softening the ethnic inferiority complex of one side and the cultural arrogance of the other. Despite the *boer* (farmer) stereotype, only 8 percent of the Afrikaans-speaking labor force is on the land (compared to 30 percent on the eve of the 1948 NP victory). Twenty-five to thirty percent of the private sector is now in Afrikaner hands, as well as 90 percent of the top jobs in the public sector.[2]

There are few modern parallels of a minority people emerging at the top of the political heap after years of bitter political and military defeat and economic deprivation. The result is a high level of group cohesion and loyalty, and a strong inclination to believe that group welfare is in every sense dependent on retaining political control or in some other way maintaining political autonomy. Since the Afrikaner revolution is a recent one, this nationalism has some rough edges. Although Afrikaner nationalist politics is by no means an authoritarian monolith, there are self-imposed ground rules. To the Anglo-Saxon outsider, this smacks of secretiveness, paranoia, or even conspiracy. But ethnics of other sorts in other lands will quickly recognize the syndrome: shun strategies that could divide the group; speak in code or riddles when others are listening; camouflage in-group tensions in the interests of group harmony; do not think aloud about plans or bargaining positions; value your reputation among fellow ethnics. The cardinal rule in nationalist politics is summed up by the Afrikaans journalistic convention *onafhanklikheid-in-gebondenheid* (independence-in-commitment), which in practice means working from within the system.

The implications for political change are twofold. A basic split within Afrikanerdom or the National Party is rather unlikely. It is in the perceived survival interests of the party leadership to retain the support of the great majority of Afrikaners and never to become decisively dependent on non-Afrikaners. Significant white-led political change will probably not come via this route. Nor is there much reason to believe that a basic split would suddenly produce radical change: English-speaking and other white groups (Portuguese, Jews, Greeks, Germans) are hardly a unified bastion of political enlightenment with whom *verligtes*

[2] One of the best accounts of the fruits of NP rule is in Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, pp. 145–76, from which these data are taken.

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(liberals or, literally, "enlightened ones") could coalesce. P.W. Botha is by no means as rigid on party unity as his predecessor, John Vorster, who once declared that he was unwilling to lose a single member of his NP caucus over the multiracial sports policy. Botha welcomes non-Afrikaner electoral support and might find it useful for his reformist image to hive off 20 or 30 ultras. More important, he is determined to lead and to make changes—"adapt or die"—but not by splitting his nation.

Second, the primary issue facing Botha and his like-minded lieutenants is how to organize and lead Afrikanerdom away from the dead end of Verwoerdian ideology. The answer lies in using the NP and the state apparatus itself as instruments for change. For the past two years South Africa's "new nationalists" have been preoccupied with the task of building coalitions and power bases within the party and government machinery. The meager tangible results of white-led change so far do not signify that Botha's coalition is not interested in major "adaptations" that could result in real change. It simply means: first things first.

V

Some of the preconditions of white-led change have already been met. The climate of Afrikaner opinion has unquestionably changed with the tumultuous events of the 1970s in South and southern Africa and indirectly in the West. Polling data indicate a rapid evolution in attitudes during the 1970s. Although there is no substantial mandate for major change yet, lesser reforms are widely accepted. Loyalty to the party appears to have roots somewhat independent of actual policies. Public opinion is highly deferential and responsive to signals of determined leadership, despite the claims of NP elites that suggest the reverse.

Botha's own emergence, historically fortuitous though it was, clearly meets the prerequisite of determined and ambitious leadership, and he personally shares the new sense of urgency. Between Verwoerd's assassination in 1966 and Vorster's resignation in 1978, the NP had been led from behind, by consensus. In the absence of a commanding figure, NP politics was a cautious balancing act between factions defined in terms of South Africa's traditional north-south friction, patronage, ideology and leadership succession. Botha, by contrast, is an NP machine politician with 44 years of party experience who fancies himself to be an expert manipulator of the complex party apparatus. He knows that its center of decision is at the top in the Cabinet as well as the Prime Minister's office: he cannot lead without a cooperative

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Cabinet. The Cabinet balance, in turn, depends on intricate personal alliances within the parliamentary caucus and the regional party organizations. Patronage and personal loyalty—not Left-Right political views—lie at the heart of these relationships.

Reformers require more power than mere rulers. The main checks on that power in South Africa are within the NP, the Westminster parliamentary system, and the bureaucracy. But reformers also require modern ideas and vigorous minds. Botha knows better than most that the NP establishment is woefully short of modern training or skills of any kind except those required to run the party. The most accomplished Afrikaners (in business, the professions, higher education, or the public service) have seldom played major roles in a party apparatus based largely on small-town lawyers, failed businessmen, schoolteachers, farmers, clergy, and professional politicians. South Africa's dynamic and competent white elites need to be drawn into the policy process.

Since taking office in 1978, Botha and his coalition have been carrying out the equivalent in Afrikaner nationalist terms of a drawn-out coup d'état. The recipe for this coup has several ingredients, of which the first is to build a solid coalition of like-minded modernizers and personal political allies. The coalition emerged gradually, and was formalized with the August 1980 Cabinet reshuffle, probably the most revealing shake-up in a generation. Key allies include: Alwyn Schlebusch (Orange Free State NP leader who assured Botha his premiership, former Justice Minister and now Vice State President and Chairman of the President's Council); Chris Heunis (Cape Province NP leader, now assigned the sensitive portfolio of Internal and Constitutional Affairs); S.P. ("Fanie") Botha (NP parliamentary leader, major Transvaal party figure and overseer of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commission exercises on labor and manpower issues); Kobie Coetzee (former Deputy Defense Minister, now Justice Minister); R.F. Botha (Foreign Affairs Minister and a widely popular advocate of reform); and Piet Koornhof (Minister of Cooperation and Development—i.e., black affairs—and the best-known modernizer in the field of racial policy). Moreover, Botha is now able to bring politically reliable and compatible people into pivotal Cabinet slots and the President's Council even when they lack a strong party base. Prime examples are Magnus Malan (former armed forces chief of staff and now Defense Minister) and Gerrit Viljoen (former Broederbond head, university rector and Namibia administrator, now National Education Minister and the leading intellectual in the Cabinet).

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Somewhat apart from the core of political power are the economic policy technocrats headed by Owen Horwood (Natal NP leader and Finance Minister), backed by key advisers Gerhard de Kock, Simon Brand and Joep de Loor. The coalition-building process has also entailed isolating or neutralizing potential leadership threats (Andries Treurnicht and Connie Mulder, Botha's main rival for the premiership in 1978); and dispensing as gracefully as possible with such embarrassing obstacles to reform and domestic harmony as former Justice Minister Jimmy Kruger and former Community Development Minister Marais Steyn.

Apart from control of the Cabinet, the modernizers required a more responsive, streamlined apparatus for policy analysis, decision-making and implementation. Botha inherited a political-administrative shambles from his predecessor. Bureaucrats, serving as legally entrenched guardians of the status quo, had acquired legendary expertise in manipulating thousands of laws and regulations on behalf of 40 executive departments—exercising heavy-handed control over people and institutions of every kind, but especially over the lives of blacks and the activities of the private sector. Few ministers could operate creatively in the statutory morass, and few bothered to try.

Accordingly, a top priority has been to create greater maneuvering room for political leadership, expanding the range of available insights, options and devices for new policy development. The traditional device of appointing official commissions in specific policy fields has been converted from a means of burying problems in "further study" to a means of developing hard options. Talented figures from within or outside government have received Cabinet mandates to function as extra-bureaucratic point men on knotty problems (e.g., the planning of Soweto's future). University-based think tanks have gained an unprecedented role as potential agents of change in areas such as the reassessment of homelands policy. Hundreds of statutory instruments are in the process of being scrapped or consolidated. Ranking English and Afrikaans-speaking business leaders have joined the Public Service Commission and parastatal bodies to advise on streamlining the state machine: executive departments have been cut from 39 to 23.

Under Vorster, policy evolved haphazardly with limited interdepartmental coordination or collective Cabinet oversight. Administrative fiefdoms were permitted to develop (the Information Department, the former Bantu Affairs and Development Department) under ministers who tended to be captives of their senior

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officials. Coherence and coordination were largely absent. Botha's team has tackled these issues by creating what could become an awesome instrument of centralization and control. At the center is the Prime Minister's department, strengthened by an enlarged secretariat of trusted senior civilian and military officials who function simultaneously as Botha's staff and a Cabinet staff. Distinct planning groups exist in each of five major policy areas within the secretariat. This body serves as a clearing house and funnel on issues and proposals that flow to it from within or outside the bureaucracy's 15 interagency committees. At the center of policy are five working groups and five Cabinet-level committees, of which the most important is the resurrected statutory State Security Council (created in 1972), a body with the conveniently open-ended function of "formulation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic." Reminiscent of the Nixon-Kissinger National Security Council system, but covering the full span of public policy, this highly articulated and formalistic structure is an elaborate device for assuring coherence and control, through myriad agendas, meetings and policy papers. Whether it works as an "orderly" policy-making vehicle or as a screen for monopolizing policy initiative at the top is a question for the future.

The third ingredient in Botha's coup is the 1980 series of constitutional amendments resulting in the creation of an advisory President's Council, the abolition of the Senate (upper house), and a provision for nominated members of Parliament and Cabinet. Because of their origins, these moves have been misunderstood. Widely heralded in the Afrikaans press as the basis for a "new dispensation" for all South Africans, the changes included a minimal gesture to Coloureds and Asians (invited by appointment to serve on the President's Council) and to Africans (offered a separate, appointive Black Council). When significant black leadership made clear their refusal to participate on unilateral white terms in such institutions, the NP leadership quickly accommodated itself to the fact, unceremoniously scrapping the Black Council. The influential daily *Beeld* noted crisply that it was a "mistake" to attempt political change involving blacks "without their consent." Had a lesson been learned?

The answer remains unclear, but what is certain is the success of the 1980 constitutional moves within the sphere of Afrikaner politics. Equally important, these measures strengthen the domination of Botha's modernizers at the expense of Parliament, the parliamentary NP caucus, and the provincial NP congresses—the

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main perceived obstacles to the kind of autocratic political change apparently envisaged. The beneficiaries are the Cabinet, its key committees and the Prime Minister's office. Only minimal symbolic gestures have been made to the NP's right-wing faction—in the form of two subsidiary Cabinet appointments—during this whole process of Cabinet and constitutional change. The age of modernizing autocracy is upon us, and its next step could be moves toward an executive presidential system patterned on Gaullist France.

VI

The English-speaking South African author Alan Paton believes that we are witnessing "the awakening of Afrikanerdom from its protracted and narcissistic fantasy." If so, this awakening has so far concentrated more on procedure than on substance, on the bureaucratic politics of modernization rather than the bottom line of change. But the point is that, apart from revolution, change can only happen this way.

The modernizers who are taking over Afrikaner nationalist politics, unlike Verwoerd, do not have an ideological blueprint. They have a set of attitudes—pragmatic, flexible, determined—and a concept of strategy defined as the continuing process of matching means and ends. Malan's conception of "total strategy" is redolent of Gaullist and Maoist origins: the struggle against the "Marxist onslaught" (a convenient umbrella term encompassing Walter Mondale, Fidel Castro and African National Congress leader Oliver Tambo) is 80 percent political. It must be met by the mobilization of every societal resource, including those of the black majority.

Gerrit Viljoen's vision of strategy centers on the concept of undefined (obviously) "minimum conditions": Afrikaners would have a mission to survive in southern Africa even if they once again became a subjugated minority, but to avoid this they need an adaptive strategy, learning from "our neighbors" to take "action in good time so as to keep our options clear and free, so that we may direct events. . . . We must guard against the fallacy that there can be any final solutions or a conclusive blueprint, a fixed and infallible master plan." Afrikaners, he argues, must have confidence based on their own history in their ability now to dispense with "excessive" statutory defenses of their group interests. Finally, they need a more humble and humane nationalism, recognizing their own "backwardness," and "blind prejudice," and stressing the group's "unrealized potential."

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The new elites being brought into important policy roles provide some clues about areas of potential change and the level of real interest in change. Business leaders, for example, are the only logical white lobby for addressing the "skills gap" estimated to reach over 700,000 skilled workers and 180,000 professional and technical personnel by 1990. Despite a recent upswing in white immigration, the only real solution is a sustained drive against the inequities of the apartheid education system (whose massive costs in manpower skills alone are apparent to all except those who actually administer it).

The entry of military elites into active participation in the policy process has uncertain implications. Stereotyping military preferences, some observers anticipate the rise of an authoritarian law-and-order mentality, a predisposition toward aggressive cross-border actions and a tendency to view blacks in general as "the enemy." But this prognosis overlooks the fact that these tendencies already existed in some degree before Botha's advent to power. It would be unwise to view the South African Defense Force (SADF) as an instrument of domestic brutality or as the rogue elephant of southern Africa, crashing across borders and wrecking Western interests. In Namibia, there is little evidence that the SADF believes in military solutions; nor is it the source of the atavistic ideologies that have landed South Africans in difficulty. Malan, Botha and their colleagues were in fact the first Afrikaner nationalists to articulate the view that the military's purpose is to buy time for political solutions that would expand domestic support and permit expanded black military recruitment. They were also the first to state publicly that defense depends on avoiding domestic disaffection—as several prominent black leaders have pointed out.

The SADF will maintain a tough external posture aimed at preventing the establishment of neighboring guerrilla sanctuaries, deterring Afro-Cuban conventional opponents, and raising the price of possible Soviet intervention. But one needs also to consider the SADF's potential as a lobby of modernizing patriots whose growing professionalism has altered its composition and self-interests from the days when it was an unprestigious patronage outlet for Afrikaner mediocrity. The nationalism of this largely Afrikaner elite could play a role in the idealistic search for self-renewal so needed by an increasingly materialistic and defensive people. Citizen soldiers have played important roles in Afrikaner history, but this is the first time that career professionals have done so. While there are, therefore, no direct South African precedents, there are plenty of analogies elsewhere.

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VII

The political and attitudinal preconditions for significant change have emerged in recent years, but what kind of change? White South Africans are engaged in an unprecedented ferment of constitutional trial ballooning, both within and outside the official structure. It is a difficult debate to follow, because the ground rules of Afrikaner political discourse inhibit communication with outsiders. The political leadership continues to define its minimum conditions in maximum terms, and whites are likely to remain at the stage of shadowboxing, at least until more is known about the participants and procedures for real intergroup bargaining. Nothing important will be disclosed prematurely, giving the impression that Verwoerdian taboos remain in force. The debate currently centers on terms like "commonwealth," "constellation," "consociation" and, tentatively, "confederation"; still beyond the pale are "power sharing," "federation" and "unitary state." This, of course, fuels charges that we are witnessing another "great evasion" of the core issues.

The Constellation of States proposal launched with much fanfare at a November 1979 businessmen's conference has been almost uniformly interpreted as a diplomatic initiative aimed largely at wooing nearby African countries into some form of regional political association with Pretoria. Its timing in relation to the Zimbabwe transition process and Namibia talks—as well as its similarity with earlier regional initiatives—lends credence to this view. But the constellation idea is more than a warmed-over version of the "outward policy" of the early 1970s; it is also a domestic proposal. Recalling that the terminology for homelands is "black states" (in the case of those that reject Pretoria's offer of "independence") and "independent black states" (Transkei, Venda, and Bophutatswana), the constellation concept is a thinly disguised rubric under which finally to admit the essential unity of South Africa. The doctrinal reunification of the country starts with a direct appeal for business-government partnership within South Africa to undo the economic fragmentation and irrationality of grand apartheid.

The Afrikaner political elite is edging toward a model featuring an economically unified confederation (coded "constellation") and a high degree of political decentralization. Political power would be "divided" (not "shared") among a wide range of units: "independent black states," a projected white-Coloured-Asian government (or governments), and a series of "autonomous" and

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"self-governing" black municipalities located in the "white areas" of South Africa. A new layer of eight to ten economically defined "regions" may be created around regional growth points, displacing (if not replacing) the four existing provinces (Natal, Cape Province, Orange Free State and Transvaal). The apparent aim is to enable homelands to "exercise their political responsibilities in the economic field" at the regional level, while "defusing" political issues that might become unmanageable at the central, confederal level. As elaborated in a detailed plan for Natal prepared by Jan Lombard and his colleagues at the University of Pretoria, that region would have its own authority comprising representatives of urban areas, the KwaZulu homeland government, and white farming zones. A bill of rights would be adopted and all apartheid laws scrapped in the new region.

It is interesting that the Lombard plan, commissioned by white farming and business interests, has appeared simultaneously with other studies: the government's own review of KwaZulu consolidation, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's formation of an Inkatha-based think tank, and the appointment of a 42-member multiracial commission to study Natal's future. In addition to Inkatha, significant Coloured and Asian leaders will serve on the commission as well as white business figures, church leaders, academics, and white opposition parties. The battle of think tanks and commissions appears to have been joined. Pretoria, asked by its Natal supporters to repudiate Lombard's plan, briskly told them to "carry on with your normal jobs and farming." This activity is the closest thing to a potential intergroup bargaining process underway in South Africa today.

VIII

We are entering a period in which it has become possible in white politics to talk about what amounts in practice to power-sharing (no matter how it may be camouflaged). The process of rethinking has started, obliquely, to deal with important political issues. The involvement of Chief Buthelezi and some other black leaders in studying models of change could be the precursor to some form of negotiation, or it could simply signify the hope among blacks that Afrikaners will choose negotiation over open-ended domestic strife. Pretoria can hardly be in any doubt that definitive change, as distinguished from unilateral concessions or adaptation, must be preceded by multiracial bargaining. Yet the procedural basis of intergroup negotiation is barely at the rudimentary stage. Before deciding whether this precondition for

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ordered change can be met, we need to know more about black attitudes, organization, strategies and bargaining power.

The events of the late 1970s have brought the black communities of South Africa to a new level of political awareness and ferment. Millions of people were caught up in the 1976 urban disorders that spread across the country, and millions have learned lessons from the continuing low-level confrontations that have occurred periodically since then. Today, the lives of the blacks are shaped not only by the demands of apartheid legislation and the requirements of economic survival, but also by the presence of increasingly active black organizations (overt and underground). Although overt nationalist politics is often ruthlessly repressed, legal and covert organizational activity of many kinds—some of it blatantly political—takes place.

Black South Africans are increasingly aware of the grossly discriminatory effects of the many laws, rules and customs that govern their lives. The painfully slow process of piecemeal socio-economic amelioration launched by Pretoria and the white business establishment has had little basic effect so far. On the other hand, blacks can also clearly perceive that some change is occurring, and that it results in part from their own actions. Limited violence or peaceful protest actions—over job benefits, education or bus fares—often produce results.

The political reawakening in white politics may open important new avenues for black organizational activity. The two most obvious arenas are urban councils and trade unions, fields in which white-led change has presented black elites simultaneously with a challenge, a threat and an opportunity. Aspirant black leaders are seldom in a position publicly to endorse such change, for obvious reasons. At the same time, the Wiehahn Commission's labor reforms and the spread of elective urban councils create organizational bases that will be filled by someone. Unless they are totally boycotted, they become objects of political competition. The political dilemma is, therefore, what posture to adopt toward these institutions: can they be safely co-opted by blacks for their own purposes as potential bases of influence, or will participants in them be discredited? Is it politically safe to ignore them? Answers to these questions are subject to almost daily revision because black South African tactics are in flux.

The advent of African governments in Angola, Mozambique and now Zimbabwe—following upon guerrilla struggles—unquestionably has had the effect of raising black hopes and expectations. There is growing confidence among the black communi-

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ties of South Africa that the southward spread of basic political change will not stop at the Limpopo and Orange Rivers. Through one means or another, South Africa's domestic colonialism will be ended and black South Africans will gain fuller if not total control of their country. But this new confidence in the potential of black efforts to acquire power raises more questions than it answers. It has varying implications for those committed to violent means and those working within the country or "within the system." It means different things to those with something to lose and those with nothing to lose in a violent upheaval. It also means different things to large and small ethnic groups, and to the Coloured and Asian minorities.

Black politics are fragmented on tactical and leadership issues, however united they may be about the need for change and its inevitability. Many, perhaps most, blacks would like to believe that nonviolent change is still possible. But optimism about the future is certainly tempered by the perception that whites are not yet prepared for major political change; quite a few black lives and material interests may have to be sacrificed in order finally to convince the white establishment to sit down and bargain. The way in which various black groups acquire the power necessary to produce a genuine bargaining process could be costly for all South Africans.

For all these reasons, the black political arena is an increasingly complex puzzle for outsiders to measure and for participants to operate in. No single leader or organization has a monopoly of legitimacy or a coercive preponderance in the black communities. The question of how best to organize for future bargaining with whites—as guerrillas, trade unionists, civic associations, students and writers, consumers and entrepreneurs, cultural-political movements, and government and business employees—remains without a definitive answer. It is risky to burn one's bridges in any direction.

Three things can be said with certainty. A competitive race is underway among blacks to fill the many organizational vacuums (or seize the new opportunities) that exist (or are being created by the government) within the diverse black communities. Some of the sporadic violence reported to the outside world as a function of black-white confrontation is, in reality, a reflection of this competition. Tests of organizational strength—between students, trade unions, and homeland and urban politicians—can be safely predicted.

The exile-based African National Congress (ANC) possesses sig-

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nificant assets as the oldest nationalist movement among blacks, but it has no guarantee of ultimate victory in the struggle over who will sit at subsequent bargaining tables. The ANC is today the group most active in guerrilla/sabotage operations, and its former leaders (notably Nelson Mandela) are among the country's best known political prisoners. It has legitimacy for many, if not most, politically aware blacks at the symbolic level as a unifying umbrella for nationalist activity. Few are prepared to repudiate it publicly. Outside South Africa the ANC is relatively well organized and funded, compared to other groups; reportedly its underground internal structure is also becoming more effective.

On the other hand, a variety of battalions can march under the banner of African nationalism at this stage in the conflict, and it may be neither possible nor necessary to resolve all divisive issues today. If the ANC were legalized now, a grand coalition, though fragile, might develop. But if it remains underground, the passage of time may deepen the rivalry between externally based and internal elites. Provided Pretoria permits them to operate, there is every reason to suppose that trade unions, civic and urban associations, affiliates of the Black Consciousness Movement, internal Coloured and Asian parties, and Chief Buthelezi's Zulu-based Inkatha movement will gather organizational strength.

Many issues could splinter nationalist unity: the acceptability of political compromise with the whites; the use of physical intimidation by black against black; the fact of the ANC's financial and material support from Moscow and the role of white communists in the movement; and the legitimacy of ethnic-based politics (e.g., Inkatha) and of movements whose power base is a part of the South African official system. Over time, actual experience will produce a clearer pattern of leaders and tactics.

Third, the black communities of South Africa do not possess the means for a direct assault on white power, and there is little likelihood that this will change soon. The attitudinal ingredients of a potential revolution may be present, but the physical ones are not. Threatening groups or elites can be ruthlessly contained and controlled, and in the absence of reliable guerrilla sanctuaries, it is no simple matter to persuade or coerce disunited and impoverished populations in the rural areas to support a sustained guerrilla effort. Today and for some time to come Pretoria will be in a position to punish severely any neighbors that support or tacitly tolerate anything more than a token guerrilla presence. In the major urban centers black townships can be quickly cut off from the means of subsistence—food, water, electricity, commu-

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nications, transport and jobs. Spontaneous violence is likely to be highly self-destructive and, in any case, is more useful as a mobilizational and public relations device than a military tactic. The means for sustained urban terrorism are developing but remain at an embryonic stage.

This is not to say that South Africa is invulnerable or that it will remain mostly peaceful. It is simply to note that the balance of coercive power remains overwhelmingly in favor of the whites, and the outcome of violent challenges remains entirely predictable. There is every reason to anticipate continued and even gradually increasing political conflict and violence of several types ranging from sporadic terrorist acts to mass demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, urban disorder and sophisticated sabotage against South Africa's many soft targets. The aim of such measures varies: to wear down domestic morale, to raise the price of the status quo, to focus attention on specific immediate grievances, to discredit Pretoria in Western eyes, and to instill discipline and political awareness among blacks. South Africans are at the beginning of a potentially long process.

Thus it is misleading to speak in terms of a simple choice between peaceful and violent change, and wrong to assert that it is too late to forestall mass revolutionary violence. The still enormous disparity in the kinds of physical power in the hands of the white and black communities provides a margin of time and firm check on sudden political disintegration.

Consequently, it is fatuous to argue that whites have already lost the initiative within South Africa. The importance of internal white politics derives from the fact that, on the one hand, whites continue to hold effective power and cannot be *forced* to share or transfer it; on the other hand, the way white leadership plays its cards will help to shape the question of who sits at future bargaining tables and under what circumstances. The governing white minority cannot "solve" the domestic political conflict unilaterally. But it *could* move to defuse a potential crisis, and take steps that would make genuine bargaining possible. Today's white debates and black organization activity both have important implications for an eventual choice between what white opposition leader F. Van Zyl Slabbert has called "siege politics" and "negotiation politics." Autocratically imposed reform *could* become part of a process leading at a future stage to compromise and accommodation between freely chosen representatives of all major groups.

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IX

U.S. officials correctly insist that the timetable and the blueprint for change in South Africa are not for outsiders to impose. Yet, without Western engagement in the region as a whole, it will not be possible to assure that South Africans are permitted to build their own future. The American stance must be firmly supportive of a regional climate conducive to compromise and accommodation in the face of concerted attempts to discredit evolutionary change and to exploit the inevitable ambiguity and periodic "incidents" that will accompany political liberalization.

Provided the Western nations know how to capitalize on it, there is at present a window of opportunity to create such a climate in southern Africa. Most of the region's governments are in pragmatic hands. With increased investor confidence and a readiness to build on the substantial interstate linkages already in place, this heartland of non-fuel minerals could surpass its already impressive 45 percent share of the gross domestic product of all of sub-Saharan Africa. Conflicts in Namibia and Angola seem tantalizingly close to some resolution, an eventuality that would further erode a Soviet position already weakened by Robert Mugabe's current policy line in Zimbabwe. But none of these possibilities can be taken for granted. Southern Africa's political climate is in a fragile transition phase, and it may prove to be easier to destroy and destabilize its potential than to build on it.

To take the initiative, Washington will need a sustained and nimble diplomacy, responsive to the pragmatic instincts of regional leaders. We do not face a choice between aligning ourselves with black or white since our interests cross racial lines; nor can we operate on the basis of a Marxist/non-Marxist litmus test in the choice of regional partners because there could be a widening gap between rhetoric and performance there. A wait-and-see stance toward delicately poised governments in Zaïre, Zambia and Zimbabwe could result in passing the initiative to others.

The real choice we will face in southern Africa in the 1980s concerns our readiness to compete with our global adversary in the politics of a changing region whose future depends on those who participate in shaping it. The choice has global implications, but the immediate decisions are, more often than not, regional ones. The United States will need the full range of policy tools to deliver increased tangible support for the development and security of African states. Official seed money may be a necessary trigger for expanded participation by the private sector.

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Constructive engagement in the region as a whole is the only basis for Western credibility in Salisbury and Maputo. Our credibility in Moscow and Havana depends on adopting a strong line against the principle of introducing external combat forces into the region—a message best communicated by greater reliability in U.S. performance worldwide. There can be no presumed communist right to exploit and militarize regional tensions, particularly in this region where important Western economic, resource and strategic interests are exposed.

In the bilateral relationship with South Africa, a policy of constructive engagement does not mean rewriting the past 20 years of U.S. diplomacy, because some useful building blocks are already in place. Western governments have made it clear that they have no desire to participate in the defense of white minority rule. Adherence to the U.N. arms embargo and the U.S. refusal to use South African defense facilities are symbolically important ingredients of policy; they should be continued in the absence of major political change, barring a dramatic deterioration in the geopolitical situation facing the West in adjacent areas.

Another building block is the clear Western refusal to resort to trade or investment sanctions against Pretoria, and the recognition that engagement in its economy can be constructive for the majority. Our market economies will apply normal political risk criteria in their reading of the South African investment climate, thereby signaling a message of both hope and concern. The United States must make it clear that it does not intend to enter the slippery terrain of economic sanctions through the back door of incremental restrictions on exports of possible "strategic" value to a threatened state. Constructive engagement does not mean waging economic warfare against the Republic; nor does it mean erecting foolish pinpricks that only erode the American position in South African and world markets.

Another useful building block is the widely accepted understanding that European-American collaboration and mutual respect are the only valid basis for any future undertakings directed toward South Africa—on Namibia or other issues. Similarly, we should continue the readiness under recent U.S. administrations to bring our policies out into the open and to meet publicly with South Africa's top leadership when circumstances warrant it. Constructive engagement is consistent with neither the clandestine embrace nor the polecat treatment.

The innovative feature of constructive engagement is its insistence on serious thinking about the sequencing and interrelat-

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edness of change. Priority ought to be given to those arenas of change that logically lead to, and make possible, future steps. We must avoid the trap of an indiscriminate attack on all aspects of the system—as though each were equally odious and none should be addressed first. If there is a "tilt" in such a policy, it is in favor of sustained and orderly change; in this sense, the United States would inevitably align itself with particular processes, change agents, and political forces in concrete cases.

Several categories of change can be distinguished (in random order): (1) measures to improve the living conditions and opportunities of the black communities; (2) steps that increase black bargaining power by strengthening the capacity to organize and to articulate common interests; (3) developing forums and procedures that expand the potential for intergroup bargaining and accommodation; (4) political-constitutional reform toward power-sharing; and (5) dismantling statutory social barriers and discriminatory access to public services and facilities. Some would argue that power-sharing (if not outright black rule) is the precondition of any major improvement in the economic position of blacks. On the other hand, basic political change of this sort will probably not occur until blacks acquire the economic and organizational base from which effectively to demand a larger share of political power. Improved facilities for intergroup negotiation could accelerate change in all other fields. By contrast, social apartheid (separate bus service, the ban on interracial sex) is probably of less importance to blacks than whites; movement in this field would be of symbolic value, indirectly affecting attitudes on other agendas.

Housing and health policies probably have less to do with power-sharing than does education. The case for education as a priority concern is powerful because it brings a capacity for participation, self-help, communication, and management. While education is the responsibility of Pretoria, its failure until recently even to recognize the problem justifies a determined external push backed by official and non-government facilities and inducements. Ironically, some black exiles currently receive externally sponsored scholarship and travel aid, but little has been done by Western governments and educational institutions to focus on upgrading internal opportunities or to support overseas study by persons committed to returning to their country. A major target of black aspirations has had a minimal echo among Americans.

Washington needs to develop priorities in the political-constitutional field. Piecemeal power-sharing steps deserve support if

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they are (a) consistent with the goal of expanded black political advancement, (b) demonstrably agreed to by the participants in them, and (c) not inconsistent with an open process of change. The United States cannot align itself with a policy of forcibly expatriating black South Africans to become citizens of inequitable ministates (the homelands); and it should not recognize the grant of "independence" to them in the absence of a meaningful test of the opinions of those affected by such action. But we can support the devolution of real power to local and regional bodies—assuming it meets the above criteria—as a constructive step.

The argument that the West can only support power-sharing that is preceded by a full-blown national convention keeps us immobilized by a distant objective. Since South Africa is a sovereign state, only the government itself can call and supervise such an exercise, and how likely is it that Pretoria would receive unanimous internal and international sanction to do so? The United States cannot place itself in the position of rejecting political change agreed to by substantial elements in the black communities without, in effect, granting a veto to other elements to determine the legitimacy of change. Americans have no mandate to judge how much reform is enough; but neither do we have the right to decide which black groups and leaders are "legitimate" representatives of the majority. If that is true for us, it is also true for others in the international community who might be tempted to follow the disastrous Namibian precedent of turning the United Nations into a propaganda agent for their favorite nationalist group before the Namibians have even voted.

The questions of sovereignty and citizenship are central to political change. The current white debate draws loosely reasoned parallels with the European Economic Community. Yet there is a basic contrast between splitting a single state into a "multinational confederation" and merging separate states into an economic community. The very term "confederation" implies multiple sovereignty, which perhaps explains why it has not been a stunning constitutional success in modern history. Unless Pretoria is prepared seriously to consider a *negotiated* partition, it ought to admit the concept of a unitary South African citizenship. It would be a potent signal of a new era, without committing anyone to any specific degree of centralized political institutions.

South Africa is a rigid society, severely lacking in the institutions and procedures that would permit bargaining and resolution of intergroup differences, in fields ranging from collective bargaining to municipal planning and the setting of bus fares. If meaningful

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power-sharing is to occur, it must be accompanied by the creation of new mechanisms for articulating and balancing interests. It should not be our purpose to impose American institutions on South Africa, but we can offer to share experiences, transmit concepts, and facilitate the creation of South African institutions, procedures and skills. The much-debated Sullivan Principles on fair employment practices by U.S. firms in South Africa offer a case in point. The endless reassessments in the United States and other Western nations of the content of *our* codes, the adequacy of *our* monitoring procedures, and the performance of *our* firms misses a larger point. The focus of effort should be to South Africanize fair employment concepts and raise the standard of corporate performance throughout that economy, where local firms account for the bulk of jobs. Employment codes will have the greatest credibility when black and white South Africans are writing and implementing them.

It is not plausible to argue that piecemeal reforms will lead inexorably to basic political change. Western policy should operate on the more modest assumptions that white-led change has just begun to get underway, and that the black communities will gain greater organizational strength through one means or another. Today's proposals are but a preview of what could evolve as bargaining positions and attitudes are shaped by actual experience.

It is too soon to predict whether blacks will conclude that physical violence on a large scale is the most effective avenue for challenging white control, or even whether it will prove to be "necessary." But despite the uncertainties, the West has everything to gain if it succeeds in pressing white-led change in the direction of real power-sharing and in strengthening the capacity of blacks inside South Africa to participate in shaping a changing system. If we can assist the society to better manage its intergroup conflicts, the temptation of violence will be reduced.

Can our policies, in fact, do these things? The U.S. government itself does not possess or control many of the instruments of influence that will make constructive engagement effective. It is not proposed that Washington finance the process of South African change, any more than it can dictate its terms. In selected areas such as education and cultural exchange, expanded official funding support could play a useful role through the intermediary of non-government institutions with expertise in these fields. In addition, tax policy may offer some leeway to provide positive incentives for U.S. corporations in South Africa to participate

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more aggressively in black socioeconomic advancement. To the extent that money is an obstacle in specific areas, the American banking system may be able to respond more effectively than government, as in the case of some $36 million in private bank loans arranged through the auspices of the non-government Urban Foundation in 1978 to support the 99-year leasehold housing project. Other target areas where Western financial backing could supplement and support local non-government initiatives include black business and agricultural development, education loans, and the expansion of community services.

An important role of official U.S. policy is to lay down guidelines, help create a climate supportive of constructive engagement by other Western governments, and encourage our diverse and pluralistic society to engage with, not turn away from, a changing South Africa. The skills, procedures and institutional clout of American foundations, unions, corporations, media, self-help organizations, professional groups, universities and cultural exchange bodies offer a vast potential as constructive agents of engagement in the U.S.-South African relationship. The government cannot duplicate these assets. Nor can it direct and orchestrate their potential contribution, and any effort to do so could easily backfire both at home and abroad. But Washington nevertheless has an important symbolic and facilitative role to play.

One essential diplomatic tool is a reliable and mutually respected channel of communication between senior officials of the two governments. Too often in the past it has been easier for the two sides to make scapegoats of each other, end-run each other's accredited representatives, and avoid a serious effort at mutual comprehension. There must be a primary channel in which Washington makes known its suggestions, issues its warnings, and offers its reactions to events and decisions. Communication "for the record" at home and abroad is a well-developed art form in U.S.-South African policy. Communication in the sense of actually transmitting ideas and signals about change is not.

Publicly expressed encouragement and support of positive steps is another important tool of policy. When South Africa's limited but real policy changes and its obvious political flux are continuously described by Western officials as "the status quo"—and when our officials speak only the language of ticking clocks and time bombs—it is not likely that we will be taken seriously by the leadership there. A tone of empathy is required not only for the suffering and injustice caused to blacks in a racist system, but also for the awesome political dilemma in which Afrikaners and other

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whites find themselves. The casualness and condescension with which Western observers endorse the benefits of cataclysmic political change for other societies may be one reason why the West finds itself to be ineffective in regions of tension and civil conflict. Support for evolutionary change implies sensitivity to the concerns of local actors, and is nothing for us to be reticent about. Such a stance also gives us a little-noted source of leverage because of the certainty that if we cease supporting it, no one else will take our place.

Pressure also has a role to play in a policy of constructive engagement. Pressure in both the public and diplomatic channels can strengthen the hand of official modernizers and other agents of change, adding to the far more important forces at work within South African society. Pressure can communicate to various audiences U.S. recognition of the unacceptability of current policies to the majority of South Africans, and it can also dissociate us from odious official behavior. Provided there is some relationship between the specific means applied and the ends sought, pressure in the arm-twisting sense can also offer Washington some influence, and that influence is likely to increase with the adoption of a more actively constructive policy.

On the other hand, the option of "punishment" in the context of mandatory U.N. sanctions carries a heavy price tag since such measures are in practice irreversible and tend to erode rather than strengthen future influence and flexibility. Western impatience with the inadequate pace of change in general is no excuse for indulging in the application of pinprick pressures and minor wrist-slapping proposals. These may offer us quick, temporary relief, but in South Africa they only underscore our futility.

The prime ingredient in an effective policy is to maintain a close, ongoing watch on the situation while carefully assessing our own bargaining position. American powder should be kept dry for genuine opportunities to exert influence. As in other foreign policy agendas for the 1980s, the motto should be: underpromise and overdeliver—for a change.

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Christoph Bertram

RETHINKING ARMS CONTROL

That arms control as a concept for international order and as a tool for restricting military competition is in deep trouble today, is so obvious that it has become almost a truism. The lessons that both skeptics and supporters of arms control have learned from this experience are very different. The skeptics, though often paying lip service to "true arms control," feel certain that effective arms control, in the sense of serving the security interests of the West, is simply illusory so long as the Soviet Union and the United States are locked in continuing rivalry. The supporters see the reasons for the disappointing record of arms control not in the concept but in its political presentation; the failure of arms control, to them, is due to hopes having been too high and expectations too great. Arms control can be revitalized, they argue, if we begin to be more modest in our objectives and expectations.[1]

Neither of these positions is fully convincing. Rivalry, however deep-rooted, does not exclude limited compromise; indeed, with concern in Moscow mounting over the emerging Western reactions to earlier Soviet weapons programs as well as over internal economic strains, Soviet readiness to accept effective restraints on their own programs in exchange for restraints on Western efforts may well increase; the past ten years are no reliable guide for the next ten. Nor does modesty alone promise satisfactory results. "More of the same but less so" may avoid some of the problems that have, in the past, delayed effective regulation of the East-West military competition; but again this implies that we can project the past decade into the future, that the basis on which arms control policies were once built can remain the same.

The cause for the malaise is much deeper. It is not merely due to a misunderstanding of what arms control can and cannot do, which could be cleared up by bringing lofty objectives down to

[1] Recent representatives of this school of thought are Leslie H. Gelb, "The Future of Arms Control: A Glass Half Full," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1979, pp. 21–32; and Barry M. Blechman, "Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have a Future?" *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980, pp. 102–25.

Christoph Bertram is Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

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more realistic levels. Arms control is in crisis for more fundamental reasons: the international environment does not now seem to lend itself to serious compromise; current and future strategic concerns seem to find too little reflection in the present arms control approach; and the tools for controlling arms, for limiting forces, and for military options seem in themselves no longer adequate to the job. Unless arms control policies again address these basic problems, there can be little effective regulation of military competition except through unilaterally offsetting the military power of the other side—a reversion to the pre-arms control era whose dangers arms control was precisely designed to avoid.

II

Successful arms control requires a favorable international climate, domestic support, and credible instruments. The present situation is lacking all three.

A favorable international climate. It is possible to see, both in the United States and the Soviet Union, a willingness to sit down and negotiate; but it is much harder to discern a readiness to make the kind of concessions that agreement requires. This might be different if arms control could be isolated from the general problems between East and West, if somehow it could be protected against the manifestations of rivalry and antagonism that apply across the board in the political relationship. But we have all learned from the events of the past few years that this is impossible. SALT I, negotiated in less than half the time it took for SALT II, was possible not only because the American and the Soviet sides were willing to agree on some arms limitations, but primarily because they saw a value in their overall mutual relationship—for the Soviet Union the value of recognition as an equal by the only power whose recognition mattered, for the United States the value of domesticating Soviet disruptive power through a network of agreements. If one or both of the major powers no longer attribute a general value to their mutual political relationship, the need for arms control may well be greater; but a reliable political basis for agreements—and that means concessions—does not exist.

Today, with the United States doubtful over the possibility and even the desirability of cooperative arrangements with Moscow, and the Soviet Union at the same time confident in its military strength, worried over the insecurities that confront it at home and abroad, and skeptical about U.S. consistency, the political basis which arms control requires is not there. That one cannot isolate arms control from the overall political relationship was

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amply demonstrated over SALT II: a Soviet brigade in Cuba and Soviet divisions in Afghanistan were enough to jeopardize the chances of a sensible, serious treaty whose ratification would be in the interest of the United States and its allies.

Domestic support. Here again the contrast between SALT I and SALT II is revealing. The former was widely welcomed, not least in the U.S. Congress, as a major achievement, the latter widely denigrated as marginal. This cannot be fully explained by any fundamental difference in the negotiating procedure, in the techniques of restraint applied, or even in the political presentation and support provided by the President and his administration. The reason for the contrast lies elsewhere. While SALT I responded to the dominant strategic concerns of the early 1970s, SALT II does not respond to those of the late 1970s: it cannot preserve the invulnerability of the American Minuteman force, constrain the overall extension of Soviet military power, or cope with the growing threat of Third World conflicts. No doubt the repeated delays in the SALT II negotiations contributed to the growing discrepancy between the objectives of the negotiators and the concerns of the ratifiers, but the lesson seems clear. Unless arms control agreements are seen to be relevant to the security problems *at the time of ratification*, domestic support will be at best lukewarm, at worst absent. It was this, rather than the arguments of the SALT II opponents, which put the agreement on ice. Those arguments were generally convincingly repudiated by the Administration once it came to the Senate hearings. But the Administration's response had only a limited effect because SALT was no longer seen as central to America's security.

The instrument is wearing out. For SALT I, Gerard C. Smith, the chief negotiator, noted that the text was "carefully tailored so as to be simple to verify."[2] Since then, the subject matter of arms control has become increasingly complex, and verification will inevitably become more difficult. More important, the hope that to limit military competition one only needs to limit the numbers of specific weapon systems has been profoundly disappointed. Military competition in the nuclear strategic (or any other) field has not been less but more intense under SALT; specific limitations on specific weapon systems have spawned new efforts in the unconstrained areas, as witness the "gray area" problem with European Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF). And as the thrust of arms

[2] Gerard C. Smith, "Negotiating with the Soviets," *The New York Times Magazine*, February 27, 1977, p. 18.

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competition has moved from the quantitative to the qualitative, numerical ceilings of the kind negotiated in SALT or attempted in the Vienna mutual and balanced force reduction talks (MBFR) can no longer, like the worn-out escapement on a clock wheel, interrupt the movement and thus regulate it.

III

There is, therefore, no quick repair for arms control, and even more modest expectations are not enough to give arms control a more than marginal role in the implementation of security policy. For those who wish a more prominent role for arms control, as this author does, the question must, therefore, be how to recreate the conditions under which arms control can work properly. Elements of the answer follow from the preceding analysis. If it is correct, then we must seek to achieve a relationship between East and West in which restraints on military competition seem worth accepting for both sides; arms control must again address the dominant security concerns; and the tool has to be adapted to the new requirements. None of this will be easy or rapid.

The political framework for Soviet-American détente needs to be rebuilt. This will be more difficult than it was in the 1950s. Then, America's power and international position not only prompted the Soviet wish for recognition and the Soviet readiness to pay a price for it, but also allowed the United States to view détente with the confidence of strength. If many in the United States today feel that détente has served the Soviet but not the American interest, this often seems to result less from a detailed analysis of détente than from a general uneasiness over the role and position of the United States in the world of the 1980s.

That uneasiness may now be giving way to a new consensus in favor of a stronger, more self-reliant, more assertive America, and perhaps a new confidence in détente may emerge with it. If it does, then the notion of détente should not merely serve—as has been the established phrase—to prevent nuclear war; the danger of nuclear war between the two superpowers is among the lesser dangers today and alone cannot justify why the United States should seek, in addition to deterrence and containment, détente. Rather, it would be appropriate to return to the comprehensive concept formulated repeatedly by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during his time in office though never really tried: competition, if possible according to agreed rules; effective incentives for cooperative, and credible sanctions against disruptive,

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Soviet behavior.[3] It must not only be risky again for the Soviet Union to undermine Western security interests but also worth its while to respect them.

Is the Soviet Union willing and able to enter into a détente relationship of *mutual* advantage? The combination of fears of encirclement and confidence of power, which marks the current mood of the Soviet leadership, may give a lower priority to the search for a "special relationship" with the United States, but does not foreclose it. The recent Soviet agreement to discuss constraints on medium-range missiles, even in the absence of a SALT II ratification, underlines the Soviet Union's interest in the arms control process. Both the traditional Soviet respect for America's regenerative capability and the Soviet longing for predictability in international affairs argue for a continued, if reduced, Soviet emphasis on—admittedly, selective—détente with the other superpower.

But how does one rebuild détente between the superpowers? Two of the more popular suggestions among détente supporters in the West are unlikely to do the job: European initiatives and arms control.

The first—the idea that West European initiatives could move both major powers toward a renewed interest in détente—was the official explanation behind the visits to President Leonid Brezhnev undertaken by France's President Giscard d'Estaing and West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the first half of 1980. It is true that stability in Europe is a symbol of détente, and it is difficult to think of a more convincing one. But it does not follow that Europe can also be a motor for Soviet-American rapprochement. On the contrary, such attempts would risk strengthening those in the Soviet Union who believe that Soviet military preponderance has a sobering effect on West European governments, and those in the United States who interpret differences of view between Europe and America as a lack of solidarity on the part of America's allies. Unless the major powers themselves want to deal with each other, there will be no rapprochement.

The other popular suggestion is that arms control should be the horse that can pull the cart of détente out of its present mud. Hence the proposals that the European Security Review Conference, now underway in Madrid, should address itself to "military détente," and the hope for new negotiations, such as those on

[3] See in particular Mr. Kissinger's statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 19, 1974, reprinted as "Detente: The American View," *Survival*, January/February 1975, pp. 35–42.

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medium-range missiles. However, this view suggests not only that the lessons of the past years have not been learned: Soviet-American relations, after all, deteriorated despite the ongoing SALT process. It also confuses the political effect of agreements with the effect of negotiations. While an *agreement* on arms limitation can serve as an important symbol of détente, which is one reason why ratification of SALT II would have helped, *negotiations* on arms control are détente-consuming, not détente-producing, since they highlight military asymmetries, generate concerns over military disadvantages, tempt linkages, and thus tend to increase rather than attenuate military and political distrust.

This underlines the obvious: there are no shortcuts to a superpower relationship in which both sides have a substantive interest in détente. It has to be built by the major powers themselves, and in the wider political, not in the narrow arms control context. There are, today, few signs that the Soviet Union or the United States is willing to minimize frictions and maximize consideration for the interests of the other. Until they are willing to do so—and that may have to wait, in the United States, for a new confidence about America's role in the world and, in the Soviet Union, for a new leadership less bent on accumulating military power and more conscious of long-term economic needs—the political climate for imaginative and constructive arms control will not be there.

The second condition for successful arms control, domestic support, will be equally difficult to meet. It requires that arms control once again become relevant to major security concerns. But this raises another, prior condition: unless we first know the requirements for our security, we cannot define the contribution that arms control can make to it. The central difficulty in defining the purpose of arms control for the 1980s lies in the difficulty of defining our security requirements under new technological and political circumstances. Today, the security no less than the arms control debate is marked by conceptual uncertainties. Three examples may illustrate this.

Short-term concerns dominate much of the nuclear strategic debate. The vulnerability of land-based systems is seen by many as the major challenge to strategic stability as traditionally defined, and the new mobile MX missile, possibly together with some active defenses, is seen as the answer to the problem: once the gap is filled, invulnerability will be restored. But is this really the problem? The thrust of delivery technology goes in the general direction of declining invulnerability for strategic launchers. What we are witnessing today for fixed land-based missiles, we may see

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in a more distant future for sea-based missiles as well: no abrupt change, but a creeping process toward vulnerability. The claim that the vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles offers a temporary strategic advantage to the Soviet Union, the so-called window of vulnerability, has obscured this trend.

Similarly, the recently announced "new strategic doctrine" of Presidential Directive 59, which emphasizes the selective use of nuclear weapons, raises more questions than it answers.[4] Is the ability to wage protracted nuclear war through a series of selective strikes a means of deterrence or a scenario for use? Since both sides can conduct selective strikes, can such a doctrine be implemented without much greater emphasis on active missile defense? What are the doctrinal and technical requirements for secure strike forces? And, since there are no conceptual limits to the size of strategic forces built into the doctrine, how much is enough?

The second example of the prevailing uncertainty in defining the requirements for security concerns the extension of America's deterrence to her allies. Together, the trend of the technology, Soviet-American nuclear parity, and the concern over the survivability of nuclear delivery systems will make a NATO doctrine that assumes a first use of nuclear weapons by the West gradually but increasingly uncertain. This will not only affect the purpose of nuclear modernization programs in Europe as to whether the alliance should seek, through the introduction of longer range delivery systems in Europe, to replace or to facilitate America's strategic deterrence. It will also affect conventional force structures in Europe, for if conventional deficiencies can no longer be offset by the threat of nuclear weapons, how can conventional forces best serve to deter? And, given the overall decline in available manpower throughout the West, how realistic are options which call for more conventional forces?

The third example is the implication of Third World conflict for our security and the relevance of military force to deal with it. We are only beginning to sort out these questions. What can be the functions of outside military force in Third World contingencies? What options are needed? When are expeditionary forces counterproductive, what should be their size, what reserve capabilities would be needed and from where?

Unless the questions raised in these three examples are tackled, we cannot define Western military requirements for the 1980s. It follows that it is also not possible to define the objective of arms

[4] See Richard Burt, "U.S. Stresses Limited Nuclear War in Sharp Shift on Military Strategy," *The New York Times*, August 6, 1980, p. 1.

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control in such a way that it will correspond to the strategic concerns of this decade. If there is no consensus on the requirements for nuclear strategic deterrence, there can be little on the purpose of strategic arms control. Unless there is a durable concept for medium-range delivery systems in NATO's doctrine, any bargain will be struck without a clear idea of the consequences. And the possibility of having to draw on U.S. forces stationed in Europe for Third World contingencies will affect the basis of the Vienna negotiations between East and West over the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, since they would restrict the ability of European forces to make up for American reductions. Without a clearer notion of the military requirements of our security, there can be no concept for arms control agreements that are more than politically and militarily marginal, and possibly even counterproductive.

Again, the conceptual rethinking will take time. The strategic studies community inside and outside of governments is still dominated by technological preoccupations, not conceptual ones. Moreover, in spite of the vast increase in nuclear arsenals and the refinement of nuclear plans, the notion of deterrence is still a surprisingly primitive one—how to make war for the other side so costly that it will not be launched. Too little thought is given to another aspect of deterrence—how to discourage the other side from embarking on weapons programs which, from one's own perspective, are undesirable for strategic stability. Indeed, the ability of Western strategists to put themselves into Soviet shoes—the essential condition for defining effective deterrence—remains underdeveloped. In its decision to introduce new, longer range theater nuclear missiles in December 1979, NATO gave little serious thought to the possible Soviet reaction, in spite of Brezhnev's warning two months earlier that the introduction of these weapons would "change essentially the strategic situation on the continent."[5]

Similarly, the cavalier fashion in which the so-called new strategic doctrine of the Carter Administration was issued through deliberate newspaper leaks not only demonstrated a surprising disregard for the awe in which public opinion the world over rightly holds all nuclear matters; it also seems to have been issued with too little consideration as to how the Soviets would read the document, how they would react to it, and whether that reaction would be in America's and the West's interest. The prevailing

[5] See his East Berlin speech of October 6, 1979, reprinted in *Survival*, January/February 1980, p. 29.

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Western view of deterrence is still that what the Soviets dislike most deters them best. But can this offer a basis for a stable deterrence relationship?

Finally, in addition to generating interest in a cooperative East-West relationship and to clarifying the military requirements of our security, we will have to rethink the tools for arms control and develop them to cope better with the tasks ahead. The poverty of new ideas on the substance of arms control is underlined by the wealth in procedural proposals: for Europe, the French and the Warsaw Pact plans calling for multilateral arms control negotiations; for SALT, the debate over the respective merits of comprehensive versus installment approaches. But suppose the procedures were all agreed upon, the agendas fixed, and the negotiators had sat down around the table. We would still be in no better position to know how to achieve effective arms control against a dynamic technological background, or how to verify the agreements satisfactorily.

There are not many new ideas around for an approach to arms control that can fit the conditions of military competition in the 1980s.[6] At the moment, only a few basic elements of future arms control are emerging: that it is no longer sufficient, at a time of rapid technological change, to concentrate on quantitative ceilings for specific types of weapons; that rather than restrict specific weapon systems—the military input—one should seek to restrict specific military missions which are deemed mutually undesirable—the military output; and that verification by "national technical means" will have to be complemented by a much greater willingness, particularly but not only on the part of the Soviet Union, to make military programs and intentions more transparent. But it is one thing to identify the elements, another to bring them together for a practicable approach.

IV

All this argues not for major new initiatives but for a lot of rethinking to be done before arms control can again make a major contribution to international order. Yet arms control is too political a theme to wait so long. It is on the agenda now. Nor is it reasonable to expect that the Soviet Union will not make propaganda appeals to the hopes held by many, particularly in Europe,

[6] Those who have tried include Alton Frye, "Confidence-Building Measures in SALT," in Jonathan Alford, ed., "Confidence-Building Measures," Adelphi Paper No. 149, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979; and myself, "Arms Control and Technological Change: Elements of a New Approach," Adelphi Paper No. 146, 1978.

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for a slowdown in military competition, just as it is unrealistic to expect political leaders in election campaigns not to identify with these hopes. Arms control policies, therefore, will not wait until a new conceptual framework is ready.

In this interim period, three types of action seem appropriate: maintain the process, negotiate step by step, and emphasize confidence-building.

First, maintain the process. This means that current negotiations should be continued and radical departures avoided. The frustrations of conducting the SALT, MBFR or other current negotiations may be considerable, but the political cost of their breakdown and the political effort required to relaunch them would be significantly more so. President Carter's attempt, in March 1977, to redefine the objective of the SALT II negotiations brought perhaps marginal improvements in the agreement but these could not offset the delay and the distrust that ensued, from which SALT II never recovered; one can only hope that in the light of this experience, future administrations will rein in any ambitions for changing course in the midst of negotiations.

A breakdown of the SALT process, moreover, would have a profound political effect; in Western Europe, for instance, NATO's nuclear modernization program would rapidly run out of political support if the United States were seen to abandon the process, since the political support in Europe for the new weapons rests on the American readiness to negotiate in earnest over their limitation. Today, as ratification of SALT II seems no longer realistic to expect, American political leaders therefore will have to make clear that this is by no means the end of the SALT process, perhaps by an undertaking to respect the SALT I and II limits, and an invitation to the Soviet Union to explore together the agenda for a longer term agreement on strategic forces.

Second, negotiate step by step. The search for comprehensive agreements is both too cumbersome and, at the present juncture of conceptual uncertainties, too ambitious. In practice, this will mean identifying those issues which are both pressing and can be dealt with separately, and then proceeding to negotiations. Modesty is warranted not only by the complexities of the issues but also by the uncertainty over the basis on which to judge the impact of constraints. The objective, therefore, should be to regulate rather than reduce military competition. And special care will have to be given to ensuring, through new procedures within national bureaucracies as well as within the alliance, that the implications of each separate negotiation can be assessed on

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the basis of their interrelationships, i.e., on a continuous, not merely an ad hoc basis.

Third, emphasize confidence-building. There is value in agreements on restricting troop movements and maneuvers in sensitive regions such as Europe, and in generally increasing the transparency of the military effort. A number of measures can serve this purpose: advance notification of missile tests, a successful conclusion to the MBFR debate on Soviet and East European military data, exchange of information in Standing Consultative Committees such as the one created for SALT, etc. And if the French proposal for a European Disarmament Conference should succeed in extending the zone for military restrictions to all the European part of the Soviet Union—the only European territory not covered by the confidence-building commitments agreed upon at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—this would be an important precedent for future agreements.

V

How would these recommendations translate into propositions for the negotiations, begun in Vienna in mid-October 1980, between the Soviet Union and the United States on medium-range missiles in Europe?

The Soviet readiness to sit down and negotiate appears to be meant seriously, and the West is certainly not in a position to refuse to negotiate. Instead of insisting on unrealistic conditions, such as the inclusion of French and British strategic systems or the prior ratification of SALT II, the Soviets have accepted a bilateral negotiation with the United States, to deal with medium-range missiles and "forward-based systems"—U.S. delivery systems stationed in Europe and capable of carrying nuclear bombs against targets in the Soviet Union. It is true that to include the latter in negotiations will prove a major complication—for example, NATO's many dual-capable aircraft—but this has for too long been on the list of Soviet arms control priorities for it to be dismissed as a mere gimmick. Indeed, from the Soviet perspective the inclusion of both U.S. missiles and U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft makes sense; the Soviet Union sees in them an additional U.S. option for nuclear threats against itself and views its own medium-range systems as related to it.

What should be the aim of the negotiations? The December 1979 NATO communiqué spells out one set: a common ceiling on medium-range nuclear missiles, if possible lower than the number of systems envisaged in the modernization decision. This would

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include, on the Soviet side, the SS-20 (and possibly the old SS-4 and SS-5) medium-range missiles, and on the NATO side, the Pershing II and cruise missiles.

This is scarcely an ideal starting point for the West. For one thing, the Soviet systems are in place and new SS-20 launchers are being deployed at an estimated rate of one every five days; deployment on the Western side will not begin for some time. Moreover, it strengthens the unfortunate link that NATO politicians and generals have established between the Soviet SS-20 and the Western modernization program. This link is analytically dubious, for the primary military requirement for the NATO program, namely the need to reduce the vulnerability of European-based nuclear delivery systems to Soviet attack, will persist whether the SS-20 program is halted or not; indeed, many of the shorter range Soviet nuclear missiles that are stationed in Eastern Europe and are currently being modernized—such as the SS-21 or 22—can cover NATO's nuclear installations in Europe and are often more appropriate for that task than the SS-20. The link is also politically unwise, for it gives the Soviet Union a powerful lever with which to undermine NATO's program by announcing, once the Soviet program is completed, a halt to SS-20s on the condition that no new systems are introduced on the Western side. It is true that there would be some value in obtaining limitations on the Soviet program and in establishing the principle of parity in European long-range delivery systems, assuming the limitations were effective and parity definable. But there is some question as to whether this can offset the de facto restrictions on Western modernization programs that the SS-20 link could entail.

Both the presentation of the issues and their negotiation must take this into account. It calls for a full presentation of the Soviet nuclear threat in Europe rather than the singling out of medium-range missiles alone. In the negotiations, the West could respond to the Soviet insistence on the inclusion of forward-based systems by calling for restrictions on all other Soviet weapons in Europe—like the SS-21 and 22—which can threaten American nuclear delivery systems in the theater and are not yet limited in SALT. The West might, under the agreement, suggest a separate ceiling for the Soviet SS-4 and -5 missiles, so that the Soviets cannot replace these old systems with new SS-20s. The West might also want to put a ceiling on the number of warheads that each missile should be allowed to carry, following the precedent set by the SALT II agreement.

Verification problems are compounded by the fact that both

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the SS-20 and the new American systems that are to be deployed in Europe will be mobile, and even more so the shorter range nuclear missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft, if they were to be included. Among the many thorny issues of negotiations on theater nuclear forces, this may well be the most difficult one to resolve. Confidence-building measures, designed to reduce the ambiguity inherent in the weapon systems, will be needed to make up, at least partly, for the limits of verifiability. These could include advance notification when missiles or aircraft or their respective platforms are moved; visible distinctions between aircraft for nuclear delivery and non-nuclear aircraft to reduce the ambiguity over mission and range that the inclusion of aircraft in a theater ceiling would pose; and the inclusion of medium-range issues in the SALT Standing Consultative Committee or, possibly, a similar body which includes representatives of the countries in which these systems are based. This would also force the Western alliance to consider the issues of nuclear weapons comprehensively even if the negotiations address only parts of the problem.

VI

If any additional evidence were needed to demonstrate the limitations of the "modest approach" to arms control, the negotiations on medium-range systems in Europe would provide it. First, these negotiations confirm the need for a political climate between East and West that is conducive to a serious, mutual search for agreement; yet they are opening at a time when the political relationship is at its lowest ebb in the last ten years. They also offer the Soviet Union a potential for influencing directly, through appeals to European public opinion, NATO's military decisions and their implementation—a doubtful contribution to political trust between East and West.

Second, they confirm the need for defining the requirements of our security before defining the objectives of arms control. Given the conceptual uncertainties over the future of extended deterrence, the limits of concessions that can be made without damaging Western options cannot be properly defined, just as the value of any Soviet concessions, if they should be made, cannot be fully assessed.

Third, the new negotiations underline the fact that much of the traditional arms control equipment has become inadequate and that new instruments will have to be developed. In the regional context of Europe, even more than in the strategic nuclear area, the limiting of certain weapon systems, unless the functions they

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serve are also limited, will invite either ambiguity or circumvention or both.

The general problems for arms control that this article has pointed to apply beyond the specific issue of negotiations on theater nuclear forces. What we have encountered here is symptomatic of the problem as a whole. Business can no longer be conducted as usual, because the basis has changed and a new framework has not yet been established which would define the objective, the tools and, above all, the contribution of arms control to the maintenance of security of the 1980s.

Paradoxically, in the absence of other, regular forums for dialogue and conflict management between East and West, it is particularly important to maintain the existing arms control process in this period of transition. But unless we start now to develop new concepts for our security in the 1980s and 1990s and, on that basis, define what arms control can do to contribute to it, the process could become not just marginal but irrelevant.

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Fouad Ajami

THE FATE OF NONALIGNMENT

"The only really nonaligned countries in the world," the president of Sri Lanka once quipped, "are the United States and the Soviet Union."[1] A quarter-century after the great historic meeting in Bandung in 1955, what remains of nonalignment? How has the Third World fared since then? How have the heirs of the great historic figures, who most recently met in Havana in September 1979, acquitted themselves and handled the legacy? What kind of baggage will the nonaligned take to their next meeting in Baghdad in 1982? The last surviving member of the leading Bandung figures, U Nu of Burma, now tells us that the movement has been betrayed: "I cannot honestly call it a nonaligned movement. . . . As far as I am concerned I do not see any bright future for it."[2]

A quarter-century is long enough for an "audit." To follow the twists and turns of the Third World journey is to illuminate not only the path of the Third World but the global background against which it operated as well. The hope into which Third World states were born reflected the buoyancy and enthusiasm of youth. It also reflected the hubris of the West—its belief that its former wards would find their way, that the West knew the answers to social fragmentation and breakdown, and that aid and social engineering would remake "traditional" societies.

Likewise, today's despair is in part the harvest of Third World nationalism and in part the product of the liberal world order maintained by the West. The West no longer promises. Its ideas, gunboats, and technology incorporated others into the world and now it does not know what to do with them. There has been a "double revolt," if you will, against the liberal world order—a revolt by clients who no longer believe and by patrons who are

[1] *The New York Times*, May 22, 1979, p. A10.
[2] *Ibid.*, August 5, 1980, p. A3.

Fouad Ajami is Associate Professor and Director of Middle East Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University. His book *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967* is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press.

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too disillusioned and too besieged to honor previous codes and commitments.

II

The men who met in Bandung were dreamers. The world they lived in was not really theirs; relatively speaking they had clean hands. The basic case made in Bandung was simple and issued from classical liberal roots: that men could come together and create states and these states could fulfill their dreams. As their host, Indonesian President Sukarno, put it, they were the "first intercontinental conference of colored peoples in the history of mankind." The hall in which they met, he told his guests, "is filled with and contains the undying, indomitable and invincible spirit of those who went before us. Their struggle and their sacrifice paved the way for this meeting."

The colonial case was no longer persuasive. The West had lost both the nerve and the means to enforce it; and those at the receiving end had lost their tolerance for it. The leaders in Bandung could rightly feel that history was on their side, and that their enemies were swimming against the current. "We knew," said Sukarno, "how to oppose and destroy."[3]

The weapons and the sordid deeds belonged to others. There were no self-inflicted Third World wounds, no self-inflicted genocides. Others had the means of destruction, the arsenals of death. "We, by contrast," said John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of what was then called Ceylon, "come to the conference weak and relatively unarmed. We have no thermonuclear bombs in our pockets, no weapons of chemical or bacteriological warfare up our sleeves, no plans for armament factories or blueprints for ever more deadly methods of genocide in our briefcases." These were the sins of the mighty, the arsenals of others. "Today," said the Ceylonese leader, "the salvation of the world depends not on the great powers but on the lesser countries of the world."[4] Only weakness can speak with such certitude.

Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana; Gamal Abdul Nasser, President of Egypt; Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India; and Sukarno of Indonesia may not have been all that the frenzied masses thought in a moment of historical enthusiasm. After all, they didn't redeem the world, but they also did not labor in vain. Whatever the interpretation of the world we choose

[3] Asian-African Conference, *Selected Documents of the Bandung Conference*, 1955, pp. 1, 2.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

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to put forth, there has been increasing pluralism in the world system. Power—whatever its meaning—*is* more diffuse than it was a quarter-century ago. Some of the concessions the Bandung generation wanted from the mighty have been extracted. Some of the more blatant symbols of inequality have been dealt with. The right of nations (theoretically at least) to fashion their own social systems is now conceded. The solitary loneliness of a Nasser nationalizing the Suez Canal is gone; the willingness to defy the mighty is, if anything, more widely spread. Most of the blatant forms of colonialism have been effectively challenged. To be sure, world inequality is as acute as ever. Diplomats discuss it in endless sessions. U.N. resolutions attack it. Few think that it will be banished, but the political will to challenge it is there. The meaning of October 1973 was that weak, backward societies can defy the will of the mighty and that the world had changed in ways that enabled them to do so.

Only a heretic would want to deny the contributions of the first generation of leaders. To a great extent we live in their shadows. Hard as Anwar Sadat may try to "de-Nasserize" Egypt, or Indonesia to forget Sukarno, or Indians to look back at Nehru in the new and unflattering light of his daughter's ambition, or much as Ghanaians may point to the mess Nkrumah left behind, we must be fair to the dead. They left their heirs a mixed legacy; they resolved some basic questions of identity and self-esteem; they made the powerful give way; they provided a rallying point for fragmented societies; and they stilled the doubts and anxieties of their followers.

Stripped of the romance and passions that came to surround it, of the radicalism that was attached to it, the Bandung generation was, however, not a particularly radical one. Behind the sound and the fury were leaders who wanted their societies to enter the world on more equitable terms.[5] All of them knew the weaknesses of the traditional order in their own societies. Each one of them felt intensely the crisis of backwardness and decay. Each one believed that the state should arrest decline and stagnation and shake off the burden of centuries, that the *ancien régime* was hopelessly and embarrassingly weak, compromised, disconnected from rising social classes, easily subdued, and easily torn to shreds by outsiders.

The energy that propelled them was the comparatively mod-

[5] See the thoughtful essay by Ali Mazrui, "Exit Visa from the World System," University of Michigan, 1980, written for the World Order Models Project.

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erate one of middle-class nationalism. This was the force represented by the Iranian Mohammed Mossadegh (who was not at Bandung but might have been had Iranian history been allowed to take its own course), by Nasser, by Nehru, and by the others. In their own way, these were the non-Western children of the Westphalian nation-state system that had emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century and was now being globalized. The most "extreme" of them might have been Fabian socialists. None of them were nostalgic for imagined traditions.

III

But the heirs of the historic figures are a different breed and live in a different world. The struggle of the first generation was principally fought on the world stage, while the struggle today is for the most part at home.

Nearly a hundred nations came together in Havana in 1979. By then the colonial system had become a receding memory. The nationalist parades had long come to an end. The millennial hopes pinned on the great historic figures had been deflated. State repression had taught non-Westerners that self-inflicted wounds can exceed those of the age of colonialism. Foreign debts and dismal economic records had driven home the difference between nationalist incantations and the task of making societies work.

Still, though, the old world and the old symbols dominated the Havana meeting. Consider the following passage from its final declaration:

> The conference condemned the massive and systematic violation of the most elementary rights of millions upon millions of human beings who live under colonialist or racist domination or who are suffering from the consequences of underdevelopment and economic and social exploitation. The conference cautioned against the exploitation of human rights issues by the great powers as a political instrument in the confrontation of social systems and for purposes of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.[6]

Nothing was said about those who "disappear" in Argentina or of the terror in Ethiopia. The struggle of those who lived under "colonial or racist domination" will continue, as it should; but the struggle of men against those who share their pigmentation, who speak the same language, who claim to "represent" them in international conferences is the grim tale of so many Third World societies today. Of this struggle, the Havana conference said

[6] *The New York Times*, September 10, 1979, p. A6.

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nothing. The gap between individuals and their states is wide indeed; that between the utterances of rulers in world conferences and the daily realities within which life is lived is wider still.

The state that once loomed as salvation and for which men and women fought and continue to do so has too often become an instrument of terror and a means to self-enrichment. It is the betrayal of the bright nationalist dreams of yesterday that denies today's rulers the certitude and the buoyancy possessed by their predecessors. The boundaries between the state of nature and civil society have blurred in so many Third World countries. Yesterday's victims have become today's executioners. Moreover, they do it and get away with it without much protest from outsiders—who either shrug their shoulders and explain it away as the normal despotism of the Orient, as the savagery of the native, or single it out only when it is committed by regimes of hostile ideological leanings.

That the whip is cracked by yesterday's liberators and heroes of national independence, that it should have all come to this, explains much of the anomie, alienation and disillusionment one sees in many Third World societies.

The drive to "catch up" with the more successful societies of the world led Third World elites to herd their people like cattle in search of "new orders." The frequency with which that label is used—Ferdinand Marcos' "new society" in the Philippines, Indonesia's "new order," the "new order" of Indira Gandhi's emergency—reveals a need to justify the situation and to run away from problems. And run away the rulers did—into cardboard industrial projects and into international conferences. The dust and defeat of their societies was left behind and only cleaned up when a Manila hosted an international gathering, or a Monrovia a meeting of the Organization of African Unity, or a Kinshasa a dazzling boxing match. The myth of progress, of a place in the sun, justified inflicting pain and suffering. Before such grandiose claims, the rights of dissidents, the anguish of slum dwellers who had to be moved out of the sight of foreign visitors, were petty concerns. The rulers' grandiose projects promised much and tantalized many, but have failed to deliver. Many states are thus pushed into the arms of foreign powers or driven into greater repression. Repression has reigned where charisma waned.

IV

Much as they may rant and rave about new worlds and new orders, many Third World rulers preside over crippled societies.

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Side by side with the talk of autonomy and power that fills the air has come an accumulation of some basic and deadly troubles.[7]

There has been a steady deterioration of Third World agricultural output. Algeria, once an exporter of wheat, now imports more than two-thirds of its cereals. The Pahlavi quest for an "Asian Germany" went hand in hand with a deterioration of Iranian agriculture. Indonesia, once self-sufficient in rice, is now the leading importer of that commodity. Zaïre, once a food exporter, now spends a third of its export earnings on food imports.

Some of this deterioration has to do with the rise of Third World income and the demographic explosion: food production has on the whole averaged an annual increase of two and a half percent while the demand for it has risen by over three percent a year. A good deal of the deterioration has to do with the kind of industrialization pursued in an earlier era, as Third World governments sought to leap into the industrial age, to emulate what they took to be the secret and the essence of the West, and so to provide consumer durables for rising social classes.

The bias against agriculture had deep psychological roots. Unable and unwilling to borrow and import the institutions of the West—such "heretical" notions as the accountability of rulers, sexual and cultural freedom, women's liberation—the rulers came to equate modernity with industrialization. This was bound to distort priorities and investment allocation. Then there were the additional problems of the dominant import substitution strategy. What was said of the Egyptian drive toward industrialization under Nasser generally applies to most other similar ventures: the whole thing amounted to "the substitution of imports by imports" as the country had to pay increasingly higher bills for new materials and semi-finished goods and grew unable to save and invest.

The cumulative bias against agriculture has altered the international order of trade. We are thus witnessing what economist Arthur Lewis has described as "a turning of the international economy on its head. . . . The division of the world into developing countries that export agricultural products and import manufactures and developed countries that do the reverse is on the verge of ending."[8] And the terms of trade have been duly adjusting in favor of the agricultural products of the developed countries.

[7] See my essay "Third World Intervention: Orphans in Search of a Patron," in *The Nation*'s special issue on intervention, June 9, 1979, pp. 662-68.

[8] Arthur W. Lewis, *The Evolution of the International Economic Order*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 36.

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The West's industrialization was rooted in prior agricultural revolutions. The Third World goal of capturing 25 percent of the world's manufacturing by the year 2000 is a mirage. Even if the Third World broke through tariff barriers and penetrated Western markets, it would, in Professor Lewis' words, "merely exchange one form of dependence for another." The gateway to technological change, he counsels, "is through agricultural and industrial revolutions which are mutually dependent. . . . The most important item is to transform the food sector, create agricultural surplus to feed the urban population, and thereby create the domestic basis for industry and modern services. If we can make this domestic change, we shall automatically have a new international economic order."[9] And if we cannot, then states will seek in world forums the changes that elude them at home, or they will find their way into capital markets and accumulate massive debts that limit their maneuverability and bring in their train new patterns of dependence.

Third World (non-OPEC) debts rose from $142 billion in 1974 to $315 billion in 1978. Debt service rose from $8.7 billion in 1974 to an estimated $33 billion in 1979. Debt service as percentage of export earnings rose from nine percent in 1974 to 17.5 percent in 1979. In so many Third World societies today, the "politics of credit-worthiness" has more to say about the actual conduct of public policies than any ideological exhortations.[10] What the Brandt Commission Report calls the "IMF riots" in Turkey, Egypt, Peru and elsewhere underline the difficulty of governing as states find themselves caught between their creditors' demand for "austerity" and the needs of the populace.[11]

V

Such is the lot of the Third World poor. The rich states among them have an entirely different set of troubles. The "one world" that met in Bandung has become two distinct worlds. Twenty-five years ago, one of the heads of state speaking at the Bandung summit could assert a solidarity that the Third World states shared: "We the nations of the new Asia and Africa, whatever our language, whatever our faiths, whatever our form of government,

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[10] The information on debts can be found in a study by Salomon Brothers, *Lending to LDCs: Mounting Problems*, April 2, 1980. The study was conducted by Thomas H. Hanley.

[11] Willy Brandt et al., *North-South: A Program for Survival*, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1980, p. 216.

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whatever the colour of our skin—black, brown, or yellow—have one thing in common: we are all poor and underdeveloped."[12]

That existential predicament is no longer shared by all: the OPEC cartel of oil-producing nations has become a world apart. While the bulk of the Third World is shackled by debts, the OPEC countries are expected to "accumulate a surplus of about $115 billion during 1980 and of some $350-$450 billion between 1980 and 1985."[13] OPEC spokesmen may drape themselves in the garb of the Third World but to a certain extent they have become a breed apart.

But even in this instance, there is a large question: Where will the wealth lead—above and beyond investments in the West and large private fortunes? Can OPEC countries pull off a public project of some kind, shift to non-oil-based economies, while culturally maintaining their integrity and surviving in the midst of the chaos and turmoil all around them? The results of the first phase of the oil revolution (1974-78) are in, and Iran's breakdown may be a crystal ball in which the other oil producers see their own future. Can the oil states possess the things and machines of the West without adopting its ways? Can they manage the combination of a traditional social structure and the pushbutton technological culture that they have in mind? Can they maintain enough order to keep outsiders at bay or will they then tear each other apart, as the Iran-Iraq war has so bluntly done, and thus invite outside interventions and vindicate the premise that there is no substitute for the might and direct presence of outsiders?

Beneath the wealth remain the essential vulnerabilities of the wealthier of the oil states—sparse populations, large numbers of foreign workers, weak military capabilities, vulnerability to the charges of collaboration with the West, ambitious and covetous neighbors with all the concomitant human resentments and appetites, the social and political upheaval triggered by the Iranian revolution and the attempts to "contain" and defeat it. Then there are all the problems of cultural and economic dualism caused by the new wealth, as new ambitions and possibilities tear asunder the fabric of the social order without really erecting a truly new order. For all their troubles, Western elites live in real states, in cohesive social orders. The gulf between them and the popular culture is tolerable. Many Third World elites come from dual cultures; many don't even know their own societies. They

[12] *Selected Documents of the Bandung Conference*, p. 10.
[13] Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1980, p. 1001.

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seek in the world outside an escape from "embarrassing" traditions and strict normative and cultural limits or from tyranny. The wealth available to them (both the new wealth available to some after 1973 oil price hikes and the traditional booty of political power) provides a means for escape. Nazruddin—a character in V.S. Naipaul's haunting novel *A Bend in the River*—put it this way:

> They [the Arabs] need Europe. They want the goods and properties and at the same time they need a safe place for their money. Their own countries are so dreadful. . . . And they are not the only ones. All over the world money is in flight. People have scraped the world clean, as clean as an African scrapes his yard, and now they want to run from the dreadful places where they've made their money and find some nice safe country. I was one of the crowd. Koreans, Filipinos, people from Hong Kong and Taiwan, South Africans, Italians, Greeks, South Americans, Argentines, Colombians, Venezuelans, Bolivians, a lot of black people who have cleared out of places you've never heard of, Chinese from everywhere. All of them are frightened of the fire. . . .[14]

The capital flight from the Third World—all the way from Nicaragua's ousted President Anastasio Somoza and the Shah of Iran down to the modest middle classes—is the material embodiment of a deeper phenomenon: the disconnection of the state from society, the abandonment of the state as a means to enrichment. Now a large number of Third World states are flailing about, for there is no assurance that leaders can "deliver" their constituents, that they represent anything above and beyond themselves. This is far grimmer to deal with than was thought by outsiders who wanted to tame the Third World. One could "defeat" Third World states, i.e., undermine their hold on their populations, destabilize their regimes, frustrate their economic plans. But then the horrors have to be faced up to: if one helps undermine Cambodia's Norodom Sihanouk one gets the Khmer Rouge; if middle-class nationalism in Iran is never given a chance, one ends up with a Khomeini.

VI

The Third World seems to be going its own way. It is unclear where the destination lies, but there has been a definite erosion of the bonds between the West and the Third World.

Some of the "things" of the West—its weaponry, its fashions, its machines—are coveted and stockpiled by states that can afford them, by individuals who can afford quick trips to London, Paris

[14] V.S. Naipaul, *A Bend in the River*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979, p. 234.

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and New York. But the Western "way" is another matter. The susceptibility to Western judgment is no longer there. Both the West and its colonies once believed that the West knew the answers, that it behaved justly, that it had greater sympathy for the dispossessed, for minorities, for widows, than did native tradition and the native elites.

The editors of *The Wall Street Journal* have described the recent events in Iran as "the receding of civilization." By that they mean the decline of military power, the fact that gunboats no longer intimidate. Indeed, on that *The Wall Street Journal* is quite clear: "This decline of what we have thought of as civilized conduct results from the decline of the Western powers that spread these ideals to begin with, and in particular from the decline of American power, will and influence in the last decade."[15] But a less noticed and, in my view, more important form of power has also slipped away: it is the belief in the moral supremacy of the West, in its right to judge.

The contempt displayed by the Iranian revolutionaries for the ruling of the International Court of Justice on the American hostages is in part explained by the fury and wrath of a revolutionary society; on some level the Iranian revolutionaries must have realized that fighting "foreign devils" was easier than putting together a new society, making things work, bridging the gap between those Iranians long swept by secularism and those to whom religious piety is still a sacred and relevant matter. But the Iranian response revealed the weakness of Western values as well. Time and again in the post-World War II order, conduct had not lived up to pieties, and legalism repeatedly turned out to be just a fig leaf, the sanitized procedural language of the mighty. "International law," wrote Usbek to Rhedi, in Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*, "is better known in Europe than in Asia, yet it can be said that royal passions, the submissiveness of their subjects, and sycophantic writers have corrupted all its principles. In its present state, this branch of law is a science which explains to kings how far they can violate justice without damaging their own interests."[16]

What was then felt by Montesquieu's "Persians" is known to the real Persians of today and to others. The generation of Bandung still believed in the power of world public opinion. And by that they meant the opinions of the West. Today's generation

[15] *The Wall Street Journal*, November 20, 1979.
[16] Montesquieu, *The Persian Letters*, Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1973, p. 176.

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is openly contemptuous of the West's values. The unwillingness of most of the Third World to really condemn the seizing of American hostages in Iran revealed the cultural gulf and the resentments. Whatever diplomatic niceties may be followed, there was satisfaction that the mighty had been humiliated, a conviction that the West's notions of justice were procedural and selective anyway.

The bonds between such radically different worlds were inevitably tenuous. The Carter human rights campaign represented a brief interlude, a reassertion of the liberal internationalist bonds between the Third World and the West. Its eager embrace by the liberal middle classes and the intelligentsia in Iran, in Latin America and elsewhere, showed the persisting need to believe in something, in someone, the need to have an arbiter. There was enough Wilsonianism left in America, or so it appeared, and enough need for it in the world at large. But the Carter detour was brief and problematic. There were many loopholes in the policy and, besides, it never quite carried at home.

The backing into blunt military prescriptions on the part of the Carter Administration in the aftermath of Iran and Afghanistan represented an abandonment of the early designs and preferences of Mr. Carter and his associates. The goals of human rights, nonproliferation, and all the other lofty causes of the "new politics" were set aside. The prescriptions of *embourgeoisement*, of selective admission of some key Third World members into the club of the rich, were overtaken by events. The result is a kind of resigned pessimism in the West, a break with the certitude of the American variety that held out the promise that all others could be brought into the world system and taught the virtues of representative government. At the root of the new pessimism can be seen that older, distinctly non-American sensibility about "civilized" and "barbarous" nations. These are two distinct worlds, observed John Stuart Mill, and we can't hold them up to the same standards:

> There is a great difference between the case in which the nations concerned are of the same, or something like the same, degree of civilization, and that in which one of the parties to the situation is of a high, and the other of a very low, grade of social improvement. To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another and between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no statesman can fall into, however it may be that those who, from a safe and unresponsible position, criticize statesmen. . . . To characterize any conduct towards the barbarous people as a violation

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of the Law of Nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject.[17]

This sense of political and cultural despair over the Third World—the belief that it can't be taught public order, that it can't be remade in the image of the West—has its economic counterpart. Now the poverty of the Third World, too, is beyond hope. Even the sterile language of international summits gives away the disillusionment. We can see it in the following passage from the declaration of the 1980 Venice Summit, where the leaders of the Western world and Japan met:

> The democratic industrialized countries cannot alone carry the responsibility of aid and other different contributions to developing countries; it must be equitably shared by the oil-exporting countries and the industrialized Communist countries.[18]

It is a long way from the early beginnings of the post-World War II liberal economic order to the Venice declaration. All along, liberalism held out a promise of economic justice for the poor. Other doctrines like mercantilism and imperialism were explicit doctrines of inequality.[19] Liberalism did not promise to turn Chad and Burundi into Swedens, but there was a belief that there was enough to go around, that there was enough surplus to help others through. The Venice declaration breaks with that tradition. There is hardly a constituency for foreign aid in America. To be genuinely liberal, nations need a sense of benevolence, of economic security. It is tough to be generous in a world of scarcity, at a time when the West itself feels up against the wall.

The Brandt Commission's report ought to be the last of its kind. From the Pearson report, *Partners in Development*, published in the 1960s, through the booklets of the Trilateral Commission, down to the Brandt Report, the arguments have been eminently reasonable and familiar: rich and poor alike are interdependent, we ought to strike a "planetary bargain" between the rich and the poor, et cetera.

The most remarkable thing about the Brandt Report is how benign it looks in the midst of chaos and disorder. The so-called

[17] John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," in *Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol. 3, London: Longmans Publishers, 1867, pp. 153–58.

[18] See the text of the Venice Economic Summit Meeting, *The New York Times*, June 24, 1980, p. A7.

[19] This point is made in Robert W. Tucker's *The Inequality of Nations*, New York: Basic Books, 1977.

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North-South dialogue had degenerated into hollow words. Justice was not to be hammered out at international conferences after all. It was not a procedural matter. The only major transfer of global wealth was due to a political decision: political will and the cover of the October War of 1973 had paid off. All appeals to conscience were marginal things. Whereas the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations on Raw Materials, convened in 1974, was viewed as a great moral and political occasion, later North-South gatherings warranted little attention. The meetings had their rituals, their jargon, the usual list of participants; they produced documents that kept scholars and commentators busy, but they had an air of unreality. The rage of Third World delegates and their egalitarian assertions were contrived. Many of them had no roots in their own societies; many of them stood for the most appalling kinds of inequality at home.

Mr. Marcos' capital, Manila, was the setting for one of those North-South dialogues—UNCTAD 5—in May 1979. He, of course, was there to speak for equity and justice. Never mind his domestic record in his own society. The terms of the North-South dialogue enabled him to make such utterances. Anticipating the meeting, *The Economist* had this to say: "For three weeks in Manila next May, 156 countries will attend UNCTAD 5. They will fill the air with stale rhetoric and the umpteenth statement of abstract principles. Will they also reach answers to specific questions? If not, the North's delegates will leave Manila tut-tutting over Southern unworldliness and Southerners chafing at the North's intransigence."[20] And that was the way it turned out to be.

The real encounter between the West and the Third World was not the domain of Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran's representative to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, writing a "requiem for the North-South conference," but the domain of his countryman, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.[21] In the latter encounter, rage, emotions, culture could be summoned; the first was a technical exercise that got nowhere. So many of the Third World elites known in the West really have no home. When the base below crumbles, their schemes come tumbling down.

Most of the brittle Third World states strutting across the world stage turn out to be empty shells. They may strut with all the sound and fury they can muster. But the basic weaknesses even-

[20] *The Economist*, February 17, 1979, p. 84.
[21] Jahangir Amuzegar, "A Requiem for the North-South Conference," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1977, pp. 136–59.

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tually assert themselves. The big dreams and the inflated visions disappear and the act comes to an end.

It is within this bleak context that the latest narcotic offered the Third World—the cult of authenticity, the promise of a return to imagined, pure traditions—can best be understood. Zaïrean President Mobutu Sese Seko's cult of the bush and of the ancestors, Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq's Islam, Anwar Sadat's cult of ancient Egypt, Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic and countless others all have a common message: imported ideologies and standards have alienated societies from themselves. Somewhere in the past, there was a social order that worked, and it could conceivably be recovered.

It is tempting to cover up decay with claims to authenticity; or to dress up tyranny in the garb of Islam; or to run away from the depressing spectacle of foreign debts and dependence into past splendor and simplicity. But the new act is a highly dubious one. The conjurers have to deliver something concrete or the entire act can turn into catastrophe. The ancestors are long buried, their world long obliterated. If we put up their world as a substitute for ours, their world will simply confuse and destroy us. It will make current misery that much more unbearable, current dealings with others that much more difficult to conduct. Our presidents can act as tribal chieftains and pharaohs once did; we can execute men and women the way our ancestors did; we can change Cambodia's name into Kampuchea; we can feed people culture and fetishes. But history has a terrifying velocity today. Reality intrudes; men cannot indefinitely live on frenzy or indefinitely be kept in a trance.

Revolts and escapes are relatively easy matters: you rebel, you say no, you try to "exit." Were they to stop there, rebellions would be nothing but an urge to destroy, pure nihilism—all the more so when the rebels have nowhere else to go, or when they exaggerate how far they can go on their own.

Whether they like it or not, whether they admit it or not, even the most rebellious societies in the Third World have the outside world under their skin. The voices of rebellion and a return to an imagined past are jumbled up with those clamoring to get in. A forced return to something imagined and unpolluted reveals, if anything, the depth of the predicament. And as the examples of Khomeini's Iran and the Khmer Rouge illustrate in their own way, return is a journey to nowhere. Its harvest is either breakdown or mass murder.

Long ago, non-Western societies were dragged into the outside

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world. Much of their history has been a continuous effort to cope with the intrusion of the Western challenge. Be they the fundamentalists who tried to go back to the indigenous tradition in order to repel the intrusion, or the liberals who tried to deal with it by emulating the intruders, or the radicals who turned to another Western ideology—Marxism—they have all been concerned with the uneven encounter with the West and inspired to search for ways to confront it. That was what the Bandung generation tried to do within the rules of the international system. But purity is not of this world. Even those who try to exit from the world (think of China) do so only to return on better terms, to be better prepared to withstand the competition.

VII

The "collective aloofness" from the quarrels of the mighty and the need to play the game without the extremes of xenophobia or surrender urged by the Bandung generation had a deep wisdom to it. Thus, the erosion of nonalignment (always relative, always a matter of degree) and the recent drift toward fundamentalism in large stretches of the Third World must be judged as retrogressive. The attempts by the mighty to carve out spheres of influence throughout much of the Third World, the scramble by the poor to find a patron who will shore up a weak regime or will help one state subdue its neighbor, the eagerness to be deputized by a distant power—all represent a betrayal of what these societies fought for.

All this comes at a time of superpower competition that ought to give nonalignment a new rationale. For as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reveals, the game of nations remains as grim as ever. For the Third World, Afghanistan is, or ought to be, a deadly serious matter. In their concern with the terms of trade and with their relationship to the liberal/capitalist West, many Third World states had somehow forgotten the designs of the other superpower. Anti-communism had a bad name and it more or less deserved it: it was the banner of either some reactionary military junta or monarch or of outsiders like Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the 1950s. Now, many states within reach of the Soviet Union have to worry about their sovereignty and must make things work if they are not to collapse. This has nothing to do with the old rallying cry of anti-communism but with the sheer disparity of power and with the need to keep outside powers at bay.

For reasons which need not be belabored here, the cold war is

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in full swing again.[22] From Kissinger's Middle Eastern shuttle in 1974 which shut out the Soviet Union, to Angola in 1975, and finally to Kabul in 1979-80, détente has faltered. From the revisionist power's point of view (the U.S.S.R.'s), there was the feeling of being driven out of a favored position. From the status quo power's point of view (the United States'), there was a growing conviction that the "code of détente" had been violated, that détente had been oversold, and that Russia had used it to overtake America. Brezhnev's assurance, made in the aftermath of Afghanistan, that the U.S.S.R. does not "covet the oil of others" and that it is only "the colonialists who are attracted by the smell of oil" was not particularly convincing. The West was economically overextended, its oil supplies vulnerable to the anguish of a region coming apart at the seams, and to the ambitions of a more assertive, more reckless Soviet Union.

The confrontation between the superpowers makes it imperative for Third World states to play the game with skill and caution. They are being enlisted in the new struggle, and increasingly so. Some will succumb as they already have; they will offer bases in return for aid. Some will go further and taunt distant powers about their toughness—witness the statements of the Chinese, of Zia ul-Haq, of Anwar Sadat about America's toughness and reliability. Here and there, dependency will be covered up by cultural pretensions (a Sadat or a Houphouët-Boigny claiming "membership" in the Western world or a South Yemen claiming adherence to Marxist internationalism).

Alignment might buy some relief: there are understandable pressures to succumb to it. Foreign powers offer a wider range of "services." They can help an Ethiopia combat separatism and deal with an irredentist neighbor; they can help an Egypt snub the Arab world; they can help the Syrian regime maintain a hold of sorts over a disaffected population that resents the political dominance of the Alawite community of President Assad (which only accounts for something like ten percent of the population but has a virtual monopoly on political power). The examples can be multiplied: economic and political pressures from within; pressures from neighbors; the clumsy pressure of one superpower or the other to get regimes to see it their way—all make it more difficult today to maintain an equidistance between the two superpowers than it was a quarter-century ago.

[22] See Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the Present Danger," *The New York Review of Books*, March 6, 1980. See also Leslie H. Gelb and Richard H. Ullman, "Keeping Cool at the Khyber Pass," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1980, pp. 3–18.

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But there is a price to be paid. An international system in which the Third World states dilute their commitment to their own autonomy and weaken their moral posture is infinitely more dangerous for weak states. Behind the moral sermons of a Nehru was a shrewd political instinct: if military might is not your strong suit, try to make the international system less of a jungle; raise the costs of superpower mischief; make the world more messy, for such a world will allow more room for maneuver to weak powers. To the extent that the Havana meeting saw a tilt toward the Soviet Union and an erosion of nonalignment (and it undeniably did), the Third World states emerged the worse off for it. This places a special burden on those in the Third World who still believe in the cause of nonalignment (an India, a Yugoslavia, a Nigeria) to keep the South Yemens and the Cubas (as well as the Egypts and Zaires) in check.

The first antidote, then, to alignment is to fight for the soul of what remains of nonalignment. There is a second, though related, battle. It is the need of the nonaligned to take Soviet designs and interventions seriously. The early struggle of the Third World was against the West. It was an attempt to get the West to help without asking for collaboration, to speed up the decolonization process, to stand up to the backlash of European powers losing their colonial possessions, to say "no" to John Foster Dulles and his contemporaries. In that battle, the U.S.S.R. could claim "progressive" credentials, pick and choose where it wanted to intrude into the Third World when the West faltered or failed to understand and to help.

The new battle is different. The U.S.S.R. now possesses the means and the will to intervene, particularly in countries on or near its borders. There are enough tribal and ethnic differences for it to thrive upon—differences which the Soviet Union understands far better than the United States ever managed to do. The U.S.S.R. can promise to speed up the dissolution of a particular society—an Iran or a Pakistan, for example. Or it can help others combat separatism—an Ethiopia trying to hold onto Eritrea and the Ogaden. There are plenty of fears and ambitions for the U.S.S.R. to exploit. This makes it important for the nonaligned to show real nonalignment in their concern with the superpowers. The task will not be easy for those whose formative experiences were the Algerian struggle, Suez, Vietnam and other Western adventures. Afghanistan ought to help illustrate that mischief can come from the other side.

The intellectual diet of an era of Third World anti-imperialism,

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haunted by the deeds and misdeeds of the West, now has to be revised to come to terms with the new realities. This is particularly important for those who still believe, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that Marxism represents a philosophy of redemption and liberation, that ideological distinctions are more important than the duel of nations. An earlier generation of Third World nationalists came to learn the traumatic lesson that the liberal values of the West were not for export and that those who valued nationalism for themselves denied it to others. Now the same lesson has to be learned about Marxism. Marxist internationalism is a thin construct: behind the ideological masks can be seen the age-old desire of powerful men and societies to hoard and to dominate.

A third imperative has to do with Third World links outside the level of summits and conferences. It is the need for what the African intellectual Ali Mazrui calls "horizontal interpenetration" among Third World societies.[23] They need to know one another better than they do, to trade with one another more than they do. Overwhelmingly, the cultural and economic traffic from the Third World has been in the direction of Europe, or of America, or of the Soviet bloc. Third World societies need more sustained traffic among themselves. To do so they have to shed some of the self-contempt that the once-colonized bring into the world and project onto people more or less like themselves. There have to be alternative sources of aid to what the superpowers promise. Here is a large project for the wealthy OPEC states, particularly for the Arab states. For the drift toward disorder in the vast expanse close to the Soviet Union is likely to claim them as its prime casualties. The cobwebs behind which the rich oil states once lived have been blown away; now they have to do their best to stem the chaos. This means a willingness to help other Third World states without neocolonial strings or hegemonic expectations.

But above all, the principal battle of each of the nonaligned is at home. Unless states are just and viable, unless they check the forces of separatism and the propensity toward dictatorship, they will collapse and succumb to new alignments. No distant patron can indefinitely float vulnerable regimes, draw up social contracts for them, keep the psychological and material pillage within limits. No summit conference can resolve basic questions of political order and legitimacy.

The moment of nationalist enthusiasm embodied in the Ban-

[23] Mazrui, *op. cit.*

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dung generation is gone and gone for good. The successors of the great men cannot reenact their drama: a Qaddafi cannot be another Nasser, no matter how hard he tries; the place occupied by Nehru cannot be filled by others. Apostles are invariably followed by managers, and the latter are subject to more human audits. To them falls the task of making things work, of making real, and hence less glamorous, the dream of nationalism. But even if that drama cannot be reenacted, the Bandung leaders still have something valid to teach their successors: try to maintain a moral and political presence in the world that would make it difficult for superpowers to go on a rampage; raise the moral and political costs of interventions by powerful states; don't barter away your autonomy, for it is much tougher to recover it once you get used to depending upon others for essential needs; try to stay within the political and cultural limits of your own system.

VIII

But the story of Bandung also has lessons for the West: don't push societies further down the road of radicalism than is necessary; don't ask from vulnerable allies (say, a Saudi Arabia) displays of "fidelity" that they cannot afford; don't let style and theatrics pass for the real thing (Nasser's oratory proved far more important to the course of U.S.-Egyptian relations than did his conduct, and the same could be said of Sukarno's flamboyance); don't read more radicalism into others than is warranted by political conduct; don't get your facts and attitudes about other societies from the most reactionary "native witnesses."

Many of the movements and leaders opposed by the West often had in mind political institutions and arrangements far closer to the ways of the West than the social orders defended and upheld by the West's clients. The appeal to the West of Third World bedouins, emperors and oligarchs over lawyers, parliamentarians and "soft" socialists is one of the most interesting psychohistorical riddles of our time. Today the West is baffled over the culturally alien figures sweeping the Third World. But did the ones who were culturally closer to the West fare any better?

Alas, the old reflexes persist—the urge to draw a Manichean distinction between friends and foes, "radicals" and "moderates,"[24] the belief in military bases and pacts show that even

[24] Henry Bienen has some devastating and useful things to say about the tendency to come up with such terms in American foreign policy in his essay "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention in Africa," *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1980, p. 41. "Such terms," he writes, "become terms in search of a policy."

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sophisticated societies can "back into the future" and repeat old errors. This is lamentable, for the United States knows better—or ought to.

The search for that "third way" that was launched at Bandung and that still survives in pockets of the Third World—battered, compromised, but nonetheless still there—ought to be encouraged. Hemmed in, nations become irrational, hell-bent on revenge, prone to look for scapegoats as they begin to see their lives and destiny as the playthings of others. "All the problems of the world," declares Ayatollah Khomeini to an alarmingly receptive audience throughout the Muslim world, "stem from these foreigners, from the West and from America at the moment. All our problems come from America. All the problems of the Muslims stem from America." In his words is the evasion of responsibility, the search for scapegoat carried to its limits. But there is a flip side to the Khomeini theme, one less noticed by Americans but dangerous in its own way: it is Sadat's vision of America as the arbiter, as the economic redeemer, as the mighty power that will make things run and work. One faces troubles with one's enemies; but "friends" also pose problems of their own.

There is, as I observed earlier, enough of the outside world under the skin of most Third World societies. When they go their own way, they may discover what they authentically are: a bit of themselves and a bit of the outside world. And it is then and only then that they can come to terms with themselves and with the outside world. There is, or ought to be, something other than the extremes of the Shah's soulless "Asian Germany" and Khomeini's Islamic Republic, the hell of the Khmer Rouge on one side and the pathetic mimicry of client-states on the other.

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Barbara Ward

ANOTHER CHANCE FOR THE NORTH?

If one thing more than any other was made abundantly clear by the whole series of international negotiations in the 1970s, it is that the industrialized democracies—which, with Australia and New Zealand as appendages, and with the Soviet bloc, make up "the North"—have no strategy and no vision when it comes to their dealings with the three-quarters of the human race that lives in the developing "South." For over a decade, the North has been discussing with the South the problem of their long-term economic relations—the so-called New International Economic Order. But wherever the focus has been—the five meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the various special sessions of the U.N. General Assembly, the fumbling and finally negative two-year talks of the Commission for International Economic Cooperation (the ironic name given to a series of North-South consultations in Paris), the fiasco of the latest conference called by UNIDO (the U.N. Industrial Development Organization), or the virtually nonexistent outcome of the so-called Economic Summit of Western leaders in Venice—wherever the place, whatever the context, whoever the parties, the outcome has been virtually the same. In short, it has been nothing.

There are tiny exceptions: the ludicrously inadequate amounts promised to underpin more stable world commodity prices; the guarantees limited to one group of developing states under the Lomé Convention negotiated by the European Community; the £1.2 billion pledged by the wheat producers (in wheat and long-term low-interest loans) for food relief. But these minor and unrelated acts only throw into clear perspective the utter lack of strategy on a worldwide and sufficient scale.

This is the difficult and discouraging background to the publication early this year of the Report of the Brandt Commission entitled *North-South: a Program for Survival.*[1] The Commission, with

[1] Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1980.

Barbara Ward (Baroness Jackson of Lodsworth) was President of the International Institute for Environment and Development in London from 1973 to 1980. Among her books are *Rich Nations and Poor Nations*, *Only One Earth* (with René Dubos), and, most recently, *Progress for a Small Planet.*

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West Germany's former Chancellor, Willy Brandt, as Chairman, was composed of distinguished citizens drawn from North and South and from the widest spectrum of interest—former prime ministers, finance ministers, bankers, publishers, the oil producers, trade unions. Its very composition, spanning a range from a young radical leader in Algeria to the chairman of Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb of New York, suggested to more cynical observers that the chance of a unanimous report was virtually nil. The fact that the recommendations were unanimously accepted is at the very least a factor of encouragement in the generally dreary international scene.

But the character of the recommendations is more remarkable still. The temptation faced by all such potentially divided and conflicting groups is that of the lowest common denominator—the shuffling, half-muffled, half-uncommitted, half-arguments stretched as far as they will go to cover the basic failure to achieve consensus. There is little sign of this in the Brandt Report. Its general philosophy is quite simply that Planet Earth is a community of peoples in need of the underpinnings of any genuine social order—a floor under poverty, sufficient food, access to education, participation in decision-making, the promise of work. The need for unity expressed in these common purposes should far outweigh the warring interests of nations, cultures and beliefs. The Report's particular recommendations cover the "underpinnings" of unity and are best summed up in its four-point program of immediate action, which expresses a profound sense of the "common good" in practical fashion. The policies cumulatively reinforce each other and in essence extend to the whole of mankind the principles and priorities now largely accepted *within* civilized nation-states.

II

The four priority points, briefly summarized, cover a large-scale transfer of resources to the developing countries, an international strategy for dealing with the energy crisis, a global food program and the first steps in transforming today's chaotic international economic system into a workable and reliable monetary and commercial order. Clearly, the proposals overlap at many points just as they do within a nation: farmers' support prices depending upon governmental revenue, revenue depending upon tax levels, tax levels reflecting economic restraint or expansion as a government objective. The domestic range is vast. An international version must be vaster. But if priorities are correct and action is

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secured, positive results are as possible at the international level as at the national level.

But it is, of course, at this point that the critics move in on the Report and attack either its general direction or its particular proposals as utterly irrelevant to the "realities" of the 1980s. The concept of a planetary community must surely be left on the back shelf of contemporary idealism—with the Russians in Afghanistan, the Vietnamese in Cambodia, the Middle East in turmoil and Soviet spokesmen making it clear that the vital point today is not New International Economic Orders or more stable North-South relations but the spread of communism throughout the developing world. Abandon capitalism, go communist, and appropriate development toward "unity" may follow. True, China and its rejection of Soviet communism are left out. But this is only one more reminder of division. What is the use of even thinking of world community when the facts amount to violent hostility between groups of nations or, at best, an uneasy oscillation between deterrence and détente?

The critics are equally determined in their attack when they turn from the general principles to particular proposals. We can include the separate principle of food aid in the general proposals for transferring resources, since aid to Third World food production is coming to be one of the highest priorities in many aid strategies, replacing the almost exclusive attention to industrialization, export promotion and infrastructure of earlier decades. There is wide derision at the Commission's general recommendation that the level of official aid, at the present at 0.35 percent of gross national product (GNP) for the industrial democracies, should be raised to the already promised 0.70 percent by 1985 and widened to one percent by the year 2000. This would imply an annual transfer of $50–$60 billion in aid by 1985. Yet, honorable exceptions apart—the Dutch, the Scandinavians—aid has either fallen in absolute terms or barely kept pace with inflation. Most of the industrialized countries are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and its latest figures show there was very little increase in the flow of official aid between 1965 and 1977, when inflation is taken into account. Yet during this period, the Committee members' GNP actually doubled.

Perhaps the most unfortunate example of delinquency comes from the largest and internally wealthiest of all the democratic states. Official aid from the United States has fallen from just under 0.50 percent of GNP in 1965 to about 0.20 percent in 1980, an exemplary action highly unlikely to put fresh heart into other,

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poorer donors. If this is the pattern, say the critics, what folly it must be to stress higher aid giving. They do admit that the goals may be desirable. Few critics, for instance, attack the new emphasis on agriculture, which would entail additional annual aid expenditures of some $13 billion a year (in 1980 dollars) as part of the $30–$40 billion needed annually to expand food output to feed the six billion human beings who will be on the planet by the year 2000. But it has to be seen in terms of realism. The trend is the other way. And would it not be the course of wisdom to try to understand why, and examine the reasons?

III

The governments of the industrialized democracies have no doubts about the fundamental cause of their retreat from their promises of greater aid—it is the action of OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in quadrupling the cost of crude oil in 1973. (That the great Soviet "grain raid" on American reserves tripled world grain prices at about the same time is conveniently forgotten.) Since that vast and sudden upheaval, it has proved impossible to bring the industrialized democracies back to anything like the rhythm of growth which prevailed for over two decades after the spectacular postwar recovery originally fired by the Marshall Plan.

After OPEC's action, the Northern balance of payments fell from a surplus of nearly $20 billion in 1973 to an almost equal deficit in 1974. Internally, the determination of large pressure groups—unions, conglomerates—to keep their incomes at the old levels allowed the external pressure of at least $35 billion less in real income to permeate the whole economic system with an inflationary bias. Profits were squeezed, investment fell, governments deflated. Annual variations in per capita incomes changed dramatically from four percent a year growth to an actual fall in value in 1974, and unemployment grew from three to over five percent.

But prices went on rising. Between the onset of the oil price rise (and the grain raid) and the beginning of 1975, inflation rates doubled. There was a small measure of recovery after 1975, but inflation, unemployment and the levels of world trade all remained in uncomfortable contrast with the "golden" 1950s and 1960s. The growth in world trade, for instance, was only half its earlier average, although the industrialized democracies were a little helped by their ability to pass some of the real costs on to Third World nations, which had to pay 40 percent more for their

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"Northern" imports (mainly of manufactured goods) between 1973 and 1975 alone. But it was basically a very unstable economic system in which the next round of OPEC oil price increases (not agreed to but reached nonetheless) coupled with the turmoil in Iran drove average oil prices in 1979 from $12.90 to $22.70 a barrel. One thinks with incredulity of the less than two dollars a barrel of the earlier decades.

The year 1979 also brought with it a virtual certainty of an erratic but fairly predictable and continuing upward movement in oil prices. Oil prices are now around $30 a barrel. How, then, say the critics, can governments escape the resulting unsupportable inflationary pressures if they add more aid to all this growth of income? How can they check inflation? To propose more aid is like pouring a bucket of water over a drowning man. As all Northern leaders represented at the Venice Summit agreed, controlling inflation is, virtually, the sole aim of governmental policy. So why even talk about aid?

It is this same background of "stagflation" in the industrialized democracies and unpredictable yet upward movements in the oil market that also helps to explain the critics' dismissal of the two remaining Brandt emergency proposals: an energy strategy, and the beginnings of reform of international economic institutions. A dialogue with the oil states is conceivable—the "Northern" states offering restraint, regular markets and inflation-linked payments, the oil exporters keeping production steady and price rises to an agreed percentage. Then all the wealthy states, together, whether Northern or oil-exporting, could agree on means and mechanisms to offset the particularly catastrophic results of oil price rises on the non-oil producers in the Third World. In 1973 their balance of payments deficit was a relatively modest $6 billion. By 1975 it had reached $39 billion. Then after the brief semi-recovery of 1977–78, it will be some $63 billion in 1980, and countries such as India and Tanzania can find themselves paying up to 45 percent of their export earnings simply to keep a minimum flow of fuel going to industry and the farms.

But, say the critics, who can honestly imagine such a dialogue? A Sheikh Yamani, as Saudi Arabia's oil minister, may see that a stable and growing Northern market is a precondition of prosperity among the oil producers. But can an Ayatollah Khomeini see that? Palestinian leaders pressing on other Arab producers? Who can rule out another fundamentalist upheaval, like the one in Iran? There are uncertainties, too, on the side of the North. Americans still pay only half the price for gasoline that Europeans

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do. Yet President Carter's efforts to get even a ten-cent tax on each imported barrel of oil was defeated by Congress. Conservation still has few official proponents and fewer programs anywhere in the North. The final dissociation from reality came when the Venice Summit leaders (whose nations' GNP exceeds the oil exporters at least tenfold and is based not upon a single asset but upon completed development) virtually suggested that OPEC might be left to care for the problems of those Third World countries without oil. All in all, it is difficult to imagine a more likely scenario for a dialogue of deaf-mutes.

Lack of contact and trust between the North and OPEC is also in some measure responsible for the Northern failure to take any significant action to strengthen international monetary and commercial institutions. At one point, it seemed all but certain that the industrialized democracies would seriously discuss ways in which OPEC surpluses, over and above those spent in developed markets, could be deposited not in uncertain currencies but in an internationally secured "substitution account" probably under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, with strict guarantees of maintained value and returnability, judiciously lent for development in the most productive areas for investment (many of them, by definition, in the Third World). But all the steam ran out of the proposal in 1980, and the OPEC surpluses have begun to overhang the financial markets as ominously as wild foreign lending helped to precipitate the Wall Street crash of 1929.

The private banks, it is true, handled the 1974–75 surge of surpluses with exemplary skill. Nonetheless, the mere fact that they have already "borrowed short and lent long" makes it more difficult for them to enter into a new round of lending. But, say the critics, government guarantees or IMF funding will simply stoke the inflationary fires. Once again, we are back to "Catch-22." Act to meet the recession, and inflationary wage and price demands set the ball spinning again. Do not act, and risk a recession on a redoubled scale.

It is perhaps a valid criticism of the Report that it underestimates the difficulties with which Northern governments feel themselves confronted. Northern concepts of their own interests do not much enter the debate and may prove a real bar to the persuasiveness of the recommendations. Yet to be without a forward policy for three-quarters of humanity, to expect that what is in essence the continuance of a semi-colonial relationship can be passively endured, that the degree of solidarity achieved in the

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emergent South will in some convenient way remove itself—all these assumptions which must underpin the "policy of no policy" are simply examples of an unrealism to which "realists" may too easily succumb. No one can claim that the Brandt strategy solves all conflicts and reconciles all differences. But for each of the criticisms, it has at least a partial answer and the sum of its proposals would give the North a renewed sense of the direction and purpose which proved to be the most notable victims of the troubled 1970s.

Take first the criticism that a greater transfer of resources, a sustained strategy for food and energy, and the beginnings of structural economic changes in monetary and commercial policies are irrelevant because local political differences, communist pressure and Soviet "expansionism" are what is really at stake. No one denies the pressure. But if Third World leaders in political and popular difficulties knew that they could count on resource transfers from the North, might not this be an argument for avoiding a much more arduous and irremovable Soviet involvement?

The revolution in Nicaragua may be lost to the Marxist Sandinistas because Congress held up U.S. aid proposals for over a year. A vital land reform in El Salvador may be undermined by the same arbitrary behavior. One factor in Robert Mugabe's readiness to accept an open election in Zimbabwe and remain nonaligned was the degree of disillusion Samora Machel displayed over Soviet "aid" and farming models in Mozambique. Yet the paradox is that in these critical months when both nations must rebuild economies devastated by war, the needed financial support to do so has not been forthcoming. The chance of their genuine nonalignment (which should be the Northern goal) may be lost for the equivalent of less than one-thousandth of the United States' annual military expenditure. What the Brandt Report in fact proposes is to institutionalize the availability of Northern resources—which, in turn and by definition, increases the measure of choice of Third World leaders, parties and movements.

One could perhaps take the argument a step further and suggest that if the superpowers can reach a SALT III stage of negotiation, the transfer of a percentage of arms spending to international aid transfers might be separately on the agenda. The Soviets' pitiful 0.03 percent of GNP in aid to countries other than Cuba would be seen in a new perspective, and the percentage proposed would only have to reach 25 days of the world's military spending to equal the whole extra $30 billion proposed by the Commission.

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IV

All this does not argue that Third World governments—or indeed, the superpowers—*will* make the constructive choices. It merely suggests that a sustained, accepted and certain transfer of Northern resources would greatly increase the elbow room within which all our disturbed and unquiet systems have to work and that this wider area of choice is itself a worthwhile objective. It becomes even clearer when we look at other elements of the Brandt package for, here, to the factor of widening choice is added the near certainty that many of the proposals are actually to the direct advantage of the North, quite apart from their "Southern" value.

The order in which these issues are taken is relatively unimportant. To a very real extent, each supports the other. The food strategy, for instance, is from certain points of view one aspect of the wider plan for more stable primary produce prices. The somewhat imprecise concept of a World Development Fund is intimately bound up with increases in aid. An oil strategy is essential to any degree of monetary stability. This in turn is a critical part of the proposed development and funding of more effective international monetary systems. And their expansion would assist in sustained investment in Third World food, energy and mineral resources; in the uncertain 1970s, each tended to slip below the level needed for actual maintenance, let alone to meet the prospects of expansion in a hoped-for revival in the world economy as the 1980s advance. But this interdependence should not seem surprising. It is embedded in the underlying reality of a planetary economic system, however much governments may still believe in the short-term benefits of carving the larger slice from the shrinking pie.

One or two concrete examples of constructive alternatives must suffice to offset the criticisms we have outlined of the whole Brandt approach. Probably no one doubts that in the monetary field the greatest source of unease and the greatest pressure on the ability of the banking community to continue to recycle existing and unpredictably growing oil money is explained by the existence of some $800 billion unsustained by anything but America's own ability to repay. If every holder of dollars—petrodollars, Eurodollars, plain ordinary dollars in foreign accounts—were at some point to demand repayment, there could follow the kind of collapse in confidence that sent the world economy over the precipice in 1929.

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This is the fundamental rationale for giving to the IMF a new mandate to turn dollars over to a "substitution account" which would guarantee uncertain dollar-holders against a possible collapse of confidence, basically by putting a safety net under the dollar. The new assets should probably be under the tripartite control of a special IMF affiliate representing not simply the predominant North, but OPEC and Third World countries as well. (Here the example of the International Fund for Agricultural Development—IFAD—in which the Northern democracies, OPEC and the Third World have a third each of control—is a hopeful augury of new thinking.) At the same time, interest rates on the new special assets should be set by the market and the assets based upon the world's five or six major currencies in the so-called basket.

In a sense, this is organic growth from the Special Drawing Rights which for the last decade have been in marginal use in holding international exchanges relatively predictable and stable. (Perhaps a more convincing name might be invented for the strangely unconvincing SDR. Why not a bancor or a ducat?) But the fundamental issue of greater security is not in doubt, and this is one reason why the concept of a "substitution account" has at least reached (although without too much success) the level of finance ministers' discussions. It could be a first step in the Brandt proposals for international monetary reforms.

Price stability is at the center of three of the Brandt proposals—the food program, the joint energy approach and support for a measure of stabilization of primary product prices, still the Third World's main exporting sector. Northerners too easily forget that the price rise in 1973 grain (when the Russians cleared out the American reserve) affected North and South alike. Indeed, since a Northerner can consume nearly a ton of grain a year, mainly in meat equivalent, to India's average of some 400 pounds, there can be little argument about Northern interest in stable prices. Yet given the combined certainty and unpredictability of droughts (either in North America, the only major surplus area, or the monsoon belt) the basic elements of a good program are inescapable—a reserve regularly maintained for "the lean years" and a big increase in Third World agricultural productivity.

If a Korea or a Taiwan can reach a rice yield of four to five or more tons per hectare, an Indonesia less than three and an India less than two, the possibilities for a local boosting of supplies are vast. But—and here we return to the transfer of resources—the cost as we have seen has been put as high as $40 billion a year,

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and rising oil costs will bite deep into the mechanized and fertilizer sectors. The part of direct aid in this—the $13 billion estimate—is perhaps a very small price to pay for food price stability and for local hope and opportunity. In how widely starving a world would it be safe for the rich to hope to live?

The Northern need for a more stable flow of resources is not confined to food. If one takes America's imports of vital materials—aluminum, chromium, nickel, tin, cobalt to name only a few—dependence on external supplies is never less than 77 percent. Chromium and nickel are in the 100-percent class for the Common Market and Japan. The troubled 1970s meant inadequate investment in future supplies, which in turn will mean a new inflationary spurt as economies recover and the demand for materials revives. An agreed strategy, using aid and recycled currencies for adequate investment, together with a new distribution of processing facilities to favor the South, could give greater stability to the whole world's industrial sector and at the same time increase the Southern states' derisory nine percent of world industrial production. There is no reason why the "multinationals" should not include this transfer in their long-term planning.

Could there be a comparable "bargain" for the most critical of all resources—oil? Here only one thing is certain. It must be better to try to approach OPEC with constructive and cooperative proposals than to leave the whole issue to the uncertainties of confrontation. The essence of the Brandt proposals is that supplies and prices should be given a greater chance of stability and as a result both sides will benefit by the change. So much is obvious. But it entails subsidiary action which the Brandt proposals recognize more frankly than the critics, who, however insensibly, slip into the adversary position. In political terms, it means a new effort to work out a Palestinian compromise. In Northern states, it requires an entirely new seriousness in the priority given to energy conservation.

This, too, is a political issue. Detailed studies have shown—for the United Kingdom, for instance—that living standards can steadily increase and, despite a fifth more households by 2025, fuel consumption could be well down from what it had been in 1975. Clearly, in the United States the possible scale of savings from conservation is even greater. The consequent reduction in a surge of fresh demand for oil does, in the short run, lessen the oil producers' bargaining power. But in the longer run, their overwhelming need is to see their most precious resource—in Arab

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states, their only resource—last long enough for alternative patterns of development to be stabilized.

That oil as a wasting resource will rise in price is certain, OPEC or no OPEC. But there could be a mutual interest in steadier and longer term Northern demand and a longer duration for the international oil market. At the same time, investment in new sources of oil and in the whole range of alternatives—coal, synthetic fuels, nuclear energy (with proper caution), direct and indirect ways of utilizing solar power—could be part of the new resource transfer and be applied with special energy to the world's "sun belt," which happens to include some of the world's poorest peoples. There are already solar pumping stations at work in irrigated agriculture.

Once again, we see the interconnectedness of the Brandt proposals. No one can guarantee their success, but we can and must guarantee the failure of the alternative which, at present, is quite simply not to have one. Even if the Brandt proposals are no more than an insurance policy, it is worth paying the premiums. There is nothing else in sight that works.

V

Even if it is no more than insurance, the program goes some way to meet the most fundamental criticism—that Northerners should be concerned with their own economic crisis. With nearly 20 million unemployed and perhaps $300 billion worth of unused capacity, surely the stimulus and the spending should be undertaken in the North. But this overlooks two final considerations. The first is that the Third World is already a vast market for Northern goods. The figure for merchandise trade for North America and Western Europe is already over one-third of all exports. For Japan, it is nearer one-half. To increase the wealth, stability and opportunity of countries where only relatively few of their population enter fully into the monetary economy will increase their scale as markets and hence their stimulus to Northern expansion and employment. The whole boom of the 1950s and 1960s would have been inconceivable without the launching pad of the Marshall Plan, which in giving away for over five years a goodly *two* percent of a much poorer America's GNP, ensured its own prosperity along with that of its neighbors in the North.

The memory of the Marshall Plan is a reminder of one last point. True, the Plan was in part fueled by the cold war, just as today limits to Soviet adventurism could reasonably be invoked

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for the Brandt proposals. But another element was quite simply compassion—ordinary Americans feeling the good fortune of surviving so appalling a holocaust and ready to share with fellow survivors the means of rebuilding their lives. Is this feeling of compassionate responsibility entirely dead in the North? When recently Americans were polled on foreign aid, their paradoxical answer was that "aid is too high," but the vast majority were ready to give in terms of their own personal incomes a higher percentage than any aid proposed at any official level. When it comes to choosing between starving children, stunted lives, unemployment in filthy shantytowns and general despair on the one hand, or on the other the kind of cooperative Brandt program that at least begins to meet the scale of both disaster and opportunity, most Northern citizens have not forgotten the moral imperative.

It remains true that although they are only a quarter of the world's peoples, they have over 70 percent of the wealth, over 80 percent of the trade, some 90 percent of the industry and nearly 100 percent of advanced centers of learning and technology.

These stark contrasts can be brought down to a personal level. Northern citizens can compare their average of $6,000 to $7,000 a year per capita incomes with the $150 of the world's poverty belt. They can reckon the Brandt costs—which, including present aid flows, are the equivalent of about a dollar a week per Northerner. And they know where not only justice but survival lies. The task is to bring the mutual interests and the moral impulse together. Auden's words remain true: "We must love one another or die."

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Mahbub ul Haq

NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE

The deadlock in the U.N. Special Session in September 1980 over efforts to organize global negotiations on a New International Economic Order is not a cause for pessimism but an invitation to sober reflection. The breakdown was not just over procedures, though that was the way it appeared. The breakdown came because there are still substantive and fundamental differences between the approaches of the North and the South to these negotiations. Unless we honestly face up to these differences, a mere patch-up of procedural wrangles to revive the global negotiations will not achieve any significant results.

The first question we must face is: Why should the North—the industrialized nations—enter into any serious dialogue at all about restructuring the existing international economic order? The South—the developing nations—wishes to gain more economic power and participation in international decision-making, but why should the North willingly surrender its present privileged position? Unless there is a convincing answer to this question, North-South negotiations are likely to deteriorate into a ritual and skillful exercise in non-dialogue.

I believe that the only real answer is that change in international structures is inevitable, whether there is a dialogue or not. The real experiment involved in the North-South dialogue is whether the pace of change can be accelerated through common consent, and whether the pains of transition can be eased through orderly negotiations. It is tempting, but totally wrong, to jump from pessimism about the prospects of the North-South dialogue to pessimism about the prospects for change itself. The failure of the dialogue so far will not stem the underlying forces of change: it only means that change will continue to be disorderly and disruptive. The real case for the dialogue is that it can lead to an orderly transition and that bargains can be struck by which all sides gain, though not in equal measure.

Mahbub ul Haq is Director of Policy Planning at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, D.C., and is the author of *The Poverty Curtain* and other works. The views in this paper are expressed entirely in a personal capacity.

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II

What are these underlying forces of change? And why is there a certain inevitability about them? To begin with, there is an urge for liberation—"to end the tyranny of man over man" and of one nation over another. It inspired the movements of political liberation; it is fueling the desire for economic liberation now. The recent major movements in the industrialized nations—for trade unionism, civil rights, women's liberation—were inspired by the same urge for equality of opportunity. The initial casualties in this liberation movement will be national orders within the Third World, many of which are unresponsive to the needs of their own people. The current chaos and uncertainty in many developing countries are merely a prelude to that end.

But the desire for liberation, participation and equity cannot be confined within national borders. It will affect all international relations. If we add to it the strong sense of nationalism generated by political liberation of the Third World, it is clear why economic relations between rich and poor nations—whether at the level of governments, or multinational corporations, or private individuals—must proceed in a different framework than in the past.

At the same time, certain structural changes are taking place which are lending an air of urgency to the need to evolve new codes of international behavior. The demographic balance is rapidly shifting against the industrialized nations. Of the net additions to the world population in the next two decades, 90 percent will be in the Third World. The future markets and labor surplus lie in the South; the accumulating and underutilized capital in the North must come to terms with this reality. The South is also becoming rapidly urbanized. By the year 2000, about 40 cities in the South will have a population of over 15 million each, compared to 16 cities in the North. These exploding cities will provide powerful instruments of change within national orders as well as restless pressure for international migration.

Another powerful stimulus is the rising real cost of energy. The comparative advantage of industrialized nations in energy-intensive agriculture and industrial production is fast disappearing. There will have to be a major structural change in their industrial and trade patterns, environmental concerns and modes of urbanization, and in the whole conception of their life-styles. If we add to this picture the rapid emergence of China, the entry of more communist countries into the international market, the fierce competition from newly industrializing countries such as Brazil,

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the shifts in economic power within the industrialized bloc (particularly in favor of Japan and West Germany), and the major breakthroughs in communications, it becomes obvious why national and international orders will continue to undergo rapid changes in the next two decades.

These changes are going to be too large to be handled successfully without proper planning. In the absence of a dialogue, changes will be traumatic, abrupt and disorderly. There will be periods of unilateral actions and complete breakdown of any international rules. An orderly international dialogue is not essential for change, but it can avoid unnecessary costs which will arise otherwise, it can help balance the interests of various groups of nations, and it is the best guarantee against periodic anarchy and insanity in human affairs.

Despite the failure of the formal North-South dialogue so far, there has been a significant change in human perceptions and understandings during the 1970s. From a mindless pursuit of economic growth, there has been a gradual shift to a better understanding of the problems of poverty and the urgency of meeting basic human needs. From a period of relative indifference to the real problems and enormous potential of the Third World, the industrialized nations may at last be becoming aware of their own dependence on the developing countries and of the need to reach some form of accommodation with them. From the belligerence of the early stages of the dialogue, we may finally be entering a second phase of serious negotiations during the 1980s. While the new decade has started on a cheerless note, this may well prove to be the decade for either a major advance in North-South relations or a deep international crisis. When the outlook is so bleak, it is, perhaps, wise to analyze what could be done differently to revive hopes for progress.

III

Both North and South have made major mistakes in their approach to the negotiations for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

First, a quick catalogue of the mistakes made by the South:

(1) The objectives of the dialogue were not clearly perceived. At least two distinct schools of thought emerged. One bargained for short-term concessions; the other negotiated for long-term structural change. The first school would have been satisfied with more aid, more debt relief, more trade concessions, etc.; the second would regard such "progress" as an increase, not a reduction, in

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dependency. The second school sought a fundamental change in prevailing market rules and a loosening of ties between North and South, including a major de-linking of trade and aid relationships. The confusion between various objectives made it difficult to pursue any consistent strategy of negotiations.

(2) Many developing countries did not sufficiently realize that internal reforms were even more important than international reforms for the welfare of their people. Some of them started viewing the NIEO as a "soft" option, as an alternative to hard decisions to restructure internal orders. Lack of progress on the NIEO became an alibi for explaining a variety of economic sins at home. It was also not recognized that internal reforms would have made external change merely a matter of time, as developing countries would then be speaking from a position of strength. It is also interesting to note the divergence between official and unofficial dialogue on this issue. The official dialogue has at times pretended that there was no need for internal restructuring in the Third World. The intellectual dialogue in the Third World, on the other hand, has attacked inequities of international as well as of national orders, without ignoring their logical link.

(3) The Third World did very little service to its own cause by presenting the NIEO as a "demand" of the South. It should have been presented, right from the start, as a global need, since the existing economic order has not been working very well for *any* side—as is evident from problems of global inflation and monetary instability, the energy crisis, environmental concerns, commodity price fluctuations, increasing protectionism, fast-increasing armament spending and a whole range of global headaches. Furthermore, the South should have taken the interests of the North fully into account in designing any package of negotiations. This was all the more necessary since the South started with limited bargaining power; it needed the goodwill and enlightened interest of the North to "enforce" any change.

(4) The South entered the dialogue without adequate preparation. Since its membership was large and diverse, it needed frequent South-South dialogues to shape a package of negotiations which would satisfy the different interests of its various constituencies. It needed to establish a basis for mutual support from some of its richer members, particularly oil-exporting and high-income countries. It badly needed a Third World secretariat to articulate and coordinate its economic proposals.

(5) Finally, the South made the fatal mistake of assuming that a new order would be "given" to it by the North. It conveniently

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forgot that such an order will evolve mainly through its own actions, particularly in accelerating its economic development, in undertaking internal reforms, and in organizing its countervailing power to correct existing market imperfections.[1]

The mistakes of the South were, however, more than matched by those of the North:

(1) The North assumed that the NIEO was essentially a demand of the Third World and, as such, no concern of its own. It adopted a strategy of filibuster in U.N. negotiating forums—finding numerous problems for every solution that the South offered, rather than trying to explore honestly a number of policy options for each problem. The only area in which it showed a keen interest was that of energy, because of the immediate crisis the North faced. But the North failed to appreciate that the energy issue was only a part of the wider global crisis of excessive demand on increasingly scarce physical resources by a handful of privileged nations.

(2) The leaders from the North have been preoccupied with the immediate problems of recession, inflation and unemployment. It was felt that solutions to the short-term economic difficulties could be found without the cooperation of the South. This was a mistake. The energy issue itself should have made this clear. The existence of surplus capital goods capacity in the North in the face of unmet needs in the South should have given the Northern decision-makers some uncomfortable moments. The shifting demographic balance should have made them more conscious of potential markets in the South. But these perceptions were quite dim and seldom translated into policy. It was not realized in the North that its short-term economic problems were not temporary but part of a long-term structural change—much the same way as this was not realized in the 1930s within the national orders until Keynesian thought and President Roosevelt's daring initiatives combined to rescue Western capitalism from its inner contradictions. The same drama is now being replayed at the global level, the economically disenfranchised now being the teeming millions in the South who lack effective demand to buy goods and services from the North.

(3) Even when the North recognized the pressure for long-term structural change, there was a natural temptation to delay adjustment. Faced with shifting comparative advantage, the normal

[1] This aspect has been analyzed in detail in my "Beyond the Slogan of South-South Cooperation," in Khadija Haq, ed., *Dialogue for a New Order*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1980, pp. 139–52.

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response was to protect declining industries and regions for fear of unemployment and popular unrest. Confronted with radically altered prospects of oil pricing and supply, the North postponed the more difficult conservation policies and deregulation of oil prices. Beset with mounting balance-of-payments deficits, the United States made increasing use of its international credit card and incurred more debt, thereby creating even more international liquidity and worldwide inflation. All these responses were mere temporizing. They delayed the adjustment costs, but magnified them in the process. When confronted with saving the next election or the next generation, the political leaders of the North frequently opted for the former. In such an environment, long-term changes were often mortgaged to short-term expediency. This is nothing unique in political life; but it is not the stuff of great leadership.

In many ways, both North and South have failed to understand the imperatives of the growing interdependence of mankind. The North tried to sell the old relationships of dependency to the South under the newly dusted slogan of interdependence; unfortunately, it did not recognize the practical implications of its own growing dependence on the South, or the fact that genuine interdependence is impossible without greater equality of opportunity. The South bargained for greater equality, without paying sufficient attention to the Northern interests or to the costs of sudden adjustment. The result has been a stalemate.

In this strange environment of formal motions without actual movement, the communist countries (containing one-third of mankind) have been quietly neglected by both sides. Nor have these countries themselves shown a keen interest in the North-South dialogue, opting to stay on the sidelines. In any real dialogue for a restructured world order, it would be important to obtain the active participation of them as well.

IV

The non-dialogue of the last six years has persuaded some observers that no serious discussion between North and South may be possible in the early 1980s.[2] This may well be true. It is possible that only a real international economic or political crisis

[2] Roger D. Hansen, *Can the North-South Impasse Be Overcome?*, Development Paper 27, Overseas Development Council, November 1979.

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will convince all sides to rush to the negotiating table—as has happened so often in human history. But to give up now on the dialogue would be a defeatist strategy. One can hope that both sides have learned some quiet lessons from the experience and mistakes of the last few years. These should be drawn upon in making a new attempt to revive the stalemated global negotiations.

A fresh approach can be made by examining the premises of the old global order in several specific fields—such as energy, food, the monetary system, resource transfers, trade, economic development, technology, multinational corporations, and international institutions. The basic strategy should be to let the analysis itself lead to the final solution rather than to start with any preconceived proposals. Four concrete questions must be posed in each case:

—What are the premises on which the old order was based?

—Are these premises still valid?

—If not, what are the new premises which should replace them?

—Will the new global order meet the legitimate interests of all sides?

We will make an attempt in the following discussion to analyze the present framework of the global order in several economic fields in this spirit.

V

The energy issue must be demystified. No reasoned dialogue on that issue has taken place so far, as it gets bogged down in side issues and peripheral controversies. Either OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) is made to feel guilty—which is hardly a brilliant strategy for soliciting its cooperation—or the industrialized nations and developing countries are asked to adjust to a new energy environment without having a clear idea of what historical and long-term forces are shaping this environment.

The energy problem can be seen in its proper perspective only if it is viewed as one of the many structural transformations that the world is going through, and if it is placed within the framework of restructuring of national and international orders which has become increasingly urgent. The energy issue arose when the world was already confronting a profound transition: concern for protecting the world environment; for eradicating absolute poverty; for developing new self-reliant styles of development in the

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South and a new value system in the North; for controlling the impending international monetary crisis; for the establishment of a New International Economic Order. The energy issue greatly sharpened the global perception of these other transitions by demonstrating the essential interdependence and vulnerability of all nations. It is within that broad perspective that the energy issue can be helpful as an engine of transition, so long as it is linked with other related issues.

There is a popular belief that the energy crisis (i.e., the rising real cost of energy) has "caused" the world economic crisis. This, in a way, reverses the sequence of events. The rising real cost of energy is the result of the overload of the world system, not its cause. The fast rate of increase in oil consumption in the past few decades has led to a rapid depletion of non-renewable resources. This happened because the price of oil was kept artificially low by international oil companies for a long period. Paradoxically, it was this artificially low price of oil which caused the eventual crisis by leading to an unregulated appetite for energy. If the oil price had been set not in relation to the cost of production—which was irrelevant—but the cost of alternatives, the adjustment process would not have become so abrupt and traumatic.

It is widely believed that oil prices are being kept artificially high at present through cartel-like action by OPEC: with the dismantling of OPEC, prices will crash. This is a fallacy. The current price of oil is largely determined by the forces of supply and demand as well as by the cost of alternatives. Before there are any screams of protest, let it be noted that production decisions are generally made by the national policies of OPEC members—not collectively—much the same way as the United States decides to curtail its wheat production to limit excessive supply.

In fact, many OPEC members are producing more oil (because of international considerations) than is required by their own national needs for revenue. If OPEC did not exist today, oil prices would probably stay at the same level or even rise, since it is a reasonable premise that oil production may go down in such a case, rather than increase, since many oil-producing and exporting nations may well decide to eliminate financial surpluses they do not immediately need and instead try to protect the real value of their depleting assets by keeping more of the oil in the ground.

Moreover, there is no substitute for oil on the horizon which is cheaper than oil right now. In fact, those oil-importing nations which are making costly and long-term investments in finding alternative sources of energy have a major interest by now in a

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relatively high price of oil which alone would justify these investments in alternatives. Finally, and most important, the real determining factor for the future price of energy may well turn out to be on the demand side: the extent to which conservation policies are pursued.

There is a widespread belief that OPEC nations are extremely rich; that they "create" enormous financial surpluses which they cannot use themselves and which put considerable pressure on the world economy; and that they are responsible for compensating oil-importing developing countries for the rise in their oil-import bills but are as yet providing inadequate financial assistance to them. Such reasoning only tries to put OPEC nations on the defensive, without either having the benefit of objective analysis or leading to any constructive results.

To begin with, most OPEC nations are not rich. They are liquid but not wealthy, though liquidity and wealth are being freely confused these days. Even including the capital-surplus nations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Libya and Iraq, the thirteen OPEC members had an average per capita income of less than $1,000 in 1978, only one-eighth of that in industrialized nations. Besides, most of the OPEC nations are underdeveloped, with low literacy rates, short life expectancy, unskilled labor, a low level of technology and research, little diversified development outside the oil sector, and with all the problems of a single-resource economy. OPEC nations have suddenly become financially liquid but they have yet to translate their good fortune into lasting sources of real wealth.

Second, OPEC does not "create" financial surpluses; it is the appetite of the industrialized nations for energy which does. These surpluses are "desired" by industrialized nations. If OPEC were to cut production further to eliminate present surpluses, the world economy would experience a severe slump. For OPEC nations, the economics of these surpluses is not very clear: there is a fair question whether oil in the ground will appreciate more over time than the real value of these financial surpluses. Moreover, let us also remind ourselves that these surpluses become a problem only because the world monetary system has not yet discovered either adequate market mechanisms or international intermediation through which these surpluses could be recycled to deficit countries on appropriate terms. This requires a reform of the monetary system, not of oil-pricing policies.

Finally, the capital-surplus OPEC nations have already provided over 4 percent of their gross national product (GNP) on the average

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during 1974–79 for concessional assistance, compared to 0.35 percent by industrialized nations—in other words, about 12 times as much as developed countries even when their per capita income is less than half that of developed countries.[3] This is truly remarkable when it is realized that OPEC assistance is being given not out of current income but out of the proceeds of oil—a depleting capital asset. Hardly any other nation in the world provides assistance by running down its capital. This is not to suggest that OPEC assistance policies are optimal, or to foreclose any further avenues of mutual collaboration between OPEC and the rest of the Third World, but only to restore some perspective on this issue.

In short, the old premises of the global energy order have all collapsed by now; new premises cannot be constructed under the dark shadow of unfounded myths and unnecessary controversies. It is possible to identify key areas for global negotiations only within such a perspective. Let me turn now to three critical questions in this field.

First, how will future oil prices be determined? Obviously they will no longer be determined by a handful of powerful oil corporations dominating the international oil market—nor by the unilateral actions of OPEC. They will be determined by a whole range of decisions and factors: OPEC national production policies; global conservation policies, particularly in the industrialized nations; investment in the expansion of oil production and other energy alternatives in the non-OPEC nations; the probable cost of future oil substitutes; the pace of growth in the world economy, etc. Until some of these unfold and have their full impact, the international community will live through a transition period when oil prices may remain volatile unless a tacit international understanding is reached.

Most present forecasts indicate a real increase in oil prices (by three to five percent a year) over the 1980s. All nations have to gain if such an increase is gradual and predictable, rather than in sudden and delayed bursts. But before any international understanding or agreement can be reached in this area, the interests of various sides will have to be identified. While oil-importing nations would like to have some agreement on the future course of oil prices, OPEC nations would probably be reluctant to enter into any such agreement without clear understandings on conservation policies in industrialized nations, protection of the real value of

[3] For source of data, see Robert S. McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank, September 1980, p. 13.

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their financial surpluses, and assistance with the conversion of their oil revenues into real, long-term development in order to prepare their economies for a post-oil stage. It must also be recognized that OPEC alone cannot "enforce" or "guarantee" any particular oil price, since a whole range of policy decisions will influence the market, as argued above. OPEC can only reach understandings on matters within its direct control.

Second, policies for energy conservation will be an extremely crucial part of adjustment during the 1980s. Cheap oil has encouraged wasteful patterns of energy consumption and choice of inappropriate technologies. One of the problems in adjustment is that some of the decisions are frozen by now in some societies, e.g., stress on private automobiles and public highways, suburban modes of living, energy-intensive industries. Unfreezing these decisions for the future will require tremendous political and economic courage, particularly in the industrialized nations. The developing countries have as yet more options available if they review their future patterns of development and consumption styles in the light of the new energy situation. There is generally considerable room for economizing if energy prices are allowed to rise to their proper level in oil-importing nations. To a limited extent, conservation policies are already working in some of the industrialized countries, but the eventual adjustment in their patterns of consumption and development is so fundamental that it has barely begun.[4]

Third, oil-importing developing countries require substantial resources for financing larger investments in domestic energy production. These investment needs are estimated by the World Bank at around $80 billion a year (in current dollars) during 1980–90.[5] Various proposals are currently being made to provide investment resources to oil-importing developing countries for energy development, such as an energy affiliate in the World Bank to provide $5 billion a year over the next five years; expansion of the present OPEC Fund into a development agency with a capital of $20 billion; schemes for mobilization of larger private foreign investment. The total investment needs in energy are so large that there is room for all these initiatives and great merit in having diversification of channels for this purpose. What is important, however, is to ensure that these initiatives lead to additional transfers; that they reflect the changing balance of financial power

[4] *World Development Report 1980*, Washington: The World Bank, 1980, p. 14.
[5] *Energy in the Developing Countries*, Washington: The World Bank, August 1980.

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in the world; and that they are based on a participatory system of management and control.

These are some of the key issues around which global negotiations can be organized in the field of energy.[6] The energy issue was analyzed at length merely to illustrate that even in a sensitive area like this, there are ways to avoid irrelevant issues and to focus on the new premises which should replace the old while meeting the legitimate interests of various nations. In the following discussion, this point is illustrated further in a few more areas under negotiation, though much more briefly.

VI

In the monetary field, just as in energy, most of the premises on which the global monetary order was built have quietly disappeared.

The Bretton Woods system after World War II was based on fixed exchange rates and the relative stability of world prices. Since the early 1970s, exchange rates have been fluctuating freely (and even violently for the dollar) and we are living with high rates of global inflation.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was expected to bring pressure on both deficit and surplus countries to take the necessary bitter medicine and quickly to nurse the balance of payments back to a happy equilibrium. The Fund never enjoyed much leverage with surplus countries to begin with. By now, it cannot put much pressure on the biggest deficit country—the United States. The huge financial surpluses of OPEC confronted the Fund with yet another challenge, and it has so far found no satisfactory way to recycle these surpluses to deficit countries, either in an efficient or an equitable manner, though the scale of its operations in developing countries has increased significantly in recent months. Commercial banks quickly assumed the role of recycling financial surpluses and have done a fairly good job, but only within the narrow confines of their criteria of creditworthiness and profit. About two-thirds of commercial credits have been channeled to only ten middle-income developing countries.

The United States assumed the role of a central bank; nearly 80 percent of the additional international liquidity in the last three decades was supplied by the dollar. For all practical purposes, the United States carried an international credit card which

[6] For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Salah Al-Shaikhly and Mahbub ul Haq, *Energy and Development: An Agenda for Dialogue*, North-South Round Table, Paper No. 2.

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it used indiscriminately to flood the world with excess liquidity. Instead of carrying out real adjustments at home, the United States has been paying for its balance-of-payments deficits through the simple device of international deficit financing. The IMF has not been able to exercise much control over the creation of international liquidity through national reserve currencies.

The IMF was charged with the responsibility for providing balance-of-payments support to deficit countries, with reasonable policy conditionality to adjust the causes of their fundamental disequilibrium. The potential resources of the Fund have increased substantially in recent years; it can lend as much as $40 billion to developing countries from a maze of windows (called "credit facilities"). Unfortunately, there were few takers in 1979, when the IMF received more payments from developing countries than the funds it lent to them. Recently, the IMF has adjusted the policy conditionality of its lending and the scale of its operations has increased impressively. However, the critics of the Fund charge that (a) its finance is fairly short term while the adjustment problem of the developing countries is not, and (b) its policy conditionality is very tough, as it often requires that the books of a nation be balanced, irrespective of the level of economic activity and employment at which this new balance is reached.[7]

Finally, the socialist bloc still operates largely outside the framework of the IMF. In view of the growing economic and monetary importance of this bloc, any new monetary order must seek their full participation and cooperation.

Overall, the global monetary system is in such bad shape at present that an entirely fresh start may have to be made. No marginal improvisations will suffice in the 1980s. The new premises on which the monetary order should be rebuilt are implied by the foregoing analysis and are worth recapitulating.

—National reserve currencies must be phased out of the international payments system and replaced by an international currency (modified Special Drawing Rights), to be created and managed by international jurisdiction.

—The creation of international currency should be guided by the real increase in world output and exports so as not to generate inflationary pressures.

—The distribution of this international currency should be based on present as well as potential balance-of-payments needs,

[7] "The International Monetary System and the New International Order," in *Development Dialogue*, 1980, No. 2.

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including a link between international currency and development assistance.

—The IMF, or a wholly new institution, should be gradually evolved to perform the role of an International Central Bank (ICB).

—For this purpose, the ICB should include all nations (socialist bloc as well) and its management and control should be genuinely international.

—The ICB should be empowered to put as much pressure on deficit countries to adjust their balance of payments as on surplus countries, so that the present asymmetry of treatment is removed.

—The ICB should also act as the lender of last resort, to refinance short-term debts, provide a "safety net" against unforeseen liquidity crises, and play a decisive role in recycling financial surpluses in collaboration with the private capital market.

These are not minor reforms; this is drastic surgery. The new monetary order can emerge step by step once an overall framework has been accepted. Major economic powers will find this degree of international discipline irksome to begin with, but they will gain a great deal in the long run from rules which are accepted by all nations. The developing countries, of course, would reap enormous benefits from these reforms. Lord Keynes' vision in the 1940s would finally have been adapted to current realities—after 40 years of drift and indifferent experimentation.

VII

Before searching for a new basis for international resource transfers, it is useful to sketch out some of the implicit assumptions of the present order and what is wrong with them:

—The present resource transfers from the rich to the poor nations are totally voluntary, dependent completely on the fluctuating political will of the rich nations. The attempts by the United Nations and the Pearson Commission to enforce greater discipline in this field through the 0.7 percent-of-GNP target for Official Development Assistance (ODA) has failed miserably by now.

—Most of the present official assistance (75 percent) flows through bilateral channels rather than multilateral institutions. As such, it is greatly influenced by bilateral political relationships. For instance, only 45 percent of the bilateral official development assistance is directed toward the poorest nations that need it the most, compared to over 90 percent of ODA which flows through multilateral channels.

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—The resource transfers have been in gross terms, with insufficient concern for *net* transfers. Inappropriate terms in the past have created a major debt problem, so that debt servicing reduces the gross transfers by about one-half by now.

—The international framework for resource transfers has excluded the socialist bloc, which has provided little assistance so far. New OPEC sources, while very generous, have been geographically concentrated on a few countries.

—The "aid relationship" is often viewed as a relationship of dependence, not partnership, in the Third World. Unlike the Marshall Plan, developing countries which receive assistance do not participate in the basic decisions governing such assistance.

There is no doubt that international assistance has performed a valuable role in the past. However, it is already becoming clear that a serious search must start for finding new premises for international resource transfers in the 1980s, somewhat along the following lines:

—International resource mobilization should become more "automatic" and be accepted as an international obligation toward the poor nations. International taxation can be introduced through a variety of devices: a progressive income tax on all nations, with a minimum exemption limit; introduction of a link between creation of international liquidity and development finance; indirect taxes on consumption of non-renewable resources by the rich nations; taxation of armament spending; and royalties from ocean-bed mining. The proposals are well known. What is needed during this decade is to undertake serious technical studies on them and to create a favorable political climate for the acceptance of the concept of international taxation.

—A clear distinction must be made between automatic *mobilization* and automatic *transfer* of resources. What is implied by proposals of international taxation is the former, not the latter. Once resources are raised automatically, they need to be channeled through international institutions to needy countries according to certain performance criteria—as national treasuries must determine national priorities before committing the resources they raise through taxation. In this case, the control of international institutions can become genuinely international once their resource base has become automatic and internationalized. The present awkward situation where international financial institutions are totally dependent on the goodwill of individual creditor nations will then be replaced by shared international responsibility and control.

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VIII

The world food system—if we can call it that—has been influenced by three main assumptions over the last four decades:

—The comparative advantage in growing food surpluses was supposed to lie with developed countries possessing vast areas of good agricultural land and sufficient capital and technology. Thus, the United States, Canada and Australia emerged as the breadbaskets of the impoverished world. This situation is likely to change radically. Higher energy costs will shift the comparative advantage away from traditional food-exporting areas, since agricultural production has become extremely energy-intensive in these countries; in the United States it takes ten times as much energy to produce one ton of food grains as it does in India. Over the coming decades, low-income countries of Asia and Africa are expected to develop a major comparative advantage in food production.

—It has been assumed so far that developing countries need not grow all their own food; they can always import it. The food deficits of the developing countries have been increasing rapidly, from about 20 million tons in 1960 to nearly 80 million tons in 1980, and to an estimated 145 million tons in 1990.[8] Only recently has it been realized by the developing countries that, without accelerated agricultural production, there will be little stimulus for their industrialization or overall growth. Nor is there any other effective means of putting adequate purchasing power in the hands of the poorest population in the countryside. Moreover, the developing countries lack both the physical and financial capacity to import such huge food deficits, apart from the uncertainty such dependence inevitably creates. The working assumption for the next two decades has to be that developing countries would like to achieve relative self-sufficiency in food grains.[9] This means increasing the food production by four to five percent a year, compared to an average of less than three percent for the last four decades. It would require an annual investment of $30–50 billion, major agrarian reforms in the Third World, and a coordinated effort by the international community to help developing countries achieve these new goals.

—Almost by default, U.S. food grain surpluses had become an unofficial guarantee against periods of unexpected crop shortfalls

[8] Willy Brandt, et al., *North-South: A Program for Survival*, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1980, p. 91.

[9] See the final communiqué of the World Food Conference, Rome, 1974.

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in the developing world. However, world grain reserves have fallen by now to only 40 days of the annual consumption requirement. Obviously, small fluctuations in world food production can play havoc with food prices and human lives in the absence of adequate reserves. A world food security system cannot be based on the present precarious assumptions. From an unofficial system, we must move now toward an agreed framework of food grain reserves over which there is multilateral, not national, control.

Thus, in the food area as well, many of the original assumptions of the global order are losing their validity. In this case, some of the adjustments can be made through national development policies and do not require an international agreement. However, accelerated food production in the developing countries and establishment of a system of world food security do require international help and collective agreement.

IX

Perhaps the main point has been amply made by now. A productive way of making a fresh start on the North-South dialogue would be to take up concrete areas of the global economic order, to examine critically the premises on which they were built in the past, and to negotiate new premises wherever the old assumptions have been eroded with the passage of time or new assumptions are required to serve the mutual interests of all nations. Such an approach would take the present dialogue away from empty rhetoric, costly filibuster, and skillfully engineered stalemate to more practical and constructive channels.

If this basic approach is accepted, it can be extended to all other areas of global economic concern—whether they be future patterns of international trade, codes for transfer of technology, environment for operation of multinationals, or management and control of international financial institutions. There is an obvious link between all these fields, but the negotiations cannot be conducted simultaneously in all areas nor can the new rules be designed in one giant step. Once it has been recognized that reconstruction of a new global order is the joint responsibility of all nations, appropriate forums can be established for concrete negotiation. The initial step is to agree on the basic approach. If the U.N. Global Negotiations are revived in the next few months, as they must be, they provide a unique opportunity to travel down this road.

If these global negotiations are not to repeat the sad history of

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the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) negotiations in Paris in 1977, at least two mistakes must be avoided. First, all sides must approach the negotiating table in a spirit of shared responsibility and not as adversaries. Second, the negotiating agenda and format should be manageable and have something in it for all sides. The minimum agenda can consist of three items: the search for a new international energy order; fundamental monetary reforms; and more automatic mechanisms for international resource transfers.

Any enlargement of the agenda in the first instance risks dilution of negotiations and paralysis of real bargaining. Once the agenda is so limited, the best way to proceed may be to agree on some overall objectives in the U.N. Committee of the Whole but then break into three separate negotiating groups, each with a substantive secretariat and a concrete timetable, with the mandate to produce specific proposals (and various alternatives, if agreement is lacking) for final bargaining sessions and tactical compromises in the Committee of the Whole.

The purpose of this article is to suggest an approach, not a blueprint. It is perhaps foolhardy to be optimistic about the revival of North-South dialogue in the current, rather barren, international political environment. But great initiatives in history have often been taken not in times of affluence, but in moments of crisis.

We should take some heart from the heady (some may call it naïve) optimism of the recent Report of the Brandt Commission.[10] Whatever the critics might say, this Report marks a tremendous advance in the intellectual journey we have all made since the days of the Pearson Commission Report in 1969—from concepts of camouflaged dependency to genuine interdependence among nations; from a preoccupation with resource transfers to a concern with restructuring all international economic relations and institutions; from a quiet defense of the structure of Bretton Woods institutions to a searching analysis of the need for their future evolution.

There may be little hope that some of the concrete ideas of the Brandt Report—whether international taxation or an international currency under international control—will be implemented in the next few years or even during the decade of the 1980s. But I find great comfort in the fact that practical men and women of

[10] To indulge my own vanity, I would refer the reader to some of the proposals in chapters 10 and 11 of my book, *The Poverty Curtain*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, which find an echo in the Brandt Commission Report.

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the world are beginning to "distill their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years past," as Keynes so elegantly put it in his defense of the power of ideas. If ideas are changing so rapidly, can concrete action be far behind? And why not make yet another effort to revive the presently stalled North-South dialogue? We have nothing much to lose but the present paralysis in human affairs.

X

Let me add a final word on the North-South Summit which may meet in June 1981 in Mexico, according to present indications. History offers few such opportunities to think collectively about our global future. Careful preparations are needed from now on to realize the full potential of such a Summit meeting.

If I had a chance to brief the Summit, I would stress the essential principles, not the details; the broad architecture, not the intricate design. Political breakthroughs come from a change in political perceptions, not from detailed technocratic blueprints.

My message to the North-South Summit will be a simple one:[11]

(1) Please recognize that the world's economic and political crisis is not a temporary one. It is deeply rooted in present international structures and institutions. National actions alone will not help, unless the global structures themselves are changed, preferably through an orderly dialogue and certainly in the long term interest of all nations.

(2) What is really at issue is a sharing of economic and political power, within nations as well as internationally. It will prove extremely disruptive if existing power has to be changed only through the organization of countervailing power or through unilateral national or collective actions. There is a historic opportunity for all of you to engineer an orderly change, and to minimize the costs of transition.

What is urgently needed is for the global community to finally show its readiness to assume certain global responsibilities in key areas of policy and to set in motion certain mechanisms and processes through which these responsibilities can be implemented. Such a political compact of global responsibilities should include an agreement in at least the following essential areas:

—An internationally accepted floor below absolute poverty all over the globe and a concrete framework through which this

[11] These suggestions are based on my concluding statement to the North-South Roundtable in Ottawa on November 16, 1980.

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objective can be reached over the next two decades.

—An agreed system of international food security, based on additional investment for less-developed countries' national production, adequate food reserves, and emergency assistance in times of crisis.

—A global responsibility for putting in place a new international energy security system, including global understanding on energy conservation, vastly increased investment resources for energy development, and mechanisms for more predictable increases in real prices.

—Acceptance of the principle of greater automaticity in mobilization of resources to be channeled through international institutions under genuine international control

—Acceptance of the principle that any international reserve currency should be created only under international jurisdiction and for the benefit of all nations.

—Acceptance of the global responsibility for creating adequate recycling mechanisms, particularly to ensure that adjustment in the next few years is not at the cost of either economic growth or social programs, or political survival of developing countries.

—Clear recognition of the contradictions between present levels of armaments spending, global population increase and global environment deterioration for the evolution of a new order.

I would like to suggest to the Summit that by initiating such a global Magna Carta of new premises for an old order, they will unleash forces of creativity and enterprise all over the world and provide a framework within which global negotiations can meaningfully proceed. It may even lead to a new Bretton Woods Conference to implement much of this new vision. And I should like to plead with the Summit's members that what the world badly needs today is a new vision for this ailing planet, however long it takes to implement each individual element of reform and however headstrong the incrementalism we generate, not a quick fix to get through the next six months.

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COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

To the Editor:

Lloyd N. Cutler, in his "To Form a Government" (*Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980), has highlighted an important set of developments: the instruments of collective authority and accountability in American politics have been weakened in recent years at the same time that the problems facing government have become more complex. However, Mr. Cutler, in the course of his essay, manages at one and the same time to gloss over the difficulties of parliamentary systems, overstate the intractability of modern American government, misrepresent the changes that have swept Congress in the last decade, and lend credibility to a laundry list of unworkable and infeasible constitutional reforms.

In any society, structural arrangements alone do not determine the quality or direction of policy—the political, geographic, cultural and social variables are equally important. The vacillation, disarray and misdirection at various times in the foreign and domestic policies of parliamentary Britain and Italy are cases in point. One need look only at the zigs and zags over the years in Britain's response to membership in the European Economic Community and the Labour Party's potential move in the coming months to urge withdrawal to see that indecision on an important foreign policy question is not restricted to the American system. Italy's parliamentary system, of course, has had great success in forming governments—several dozen, at last count, in the postwar era. This is not to suggest that these countries should scotch *their* political institutions and adopt ours or any others—only that structural reforms are not panaceas.

Moreover, in the United States the recent deadlocks or failures of policy initiatives have been as much failures of political will and skill as anything else. The new, more diffuse Congress *can* be worked with—the diffusion of power creates opportunities as well as constraints. But it puts a premium not just on the consultation that Mr. Cutler so easily dismisses, but on the skills of political management. A case in point is the successful handling of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

Here the Administration had a clear policy leader on MTN—Robert Strauss—who developed a politically sustainable substantive position, was sensitive to the congressional climate and to individual members' needs, and cultivated an image of toughness. These elements of successful political management were missing from SALT II, the Energy Mobilization Board and other notorious Carter failures. Better bills and better leadership could provide different results.

Even in the current context, there are virtues to an active Congress—virtues unappreciated by Mr. Cutler, who would prefer to make Congress a "silent partner." Our system of separation of powers provides multiple channels for assessing policy options and for rejecting those that are misguided or altering

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those that are misdirected. Many constituencies have a voice—and the outcomes, more often than not, are the better for it. For example, the two-year struggle on Capitol Hill over natural gas deregulation served both to correct problems with President Carter's proposal and to develop a consensus that made it possible later to deregulate oil. In spite of the temporary setbacks, the strife, and the seeming irrationality of the legislative process, we now have an energy policy, the broad outlines of which will survive any change in administrations. In many ways, this compares favorably with Britain, where dramatic policy reversals often follow a change in government: witness the Conservative and Labour governments' struggle over nationalizing, denationalizing and renationalizing the same industries.

In any case, if discussion of the problems and limits of Congress takes place, it ought to be on an accurate factual basis. Mr. Cutler's discussion of changes in Congress has numerous inaccuracies that require clarification. Senator Mike Mansfield did not in 1961 change the practice of awarding committee chairmanships; nor was he the first to give every Democratic Senator a major committee assignment. The latter was an innovation of Lyndon Johnson. The former was altered by the Senate Democratic Conference in the 1970s, but the norm of seniority has never been violated. The statement that the seniority system in the House was "scrapped" is hyperbole—virtually every chairman selected since the reform has been the most senior. The House Majority Caucus does not pick subcommittee chairmen (except for the Appropriations Committee). While jurisdictional overlap among committees has further decentralized the process, the procedural change allowing the leadership to refer bills to multiple committees and to appoint ad hoc committees to coordinate these efforts was instituted to enhance, not weaken, the Speaker's power—and it has worked that way for the most part (witness the Ad Hoc Energy Committee).

Finally, we disagree with Mr. Cutler's interpretation of the historical role of Congress. Mr. Cutler portrays a rosy period of two decades ago and more, when a President could "sit down with ten or fifteen leaders in each House, and. . . agree on a program which those leaders could carry through Congress." If John Kennedy were with us today, he would be amused to learn about his supposed ability to work out his program with Congress. President Kennedy couldn't simply tell Congress what to do; more often he had to wait for congressional leaders to tell *him* what was possible or impossible. Their assessments were reliable too—the bulk of President Kennedy's civil rights, poverty, education and health proposals foundered in Congress during his three years in the White House.

Mr. Cutler's proposals for constitutional reform are likely to lead to unanticipated consequences worse than the original malady. Suppose, for example, that in 1960 the candidates for President, Vice President and the House of Representatives had, as he suggests, run for election in each district as a team, with voters making a single choice. John Kennedy, who actually carried well under half of the congressional districts, would have faced a Republican majority in the House strongly tied to Richard Nixon! The same condition almost prevailed in 1976.

Other Cutler suggestions, such as the proposal to have 50 percent of the Cabinet selected from members of the House and Senate, could easily lead to a divided Executive and *increased* tension between the branches. Mr. Cutler

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also endorses the shopworn idea of a single six-year term for the President, stating that "Limiting each President to one six-year term would enhance the objectivity and public acceptance of the measures he urges in the national interest." Why? Have the proposals of second-term Presidents received greater public acceptance since the ratification of the 22nd Amendment? Obviously not.

Let us not allow pipe dreams of constitutional reform to blind us to the positive virtues of a true separation of powers or distract us from the task of making our political system work.

THOMAS E. MANN
NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN
Congress Project
American Enterprise Institute
Washington, D.C.

To the Editor:

Lloyd M. Cutler presents a cogent analysis of why we do not seem to get coherent policies. But his suggestions for constitutional change are, I think, based upon usage and not on the Constitution itself. We could obtain the desired results by following the Constitution differently.

It is a dead end, in my judgment, to compare ourselves with European parliamentary systems in which the prime minister, as a kind of first among equals, "forms a government." Our Constitution requires the President to do no such thing. The Founding Fathers were careful to separate executive and legislative powers and to provide the system of checks and balances that prevents one-man rule or rule by a feared "junto." Under this system, as it is explained in the schools, Congress makes the laws and the President carries them out.

That is not, of course, what has been happening. The President has been taking office with a program he wants to put through, and much of his effort and the effort of his Administration is then put behind lobbying, wheedling and cajoling Congress to enact it. The program is legislative. The Constitution does require the President to "give Congress information on the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." (Article II, Section 3). It does not require him to present a full legislative program.

We ask our President to be a ceremonial leader, like the Queen of England and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany; to be the creator of legislative programs, like a European prime minister; and to act as chief executive running the vast federal bureaucracy. Only the last requirement is specifically called for in the Constitution, and if the President were to devote the major share of his time to that, possibly the government would hum more smoothly than it does.

If the President were judged on how well the departments of government function, the responsibility for making laws would revert to Congress, where the Constitution put it. To get anything done, Congress would have to change some of its current practices. Just as suggestions, it might:

—Enhance the authority of the majority leaders, making them—rather than the President—responsible for coordinating and formulating the legislative program for each session.

—Write its legislation less specifically to leave the executive branch more

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discretion in carrying out the laws. A congressional ban on arms sales to a specific country, for example, would be seen as a form of usurpation, but Congress could properly establish the standards on which all arms sales must be based.

—Continue to exercise its oversight and budget functions, but in a way that deemphasizes the partnership aspects of current practice (the feared "junto") and reemphasizes its own separate functions and responsibilities.

—Require expertise from key committee chairmen to the point that they (particularly House members, who are unencumbered by the long Senate terms) would be logical choices to head Cabinet departments in new Administrations to carry out legislation they had a hand in devising.

Steps such as these would make the majority leaders more like prime ministers. They would not "form the government," but they would form the legislative program of the government. The President would be free to recommend measures. He might choose to provide a list of general goals to be achieved each session. The actual working out of legislation to achieve the goals would be up to Congress. In such a situation, responsibility for successes and failures would be clearer.

For the system to work, the public and press would have to focus more clearly on Congress than they do. Even in current practice, we know much more than we need to know about Presidents and their families and much less than we need to know about the workings of Congress. Restoring the real and perceived responsibility for such matters as windfall profits taxes and creation of new programs to Congress, however, would attract to Congress attention it does not now get.

Individual congressional incumbents would lose their free rides in a real three-branch system. But the President would be relieved of the impossible demands current expectations place upon him.

Would such a shift in emphasis work? We won't know unless we try it. But a shift could be achieved faster than a major rewriting of the Constitution. The current, expanded presidency is the outcome of historical factors and not of the letter of the law of the Constitution. Mr. Cutler has presented a compelling case for why the historical situation is different today. But I think we can meet the new situation by evolving new practices from the document we have.

TOM BLACKBURN
The Trenton Times
Trenton, New Jersey

The author replies:

Mr. Mann and Mr. Ornstein express a reasonable difference of opinion with my thesis that nothing short of some structural constitutional change will enable us to form a government capable of legislating and executing a balanced program for governing.

We disagree as to whether the fault is personal to any President or legislator. While we may occasionally elect Presidents and legislators who will manage to do better in forming a government than those of this generation, we need a structure which will enable every President and legislator to do better.

But they are wrong to characterize my article as an attempt to persuade

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the reader of the virtue of any particular amendment. I expressly disclaimed any such purpose. I said I am far from persuaded myself.

They are also wrong to say I favor a change that will transfer all power to the President and make the congressional majority his passive followers. I suggest only that we need to find a way of binding the President and the legislative majority to a shared political fate—a concept implying that there is no freedom in a rocking boat, and that they must row together to save their collective political lives.

Mr. Blackburn's idea comes close to what the framers probably had in mind. But it does not fit the world we inhabit today. President Dwight D. Eisenhower declined to follow the Roosevelt-Truman precedent of sending a legislative program to Congress at the beginning of his first term, but even with his modest view of the presidency, he soon resumed the practice. If we accept the premise that governments today should be addressing the problems they now tackle, we must specifically confer the power to do so on elected officials we can hold clearly accountable for its use. Under our system of sharing power between the President and Congress, we must find a way to link the President and the legislative majority into a shared political fate. That is what we now fail to do.

CONFRONTING THE SOVIETS

To the Editor:

Paul Nitze's "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s" (*Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980) invites reply. Mr. Nitze's views are consistent with those he has expressed over a period of 35 years, but this time they are especially notable for the complete faith he expresses in their eternal verity, and for his passionate warnings that "Soviet gains and threats to world peace" will "multiply inexorably" if the United States does not adopt policies along the lines he suggests.

Reduced to its essentials, the Nitze thesis is that the Soviets want to control the world and to destroy all potential centers of power and influence which they do not control, and that they subordinate everything else to this grand objective; persistence and continuity predominate in their approach; their "objectives" for the 1980s flow from their judgment that the correlation of forces has shifted in their favor. It is upon that judgment that the Soviet policy of expansionism currently being pursued has been based, and the evidence of it is seen—according to Mr. Nitze—in a variety of developments which he has described in ways to conform to it.

There are a significant number of assertions in his account which are either devoid of substantial evidence or based upon events which, given his underlying thesis, are treated as evidence. The public record contains no clear or persuasive evidence, for example, that the Soviets played a "major role in encouraging" the October 1973 attack upon Israel and subsequent OPEC oil squeeze, that the hostage seizure in Tehran in November 1979 involved members of the Moscow-controlled Tudeh party, or that the assault on the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the activities of the Red Brigades in Italy were "supported and perhaps instigated" by Soviet agents. And almost everything that occurred in the world during the 1970s which might be regarded as unfavorable to U.S. interests is attributed to Soviet action. Mr. Nitze even

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believes that events since 1973 in Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, South Yemen and Zaïre have given "evidence of Soviet determination to expand the sway of Soviet influence across Africa and the routes of access to the Persian Gulf." Exactly what Cambodia and Laos have to do with Africa or access to the Persian Gulf, Mr. Nitze does not say.

The world today is replete with instabilities, tensions and strivings. This presents the Soviets with opportunities—and with problems—as it does the United States. The Soviets have botched some of the opportunities, and so have we. But compared with, say, 1950, there are a lot fewer communists in the world today allied with Moscow, or under its influence, than there were then. The Soviets have lost their influence, or most of it, in the communist states of China, Yugoslavia and Albania. They have been faced with strong recalcitrance in Romania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the communist parties of Italy and Spain. They have had favorable positions slip away from them in Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and the Sudan. At home, they have had to worry about failures to meet economic goals, technological backwardness, a growing demographic imbalance between Russian and non-Russian peoples, and a general lack of creativity and enthusiasm in Soviet society. When the Soviet leaders look at their situation today and consider their courses of action, it is highly unlikely that they view the correlation of forces in quite so favorable a light as some Soviet propagandists suggest or as Mr. Nitze thinks they should.

More than ever before, Soviet policy has become the result of competition among individuals, bureaucratic entities, interest groups, nationalities, professions and generations. There are debates about arms control versus arms expansion, forward strategy versus quietism in the Third World, economic autarky versus trade and interdependence. One of the liveliest debates has been over how to apply modern science and technology to the Soviet economy and how to deal with its consequences. Indeed, Professor Cyril Black of Princeton University sees the 1970s debate over the scientific-technological revolution as resulting in "sweeping changes" which have transformed Marxism-Leninism in the direction of a more pluralistic society. The Party hacks who have dominated Soviet policy are already giving way to a new generation of managers and professionals with a more pragmatic orientation.

It is, therefore, unhelpful to American understanding and policymaking for Mr. Nitze to repeat the old clichés about the U.S.S.R. and to selectively find evidence and "events" to support them. Instead, we should seek to better understand what is happening in the Soviet Union and adopt policies which will encourage the evolution of Soviet life and policy in directions we desire.

"The main Soviet strategic objectives for the 1980s" listed by Mr. Nitze—with one major exception—contain little that has not characterized Soviet policy for many years. They are the stuff of international politics and even the mirror image of U.S. objectives. The Soviets would like to separate NATO Europe from the United States; we would like to separate Eastern Europe from the U.S.S.R. Neither of us seems likely to succeed. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have sought influence in the Persian Gulf; the Soviet policy—even Mr. Nitze admits—is but a continuation of a 200-year-old Russian aim. "The encirclement and neutralization of China" is a colorful way of describing a 20-year-old Soviet policy designed to counter Chinese

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influence in the Third World. The Soviets, however, think the shoe is on the other foot, i.e., that our China policy is an effort to encircle the U.S.S.R.

"Trouble for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean" is no doubt welcomed in Moscow. But most of this trouble flows from 80 years of bad U.S. policy, not from Soviet or Cuban machinations. What is surprising is that Cuban efforts to export Castroite communism have had so little success despite the fact that most of what passes for an effort to redress U.S. policy is too little and too late. The Soviets repeatedly allege that we stir up a good deal of trouble for them in places like Afghanistan and Poland and no doubt believe we have been responsible for their loss of influence in Egypt, the Sudan and elsewhere. The evidence would suggest that it was more likely bad Soviet policy and behavior, rather than CIA machinations, that produced those results.

Of greatest moment in Mr. Nitze's article, however, is his description of Soviet military policies and his prescription for U.S. policy to deal with them. In Mr. Nitze's view, the Soviets are improving their military capabilities to dissuade "the West" from using military force to oppose Soviet expansionism. Because "the West" might at some point resort to nuclear weapons instead of accepting such expansion, the Soviets are preparing "to fight and win a nuclear war." But respected and careful students of Soviet military doctrine, such as Raymond Garthoff, disagree with Mr. Nitze's thesis that the Soviets do not accept deterrence and believe they can fight and win a nuclear war. One might reasonably ask what a prudent Soviet military planner ought to do when contemplating U.S. military capabilities and doctrines, including Mr. Nitze's suggestion that we might be the first to resort to nuclear weapons and our persistent refusal to forswear first use.

There is indeed a danger of general nuclear war, though there is at least a reasonable case to be made that it lies as much in U.S. doctrine and capabilities as in Soviet doctrine and capabilities. The MX missile was established as an Air Force requirement, for example, in 1971, and an advanced development program was begun in 1973. This missile, together with the Trident II system and the current deployment of the Mark 12A warhead on the Minuteman III, will give the United States a substantial first-strike capability against the largest and most vulnerable sector of the Soviet strategic force—the Soviet missile forces in silo. With these U.S. capabilities in the process of becoming reality, and with the extended deterrence openly declared in Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's exposition of Presidential Directive 59 at the Naval War College, what are the Soviets to do? Unless they are ready to sit tight and allow themselves to be incinerated, they must also prepare for a first strike. Thus, the stage is being set for one side or the other to take preemptive action and, in a situation of tension, plunge the world into unmitigated disaster.

One can argue at length about who—the United States or the U.S.S.R.—first undertook the improvements in strategic nuclear capabilities which have gotten us into the present predicament. But the problem now is to get out of that predicament.

It will perhaps be helpful to improve conventional capabilities in order to raise the threshold for the employment of nuclear capabilities. But then why advocate lowering that threshold by the development of first-strike capabilities and by the adoption of a doctrine of extended deterrence and limited nuclear war? Mr. Nitze never really says what is to be gained by the improvements in

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U.S. strategic capabilities which he advocates except to deny the Soviets strategic nuclear superiority—whatever that is. General Maxwell Taylor, in a very thoughtful article in *The Washington Post* in September 1980, has raised a very serious objection to an arms race "to achieve parity with or superiority over the Soviet Union." That goal, he finds, is "too ill-defined for program planning and the location of the finish line, even if it is discernible, may be changed at will by the Soviets."

To the extent that we follow Mr. Nitze's prescription and throw increasing amounts of public funds into armaments, especially strategic nuclear forces, we do the opposite of what Mr. Nitze also wants us to do, i.e., to get our economic house in order. We cannot extract from the corporate world and from individuals increasing amounts of money in taxation and thus deny them the savings and investment to improve our productivity, technology and capacity to compete effectively in world markets, and to head off the declining confidence of all economic groups—business, worker and farmer—in our political system's capacity to manage the public interest. We also preempt the resources and the willingness of both government and private business to export to the rest of the world what it wants and needs, i.e., goods, capital and technology.

The problem of U.S. policy is not to inject more military power into the evolution of world politics, but to try to surmount the need to dispose and brandish it. This involves encouragement of pluralism and experimentation—and reassessment—in the communist world, encouragement of economic interdependence and cosmopolitanism, and a recognition that we, the communist nations, and the vast aspiring populations of the southern two-thirds of the world have a common problem in making this planet in the twenty-first century a place fit for decent human habitation.

WILLARD C. MATTHIAS
American Committee on East-West Accord
Washington, D.C.

Willard C. Matthias is Research Director of the American Committee on East-West Accord. He was for 12 years a member of the Board of National Estimates at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Nitze replies:

I can only applaud Mr. Matthias' determination to believe that we have no serious problems with the Soviet Union, that their aims are merely the mirror image of our aims, and that we and they can devote ourselves to the common problem of fulfilling the aspirations of the populations of the southern two-thirds of the world.

Would that it were so.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE. By Kurt Waldheim. New York: Rawson, Wade, 1980, 158 pp. $9.95.

The Secretary General, in a book that is quite defensive about his own role and that of the United Nations, gives us first a brief autobiographical sketch, then an account of his activity in dealing with some of the major disputes, such as Cyprus, Southern Africa, and the Middle East. No startling revelations, as Dr. Waldheim tells us at the start that "much of interest must for the time being remain unsaid." This is a revised edition of a work that first appeared in French in 1977.

YOUR MAN AT THE U.N. By Seymour Maxwell Finger. New York: New York University Press, 1980, 320 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $26.50).

For American decision-making at the United Nations one could not have a better guide than Maxwell Finger, who served in the U.S. Mission for 15 years. He gives candid and eminently fair sketches of those who headed that mission, from Stettinius to McHenry, but the greatest value of the book lies in its detailed treatment of how this unique diplomatic establishment actually functions, in its relations with Washington and in its own East River habitat.

AMERICAN DREAM, GLOBAL NIGHTMARE: THE DILEMMA OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. By Sandy Vogelgesang. New York: Norton, 1980, 313 pp. $13.95. A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

Of all the recent books on human rights in relation to foreign policy, this one excels in inside knowledge of the policy process and understanding of the issues, recognizing that they contain more questions than answers. The author, who served in the State Department both before and after the Carter crusade, describes not just the problems of the executive branch and the international dilemmas, but also the "politics of human rights" in the broad sense, including the role of Congress and the domestic underpinnings.

HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION. By Samuil Zivs. Moscow: Progress, 1980, 188 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor, $4.00).

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A Soviet jurist makes a ringing defense of "socialist legality" in the U.S.S.R. and replies to Western critics.

UNITING THE DEMOCRACIES: INSTITUTIONS OF THE EMERGING ATLANTIC-PACIFIC SYSTEM. By James R. Huntley. New York: New York University Press, 1980, 393 pp. $29.50. A Battelle Memorial Institute Book.

The democratic states of North America, Western Europe, Japan and the Antipodes have already created a functioning system which the author sees as the likely precursor of true international community. His book is largely descriptive of the various organizations that link these states and contains little in the way of new ideas.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. Edited by Kamal Hossain. New York: Nichols, 1980, 285 pp. $32.50.

Whatever shape, if any, the new international economic order may take, its advocates envisage a new legal order to go with it. Many of their ideas are developed in these essays, which take off from recent resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and of UNCTAD and treat such matters as sovereignty, economic rights and duties of states, transfer of technology, and the Law of the Sea.

NEWSPAPERS AND DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS ON A CHANGING MEDIUM. Edited by Anthony Smith. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980, 368 pp. $25.00.

A broad effort to assess the changing character of the printed press and its place in Western society. Written by a number of European journalists and scholars, it does not attempt a synthesis but nonetheless achieves the purpose of the editor and of the sponsor (the German Marshall Fund) to bring out the basic questions now arising for the newspapers: how much freedom they can maintain and whether they can survive at all.

THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION: HOW WESTERN CULTURE DOMINATES THE WORLD. By Anthony Smith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, 192 pp. $13.95.

The Director of the British Film Institute adds his sober reassessment to the unending debate about First World news media and Third World news. He concedes the imbalance, sees it as the product of a cultural gulf that will not disappear, and is properly skeptical of the "solutions," either one-sided or by way of compromise, that have been proposed at UNESCO and elsewhere; but he sees the need for new networks "constructed in a spirit of real interdependence."

SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE. By Bruce A. Ackerman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980, 392 pp. $17.50.

A lawyer-philosopher from Yale states the positive case for a liberalism that glorifies neither the state bureaucracy nor the private market. References to the sphere of relations among states are few, but the breadth of the attack on the fundamental issues of man and society is impressive.

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General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

"U.S. DEFENSE POLICY IN THE 1980s." Cambridge: *Daedalus*, Fall 1980, 209 pp. $4.00.

The first of two volumes which are likely to compare favorably with the now-famous, essential 1960 issue of *Daedalus* on arms control. But it is indicative of the current sea-change in perceptions that the major interest and concern is now for *defense policy* rather than arms control. If there is an overriding theme, it is the dominance of international politics over technical factors in assessing defense policy. The chapters on regional security issues in the Third World are excellent, and on the core questions of strategic deterrence and the Soviet Union there is a healthy tension among the authors. This is an important work of high quality which should be widely read.

U.S. ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. Proceedings of a Symposium held at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1–2, 1979, 115 pp.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE IN SOVIET STRATEGY. By Michael J. Deane. Washington: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980, 119 pp.

A number of factors are contributing to a resurgence of interest in ballistic missile defense: advances in BMD technologies; changes in the cost ratio making defense less expensive than offense; the growing threat to American ICBMs; reduced expectations for negotiated arms control; and doubts about the intellectual underpinnings of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. The Harvard volume contains a number of excellent essays addressing these questions from a variety of viewpoints. Moving toward a defense-dominated world is likely to require modifying or even abrogating the ABM Treaty. Whether this would enhance or decrease strategic stability remains, it would appear from the symposium, a moot point. Michael Deane's book argues that the Soviets do not accept Western concepts of deterrence and that they will continue to seek strategic defense capabilities.

ARMS, MEN, AND MILITARY BUDGETS: ISSUES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1981. By Francis P. Hoeber, William Schneider, Jr., Norman Polmar and Ray Bessette. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1980, 186 pp.

The fourth in the National Strategy Information Center series of annual volumes devoted to analyzing U.S. military capabilities. Past volumes have highlighted the growth of the Soviet threat, warned the public, and offered recommendations for overcoming U.S. deficiencies. The current volume is significant in that it assumes that recent international events have made believers out of skeptics, and therefore is more concerned with proposing "quick fixes" and initiating long-range plans than in sounding alarm bells.

SShA: VOENNO-STRATEGICHESKIE KONTSEPTSII. Edited by R. G. Bogdanov, M. A. Mil'shtein and L. S. Semeiko. Moscow: Nauka, 1980, 304 pp. Rubles 1.80.

Soviet analysts—among them General Mil'shtein, who knows the subject well, although that is not always clear from this book—describe the concepts of U.S. defense policy, stressing the two contradictory tendencies now standard in Soviet interpretations: one aggressive, the natural consequence of the class

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character of the American system; and the other based on objective conditions of international life favoring limitation of arms and peaceful coexistence with the U.S.S.R.

J.C.C.

DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF SALT I. By Gerard Smith. New York: Doubleday, 1980, 556 pp. $17.95.

This long-awaited memoir by the leader of the American team that negotiated the SALT I (1969–1972) agreement is a critical contribution to the history of the negotiations. Written in a gentlemanly manner, it nevertheless must be seen as Gerard Smith's corrective to the previous accounts of John Newhouse (*Cold Dawn*) and Henry Kissinger (*The White House Years*). The perspective is from the negotiating table at Helsinki and Vienna. Among the many points in the rich and detailed book, three stand out: the Nixon Administration did not push for a moratorium on MIRVs in 1969–70 as actively as Smith would have liked, and this stands as a major missed opportunity in the history of arms control; Kissinger's development of a back-channel with Dobrynin without informing Smith led to confusion and "duplicitous diplomacy" and brought Smith close to resigning; and the final Moscow round between Nixon and Brezhnev took place amid astounding confusion within the American camp. Smith's judicious and fair-minded approach, however, leads him to understand, if not always agree with, the differing perspectives at the White House and even within his own delegation.

THE SOVIET UNION AND SALT. By Samuel Burton Payne, Jr. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980, 152 pp. $19.95.

Based on extensive use of Soviet materials, this work compares favorably with Thomas Wolfe's recently published *The SALT Experience.* The author makes a distinction between two groups in the Soviet defense establishment: the "militarists" and the "arms controllers." He describes their differing perspectives and priorities on nuclear strategy and on negotiated restraints; yet both groups, he maintains, seek to advance Soviet goals through the accretion of military power. This is an intelligent, balanced work.

RISCHIO ATOMICO ED EQUILIBRI MONDIALI. By Sergio A. Rossi. Turin: Societa Editrice Internazionale, 1980, 300 pp. L. 9.000.

Written by a former Italian official at NATO, this is a summary of the SALT negotiations and the continuing strategic debate right up to and including the Afghanistan invasion. Although not an original work, it is of significance because it is one of the very few Italian contributions to this subject.

U.S.-SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE: CONCEPTS AND CAPABILITIES, 1960–1980. By John M. Collins. New York: McGraw-Hill Publications, 1980, 645 pp. $21.95 (Paper).

Practicing the art of "net assessment," this weighty volume seeks to appraise the military balance between the two superpowers, bilaterally and in combination with their allies. The author, a retired military officer, is a defense specialist at the Library of Congress. He presents a massive compilation of facts and figures, juxtaposing military capabilities and trends, and touching on almost every aspect of the subject. Yet its very scope leads to a certain superficiality and one wishes for a more refined analysis. Nevertheless, military strategists and their armchair colleagues can use this generally accurate volume to their advantage.

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THE PRESENT DANGER. By Norman Podhoretz. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980, 109 pp. $7.95.

A short but forceful essay, giving the neoconservative argument regarding the decline of American power and will. Podhoretz sees the trends of recent years as leading to the "Finlandization" of America. He speculates that the seizure of the hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may end the period of strategic retreat and bring forth a new nationalism and containment policy. This work originated in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations.

EVOLVING STRATEGIC REALITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS. Edited by Franklin D. Margiotta. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1980, 222 pp.

The product of a series of seminars held at the National Defense University, this volume contains papers on topics ranging from U.S.-China relations and Soviet foreign policy to energy policy, military manpower, and perceptions of declining American strength. While identifying evolving (as well as solidified) national security issues, the papers are intended to contribute to an ongoing debate rather than to offer specific solutions.

THE GENESIS OF NEW WEAPONS: DECISION MAKING FOR MILITARY R&D. Edited by Franklin A. Long and Judith Reppy. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1980, 224 pp. $22.50.

This series of illuminating essays tells how American programs for military research and development are organized and how they really work. Included are essays on how new weapons are conceived, how decisions are reached, and the respective roles of industry, the military services, civilian officials and the Congress. A chapter by David Holloway discusses the very different weapons acquisition process in the Soviet Union.

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY. By Jacques S. Gansler. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980, 346 pp. $19.95.

Written by a former Defense Department official with extensive experience in the defense industry, this book gives a knowledgeable insight into the "military-industrial complex." There is none of the polemic so often found in writing on this subject. Focusing on the post-Vietnam period, the author concludes that the industrial base of defense procurement has become economically inefficient and unresponsive to a potential military emergency.

WEAPONS: THE INTERNATIONAL GAME OF ARMS, MONEY AND DIPLOMACY. By Russell Warren Howe. New York: Doubleday, 1980, 798 pp. $19.95.

This overly long—and somewhat breathless—work touches on almost every aspect of arms and security, but lacks analytic rigor and clarity.

TOP SECRET ULTA. By Peter Calvocoressi. New York: Pantheon, 1981, 192 pp. $9.95

ULTRA IN THE WEST: THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN 1944–1945. By Ralph Bennett. London: Hutchinson, 1980, 305 pp. £9.95.

Two excellent short books by authors who participated, at Bletchley, in the intelligence handling of high-level German cipher take during World War II. Calvocoressi's gives a vivid view of the whole operation, from intercept to outgoing signal to the commands, with a few highlights on the importance of ULTRA in the conduct of the war and a deserved tribute to the initial Polish

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contribution. Bennett, using the now available file of 25,000 outgoing signals, examines in definitive detail the unique picture ULTRA provided in the climactic phase of the war. His defense of intelligence performance in relation to the Arnhem debacle is totally convincing, on the failure to spot the Ardennes offensive a shade less so.

W.P.B.

THE MILITARY IN AMERICA. Edited by Peter Karsten. New York: Free Press, 1980, 512 pp. $9.95.

This collection of essays offers what the editor considers to be the better examples of relatively new approaches to military studies. The works included in this volume deal with the political, social and psychological aspects of the military (rather than concentrating on tactics, logistics, etc.) dating from the Colonial period to the present. Each essay is introduced by an informative background note to place the piece in historical context.

DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FACILITIES IN WAR. By Bennett Ramberg. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1980, 203 pp. $19.50.

This book is aimed at alerting policymakers, the scientific community, and the general public to the hazards posed by nuclear facilities during wartime and to encourage a reevaluation of current energy policy in order to reduce these risks. In a very technical analysis, the author argues that the safety mechanisms designed to prevent radioactive leakage at nuclear plants would never withstand an intentional bombardment, and he offers some proposals to reduce the threat of nuclear contamination under these circumstances.

INTERNATIONALIZATION TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. By the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. London: Taylor & Francis, 1980, 224 pp. $24.50.

Intended to serve as background for the 1980 Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference, this book offers an analysis of the many issues surrounding a possible internationalization of the management of the nuclear fuel cycle, a step which its advocates believe would diminish the problem of nuclear proliferation.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

QUEST FOR WORLD MONETARY ORDER. By Milton Gilbert. New York: Wiley (a Twentieth-Century Fund Study), 1980, 255 pp.

An American economist who was Economic Adviser to the Bank for International Settlements from 1960 to 1975, Milton Gilbert was long known for his insistence that an increase in the official price of gold was essential to bring about the repair of the international monetary system. This posthumous volume sets out his argument quite systematically and enlivens it with an insider's account of important events, some of them going back to Gilbert's earlier work at the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Individual chapters deal with sterling, the French franc and the Deutschemark, but the main focus is on the dollar and the American policies Gilbert was unable to change. An essential piece of testimony to the times.

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ASSET MARKETS, EXCHANGE RATES, AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. By Polly Reynolds Allen and Peter B. Kenen. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980, 585 pp. $55.00.

Behind its forbidding title this impressive book deals with major themes of our times: how national economies are affected by increased interdependence (when changes in one economy generate interactions) and integration (when assets or goods can be substituted for one another). Drawing together major strands of recent economic theory (which they usefully review in some detail), the authors have constructed a sophisticated model with many facets. An understanding of the real world shapes the inquiry, especially concerning the loss of national freedom of action, but the authors are properly cautious about how their results can be translated into policy.

TRADING BLOCS, U.S. EXPORTS, AND WORLD TRADE. By Penelope Hartland-Thunberg. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1980, 197 pp. $22.00.

This short text shows how little a careful analysis can do to distinguish the effect of the formation of foreign blocs from other factors shaping U.S. trade, investment and licensing. Though the European Community is by far the most important bloc, much of the value of this book is in the descriptive and statistical detail about those in the rest of the world.

THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISTURBANCES ON THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Egon Neuberger and Laura D'Andrea Tyson. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1980, 501 pp. $60.00.

This is an important, pioneering work. In it a group of leading experts on socialist economies (mostly American) look harder than anyone has previously done, and in an orderly way, at how inflation, price changes, recession, energy difficulties and other upsetting activities in the world economy have affected the supposedly more sheltered planned economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some answers are clear, some open to argument, and several fairly surprising. This successful venture should stimulate a good deal more work.

SOTSIALIZM I MEZHDUNARODNYE EKONOMICHESKIE OTNOSHENIYA. By N. P. Shmelev. Moscow: Mezhdunarodyne otnosheniya, 1979, 303 pp. Rubles 1.50.

A substantial discussion of the theoretical and practical aspects of increased participation by the socialist countries in the world market. Transition to a socialist economy of a more open type necessitates various domestic reforms; greater coordination and multilateralization within the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA); partial convertibility of the ruble; possible participation in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR); membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in a transformed International Monetary Fund (IMF); and reconstruction of the international economic order on the basis of more effective economic exchanges.

E. K. Valkenier

DOMESTIC GOALS AND FINANCIAL INTERDEPENDENCE: THE FRANKFURT DIALOGUE. Edited by Randall Hinshaw. New York: Dekker, 1980, 184 pp. $25.00.

As he has five times before, Professor Hinshaw of Claremont puts into

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highly readable form and modest length several days of discussion by a number of leading economists, some of whom have talked at much greater length and less vividly than they do here. Their topics were central: how governments can manage their economies under the impact of worldwide inflation, exposure to international capital markets, and disorderly behavior by others.

CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1929–1976. By Robert A. Pastor. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, 366 pp. $24.50.

This solid contribution to an immensely important subject gives Congress rather good marks. As the book is strongest in dealing with trade policy, it is too bad that it could not cover passage of the 1979 Trade Act which broke new ground in executive-legislative relations. There is little emphasis on the influence of the outside world or differences in the character of issues. The rather labored effort to provide a new explanatory theory is not very fruitful, but the old ones are soundly drubbed.

THE WEALTH WEAPON: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. By Ben J. Wattenberg and Richard J. Whalen. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1980, 127 pp. $16.95 (Paper, $6.95).

The strength of this little book is a clear, vigorous exposition of four points of view: business, labor, Third World and "foreign policy activist." Its weakness is in the rather feeble effort to draw any conclusions other than that the argument will go on and that sometimes each view is correct.

FOOD FOR WAR—FOOD FOR PEACE. By Mitchel B. Wallerstein. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980, 312 pp. $30.00.

Relatively popular as foreign aid measures go, food aid is in fact a highly controversial subject. Can it be successful at one and the same time as an instrument for disposal of surpluses, trade promotion, economic development, assuaging hunger, strengthening friends and punishing enemies? After a good, concise history of American, foreign and multilateral food aid, this study concentrates on U.S. foreign policy. Trade is dealt with, but not the disputes about the impact of food aid on domestic production. Clear, balanced assessments of all major points make this a valuable work, even though the author deplores the lack of decisive evidence on some basic matters.

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT: AGENDA 1980. By John W. Sewell and the Staff of the Overseas Development Council. New York: Praeger, 1980, 242 pp.

This valuable annual lives up to its name and provides a well-thought-out list of recommendations for action by the U.S., provided it can "exercise a new kind of leadership" instead of persisting in a record of missed opportunities.

THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND JAPAN: LESSONS IN GROWTH. By Saburo Okita. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1980, 284 pp. ¥ 3,000.

A leading economist who has occupied a number of high positions in Japan, Dr. Okita has a gift for dealing plainly with large, complicated subjects. These papers cover many aspects of development and Japan's relations with devel-

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oping countries, but the most thought-provoking are those on the relevance of Japan's relatively recent development to today's Third World—partly because of what they tell us about Japan.

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER. By Lars Anell and Birgitta Nygren. New York: St. Martin's, 1980, 217 pp. $22.50.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND PROSPECTS FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. Edited by Ervin Laszlo and Joel Kurtzman. Elmsford (N.Y.); Pergamon Press (for UNITAR/CEESTEM), 1980, 118 pp. $15.00.

The Swedish government's Secretariat for Futures Studies lays out the issues of the NIEO in a fairly provocative fashion that challenges a number of received opinions on both sides. In the Laszlo/Kurtzman volume, three quite interesting papers on structural difficulties are followed by studies of the possibilities of changing things.

THE FINANCIAL ISSUES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. Edited by Jorge Lozoya and A. K. Bhattacharya. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1980, 256 pp. $20.00.

AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. Edited by Jorge Lozoya and Hector Cuadra. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1980, 161 pp. $20.00.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. Edited by Jorge Lozoya and Jaime Estevez. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1980, 112 pp. $15.00.

These three additions to the 17-volume New International Economic Order Library are made up of papers of varying length and depth dealing with central issues and major points of view. The latter are largely those of Third World authors, sometimes working collectively. The Latin American volume is of special interest because the joint sponsor of the series, with UNITAR, is the Centro de Estudios Economicos y Sociales del Tercer Mundo, in Mexico.

ENTROPY: A NEW WORLD VIEW. By Jeremy Rifkin. New York: Viking, 1980, 305 pp. $10.95.

The pressure of man on the earth's resources poses enormously difficult problems that cannot be solved without new ways of thinking and acting. But our understanding of these complexities is not much helped by this book with its oversimplified argument which assigns all man's ills to his failure to let the Second Law of Thermodynamics dominate his life and his thinking.

CRISIS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Andre Gunder Frank. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980, 366 pp. $28.50 (Paper, $9.75).

The crisis in the capitalist world is diagnosed in old-fashioned Marxist terms, and then the Soviet Union, its allies, and China are condemned for easing the situation by their increasing participation in the international economy. The ruling classes of the developing countries in Professor Frank's view have turned the struggle for a New International Economic Order into bargaining about the terms of admission. All development strategies including self-reliance have proven bankrupt. The core passages, once found, are clear and concise, but the "documentation" is wordy and full of long quotations.

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RACE AND STATE IN CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT. By Stanley B. Greenberg. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980, 489 pp. $40.00 (Paper, $11.50).

It hardly seems surprising that businessmen, farmers and industrial workers should try to manipulate the racial divisions of their societies for their own ends. But it has been argued that capitalism and modernization would replace race with class as the main dividing lines. With enormous diligence, Professor Greenberg of Yale has worked out explanations of how, in fact, the complex interplay of tension and accommodation of race and economic interest has developed in some key cases. The material from South Africa, Israel, Northern Ireland and Alabama is fascinating if sometimes a bit unwieldy. The new framework, combining Marxist categories and hard facts, will inevitably stir up controversy, and all the better that it should do so.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

WALTER LIPPMANN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY. By Ronald Steel. Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1980, 640 pp. $19.95

This is a truly great biography. Steel writes with Lippmannesque lucidity. He puts the details of Lippmann's personal life, personality, and intellectual development into the broad context of national and international events. Every page is compelling, but especially the material on the pre-1914 world which evokes bittersweet nostalgia, and the chapters on the Vietnam era, which cannot be read without anguish over Lippmann's and the nation's turmoil. (An extended review article by Harry C. McPherson, Jr. appeared in the Fall 1980 issue of *Foreign Affairs*).

DEAN RUSK. By Warren I. Cohen. Totowa (N.J.): Cooper Square, 1980, 375 pp. $22.50.

A well-written, perceptive biography of the Secretary of State under Kennedy and Johnson. The convincing theme is that Dean Rusk's loyalty to the office and person of the President and his firmly embedded 1940s view of the world ultimately incapacitated him. His secretaryship cannot be separated from the larger failure of American foreign policy in the 1960s.

FACING REALITY: FROM WORLD FEDERALISM TO THE CIA. By Cord Meyer. New York: Harper, 1980, 416 pp. $15.00.

This is, in effect, two books. The first is a fascinating autobiography tracing Cord Meyer's logical progression from badly wounded Marine Corps officer to fervent leader of the World Federalist movement after World War II to fervent CIA official and sophisticated cold warrior. The second book is a long and uninspired editorial on the menace of Russia's new "geopolitical offensive."

HISTORY AND MEMORY. By Charles W. Yost. New York: Norton, 1980, 352 pp. $14.95.

A distinguished public servant reflects on history, contemporary culture, and his own wide reading and experiences in this worldly-wise and always interesting memoir.

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NAMING NAMES. By Victor S. Navasky. New York: Viking, 1980, 482 pp. $15.95.

A powerfully evocative reconstruction of the era of McCarthyism. By focusing on those who gave investigating committees the names of others they believed to have been associated with communist causes, thus contributing to the creation of the infamous Hollywood "blacklist," Navasky asks important questions about the meaning of loyalty, civil liberties, and national security. An important work of American history.

THE ODYSSEY OF THE AMERICAN RIGHT. By Michael W. Miles. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, 371 pp. $19.95.

A competent narrative survey of the surface of political trends from the New Deal to the Nixon presidency, emphasizing election results, congressional voting alignments, and other well-known issues.

NO MARGIN FOR ERROR: AMERICA IN THE EIGHTIES. By Sen. Howard Baker, Jr. New York: Times Books, 1980, 246 pp. $11.95.

These reflections by a leading Republican moderate are relaxed, amiable, sensible and anecdotal on domestic issues—but hard, strident, alarmist and ritualistic on foreign policy. A better book, however, than most political tracts.

CHANGING OF THE GUARD: POWER AND LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA. By David S. Broder. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980, 512 pp. $14.95.

After interviewing scores of leaders old and young in politics and other fields, the author concludes that we are at a watershed. Those whose lives were shaped by World War II and its certainties are being replaced by those born after 1930—a group whose principal common characteristic is an awareness of ambiguity in human affairs.

MORALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Kenneth W. Thompson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, 240 pp. $16.95.

No one in this century exerted more influence over the way intellectuals think about morality and foreign policy than Reinhold Niebuhr, and no Niebuhr disciple has written as much on the subject as Kenneth Thompson. Although most of the material here is familiar, the book is a clear and sophisticated introduction.

EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE. By William Appleman Williams. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, 208 pp. $14.95.

A restatement of the author's familiar argument that Americans have been quintessential imperialists at home and abroad. His romantic message: give up imperialism on pain of death; turn instead to regional communities. Not much guidance here for those who must formulate specific policies.

ELITES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: THE NEW DEAL TO THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. By Philip H. Burch, Jr. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980, 544 pp. $19.50 (Paper, $14.50).

This book belongs to the head-count school of political sociology. The author has compiled a mass of biographical facts about high-ranking federal officials from the 1930s to the present. He identifies a "business establishment" and concludes that "regardless of its changing form, America has almost

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always been dominated by some kind of wealth." The approach is descriptive, the tone unruffled.

THE AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENT. By Leonard and Mark Silk. New York: Basic Books, 1980, 320 pp. $13.95.

A father/son pair of authors combines historical understanding, good reporting, and an absence of tendentiousness in a straightforward portrait of Establishment institutions—e.g., Harvard, the Ford Foundation, Brookings, the Council on Foreign Relations, *The New York Times*. Theirs is a "Scotch verdict" but more favorable than otherwise.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

THE QUESTION OF SEPARATISM: QUEBEC AND THE STRUGGLE OVER SOVEREIGNTY. By Jane Jacobs. New York: Random House, 1980, 134 pp. $8.95.

Too many discussions of Canada's future are narrow and parochial. The strength of this calm and sensible discussion is the author's argument, based on informed comparisons with other nations (especially Norway's separation from Sweden), that a division of Canada need not be a disaster.

G.S.

JAMES G. ENDICOTT: REBEL OUT OF CHINA. By Stephen Endicott. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, 421 pp. $18.95.

The subject of this moving biography (by his son) was a Canadian missionary in China from 1925 until 1946 and after that a very controversial leftist critic of American and Western capitalism and foreign policy. This is an important book on the Chinese revolution, ideological controversy in the West, and an extraordinary man.

G.S.

THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1945–1962: PERON TO FRONDIZI. By Robert A. Potash. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980, 418 pp. $25.00.

Continuing the detailed examination of the political role of the Argentine military that was begun in the author's earlier volume covering the years 1928–45—from Yrigoyen to Peron—this excellent study provides extensive analysis of the succeeding period. The fall of Arturo Frondizi bore eloquent witness to the enormous chasm separating Peronist from anti-Peronist, the too-feeble democratic impulses that had undergirded the uprising in 1955, and the general disillusionment with the democratic process.

MULTINATIONALS IN LATIN AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF NATIONALIZATION. By Paul E. Sigmund. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press (a Twentieth Century Fund Study), 1980, 426 pp. $22.50 (Paper, $6.50).

Arguing that a new equilibrium has developed in Latin America between governments and multinationals, the author describes "a growing recognition that nationalization may not be the simple remedy for underdeveloped nations that some have claimed it to be—that, particularly when nationalization takes a confrontational form, its economic costs may considerably outweigh its potential benefits." The text concentrates on the nationalization experience in

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Cuba, Chile, Peru and Venezuela. Two integrating chapters on alternatives, foreign investment, and U.S. policy are helpful. A significant work.

THE POLITICS OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY, 1961–79. By A. J. Payne. New York: St. Martin's, 1980, 299 pp. $25.00.

Limited to the Commonwealth Caribbean, this analysis covers CARIFTA, CARICOM, trade and production, economic integration, foreign policy coordination, and functional cooperation. The author makes an important point: the Community was not created for the purpose of securing economic and political integration, but rather "it is a structure created by nationalistic governments to make nationalist policies more effective by pursuing them within a regional framework."

FINANCING DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor and Stewart E. Sutin. New York: Praeger, 1980, 354 pp.

These 18 essays provide full coverage of finance and banking as they bear upon prevailing capital needs in Latin America. They are grouped in three categories: Country Conditions and External Finance; Capital-flow Alternatives and the Dynamics of the Latin American Market; and Basics of Lending.

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA. By Béla Kádár. New York: St. Martin's, 1980, 267 pp. $30.00.

A Hungarian economist examines the stages of economic development in Latin America with densely argued, but not pedantic, descriptions of trends, problems, regional cooperation and other basics. The emphasis is on Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Colombia, and the viewpoint is anti-capitalist.

THE GREAT REBELLION: MEXICO, 1905–1924. By Ramón Eduardo Ruíz. New York: Norton, 1980, 530 pp. $24.95.

Contrary to the traditional interpreters, the author sees the Mexican Revolution as the last of the nineteenth-century bourgeois revolts, and not as the advance wave of the twentieth-century socialist revolutions. Its links are to 1789, not 1917 or 1959. The reasons include the nature of the Mexican class system, with a strong upper class and the absence of serious pressures from below establishing a limiting framework.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

MEMOIRS. By Jo Grimond. London: Heinemann/New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980, 315 pp. $27.50.

The former leader of the British Liberal Party recalls his life from childhood in St. Andrews through Eton and Oxford and the war to his years in the Commons. The book excels because of the force and candor of his impressions of a vast array of topics. His comments have bite for today: "This stagnation in Labour thinking is not fortuitous." Readable and instructive.

BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. Edited by Richard E. Caves and Lawrence B. Krause. Washington: Brookings, 1980, 388 pp. $18.95 (Paper, $7.95).

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Having sponsored a major study of the British economy in the late 1960s, the Brookings Institution has taken a look at a decade of slow growth, high unemployment, and inflation mitigated by North Sea oil. This first-rate team shows that quite a few popular diagnoses of the problem have only limited validity. Britain is buffeted by the ills that beset most countries, but its peculiar trouble, the authors conclude, "stems largely from its productivity problem, whose origins lie deep in the social system." There are only a few ways out.

W.D.

BRITAIN IN EUROPE. Edited by William Wallace. London: Heinemann (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1980, 213 pp. £10.50.

Papers and comments presented at a symposium in December 1979, analyzing both Britain's relations with the European Economic Community and the EEC itself. An exceptionally successful collection, exemplary in judgment, impressive in the marshalling of evidence, persuasively somber in tone. Important for anyone concerned with the (uncertain) future of Britain in Europe, about which the well-known former MP, David Marquand, writes: "The worst of all worlds is to plod doggedly on along the present path."

DIE DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK GROSSBRITANNIENS UND DIE BRITISCHE ZONE, 1945–1949. Edited by Claus Scharf and Hans-Jurgen Schroder. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1980, 120 pp. DM.24.

Seven major essays on British policy toward postwar Germany, written by scholars using newly accessible British documents. The pursuit of traditional political aims was made difficult by Britain's ever-worsening economic condition and by a more than usual degree of bureaucratic rivalry. The book is a useful contribution to the history of the unintended division of Europe and the many conflicts that have beset the world since then.

CROSSROADS MARSEILLES: 1940. By Mary Jayne Gold. New York: Doubleday, 1980, 412 pp. $15.95.

In the summer of 1940, a young American, Varian Fry, on behalf of a group of generous and concerned Americans, went to Marseilles in unoccupied France in order to identify and bring to safety the most endangered refugees from Hitler's Europe. Fry did so by gallant and resourceful means, and an aide of his, a light-living young American woman, turned serious by disaster, recalls the story of those exciting and heroic days. A gripping piece of history, vividly told.

REPARATION IN WORLD POLITICS: FRANCE AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY, 1916–1923. By Marc Trachtenberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, 423 pp. $25.00.

An analysis, based on extensive archival research, of French policy toward Germany during and after World War I. The author propounds—convincingly—a novel interpretation: the French sought economic collaboration with Germany; then, when frustrated, embarked on the Ruhr occupation, without clarity of plan or purpose. A monograph of some importance and timeliness.

THE WAR WITHOUT A NAME: FRANCE IN ALGERIA, 1954–1962. By John Talbott. New York: Knopf, 1980, 320 pp. $12.95.

A compelling account of one of the great dramas of the postwar era: the

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struggle over the destiny of Algeria, a struggle in which terror bred torture, and France itself was torn into warring factions. The war shook French life as Vietnam was to shake American life. Talbott explicates the many facets of the struggle, and his incisive mind, intellectual judiciousness, and taut prose make this a model study, an important contribution to our understanding of our own recent past.

ENTSPANNUNG AM ENDE? Edited by Josef Füllenbach and Eberhard Schulz. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1980, 381 pp. DM. 68.

A series of essays providing a comprehensive analysis of the manifold aspects of détente. The several authors, most of them highly qualified, prepared their articles before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which, in the collective view of the book, exacerbated but did not create the rather bleak condition of détente today. A responsible and valuable contribution.

IDEOLOGY AND POPULAR PROTEST. By George Rudé. New York: Pantheon, 1980, 176 pp. $10.95 (Paper, $4.95).

A well-known Marxist historian probes the "ideology of protest" as it arose in the great upheavals of European history. He goes beyond Marxist analysis and offers an important synthesis, with some implications for present-day understanding of radical moods and actions.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

STALIN'S SUCCESSORS. By Seweryn Bialer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980, 356 pp. $19.95.

SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN TRANSITION. By Jerry F. Hough. Washington: Brookings, 1980, 175 pp. $11.95 (Paper, $4.95).

By coincidence, two well-known specialists on Soviet politics have written on the same subject at the same time. Both deal with the coming transition in leadership as a generational change, and both discuss future economic and foreign policy problems. While the two books invite comparison, each has its special merits and both deserve a wide reading. Bialer's is a more ambitious study grounded in analysis of the evolution of the Stalinist system since Stalin; Hough's is more freewheeling in its advice on how America should try to cope with and influence the Soviet Union of the future.

PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980's. Edited by Christoph Bertram. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1980, 126 pp. $19.50.

It would be difficult to assemble a more illustrious team of Western experts (Erickson, Laloy, Hyland, Legvold, Dallin, Machowski, to name some) to estimate what is to be expected from the U.S.S.R. in the coming decade. If there is a major theme in their all too brief essays, it is, as Christoph Bertram states in his introduction, that the problems facing the Soviet leadership are formidable and, at the same time, unlikely to produce major changes in Soviet policy.

THE SOVIET TRIANGLE: RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE WEST IN THE 1980s. By Donald R. Shanor. New York: St. Martin's, 1980, 296 pp. $13.95.

An American journalist's report, well conceived and well written, on the

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Soviet Union's relations with America, Europe and China, as it confronts actual or potential combinations among them. Although containing some reflections on the nature and future of the Soviet empire, essentially it is a general book for the general reader on the current situation, rather than prediction or prescription for the 1980s.

ON SOVIET DISSENT: INTERVIEWS WITH PIERO OSTELLINO. By Roy Medvedev. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, 176 pp. $10.95.

In a series of conversations with an Italian journalist, the Russian historian Roy Medvedev gives his views on the Soviet system and those who, like himself, would like to change it. He makes his plea for free debate and for the toleration of a "reasonable opposition."

THE SOCIALIST PHENOMENON. By Igor Shafarevich. New York: Harper, 1980, 319 pp. $16.95.

A powerful treatise on socialism as a doctrine and as a state system, arguing that they are two embodiments of the same destructive historical force. Although the book covers the whole of human history and may seem remote from the international politics of today, it is important for students of Russia in that much of it has a Russian focus and the author is a Soviet mathematician resident in Moscow.

THE AGING OF COMMUNISM. By Robert Wesson. New York: Praeger, 1980, 168 pp. $18.95.

Give Robert Wesson credit for bold thought and clear argument. He finds the communist world well into its age of decay, with a declining capacity on the part of the ruling parties to rule, with no prospect of a democratic or pluralistic alternative, sliding toward a common destiny with the less promising parts of the Third World. But it may take a long time.

THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF RUSSIA. VOL. I: THE SOCIALIST OFFENSIVE: THE COLLECTIVISATION OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE, 1929–1930. VOL. II: THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARM, 1929–1930. By R.W. Davies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, 2 vols. $35.00 & $18.50.

In two solid volumes Professor Davies describes with exemplary organization and detail the first phase of Stalin's collectivization campaign. A collaborator of E.H. Carr in writing the latter's monumental history of Soviet Russia in the 1920s, he carries on in the same tradition in these, the first of a projected series on the industrialization of the U.S.S.R. in the years from 1929 through 1936.

THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA: THE BEGINNING OF RELATIONS, 1765–1815. Prepared under the direction of a Joint Soviet-American Editorial Board. Washington: Government Printing Office (for the National Archives and Records Service)/Moscow: Nauka Press, 1980, 1184 pp. $24.00.

Although this documentary publication may have limited relevance to the international relations of today, it is worth noting here as the first of a projected series documenting Russian-American relations produced jointly by Soviet and American scholars and institutions.

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SOCIALIST ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. By Jozef M. van Brabant. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980, 362 pp. $29.50.

Drawing on work he has done over a period of years, a Belgian scholar provides a first-rate, though uneven, history and analysis of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. The high points are the sections on origins and early days, bilateralism and institutional development.

W.D.

EUROCOMMUNISM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. Edited by Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta and David P. Burke. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, 373 pp. $32.50 (Paper, $9.95).

This latecomer to the succession of books on a well-worn subject says little about Eurocommunism in its native Western habitat but gives broad coverage, in 15 essays, on the connections with Eastern Europe and ranging as far as China and Japan, to the significant international dimensions. The authors are competent, the editing is good, and the book a welcome addition to the specialized literature.

THE BEGINNINGS OF COMMUNIST RULE IN POLAND: DECEMBER 1943–JUNE 1945. Edited by Antony Polonsky and Boleslaw Drukier. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, 464 pp. $37.50.

These documents, many previously unpublished and only recently brought out of Poland, constitute valuable source material for the history of the period of communist takeover between December 1943 and June 1945. The documents are amply annotated and preceded by an excellent introduction which provides a running account of the strategy and internal discussion of the Workers (Communist) Party and of the Soviet role.

EDVARD KARDELJ: THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF NON-ALIGNMENT. Edited by Nikolaos A. Stavrou. Washington: University Press of America, 1980, 95 pp. $5.50 (Paper).

Kardelj's fundamental essay on nonalignment, which now has a status akin to holy writ in Yugoslavia, is reproduced here in the English translation done for *Socialist Theory and Practice*. Nikolaos Stavrou provides a useful introduction without attempting extended analysis or commentary on the text.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND IRAN. By Barry Rubin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, 426 pp. $17.50.

A hard-hitting but balanced account of U.S.-Iranian relations since World War II, topped off with a play-by-play narrative of Washington's efforts to cope with the revolutionary events of the past few years. Not the last word, but it sets a high standard of investigation and writing that will be hard to match.

ANSWER TO HISTORY. By Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. Briarcliff Manor (N.Y.): Stein and Day, 1980, 204 pp. $12.95.

The late Shah's thoughts, as he spent the last period of his life in exile and isolation, make a bitter and pathetic testament. Americans who have made

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their judgment on him and his place in history are unlikely to change their minds through reading this self-serving and superficial book, but they can hardly feel complacent about their own country's actions in dealing with him and with Iran over the years.

ARABIA, THE GULF AND THE WEST. By J.B. Kelly. New York: Basic Books, 1980, 530 pp. $25.00.

Replete with information on all the Gulf states, this wide-ranging book by a scholar with immense knowledge of the area is filled with sharp and critical views not only of the Arabs but of the personalities and policies of outside governments and oil companies with interests there. Much of it is fascinating, much tedious, and where the author overstates his case, as a "partial corrective" to the orthodox version of recent events current in the West, the reader can generally supply his own counter-corrective.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARAB GULF. Edited by Tim Niblock. New York: St. Martin's, 1980, 242 pp. $29.95.

A more modest effort than Kelly's tome, this collection of expert though generally unrelated pieces on the history, economics and social life of the Gulf also adds to the West's gradually growing fund of sound information on the region.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED STATES. Edited by Haim Shaked and Itamar Rabinovich. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1980, 418 pp. $6.95 (Paper).

Papers by scholars from America, Europe and Israel presented at a seminar at Tel Aviv University in 1978. Most are of high quality. While the U.S.-Israeli relationship is not far from view at any point, the scope of the volume is quite broad, including inter-Arab relations, Turkey and Iran, and the politics of Middle East oil.

BEYOND SECURITY: PRIVATE PERCEPTIONS AMONG ARABS AND ISRAELIS. By John Edwin Mroz. New York: International Peace Academy, 1980, 200 pp. $8.95 (Paper).
POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP. By Ann Mosley Lesch. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1980, 113 pp. $3.95 (Paper).

With the idea of sounding out private as well as official opinion on both sides of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the International Peace Academy sent a mission to six Arab countries, Israel and the occupied areas. The result is honest reporting flavored with as much optimism and helpful suggestions as the findings will allow, maybe a little more. The main perceptions found on the West Bank and in Gaza by Ann Lesch, an American scholar versed in the history of Palestinian nationalism, flow from a consensus on self-determination in an independent state alongside Israel.

RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING: ISRAEL'S CHOICES, 1967. By Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980, 399 pp. $25.00

One would have thought the topic of decision-making in Israeli foreign policy already studied to the point of exhaustion, especially after the detailed investigations of Michael Brecher, but Stein and Tanter, taking the now generally known record of what happened in 1967, have some new things to

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say by way of analysis and theory. They are concerned, above all, with process and with the application of logic and rationality to a complex and changing situation in which Israel's strategy of deterrence did not work.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

THE CHINESE. By David Bonavia. New York: Lippincott & Crowell, 1980, 290 pp. $12.95.

This is a journalistic *tour de force* comparable to Hedrick Smith's *The Russians*. The author, fluent in Chinese and Russian, has spent many years in both countries and therefore combines a knowledge of Chinese culture and of communist systems. He is also perceptive and balanced in his judgments, and he writes very well. The book concludes with some solid pages on foreign policy. "Many Americans worry that in extending . . . aid to China, the West may be breeding a new monster which, once strong, will be no less aggressive than the Soviet Union. . . . What American statesmen have to ponder is whether China is an asset or a liability in the confrontation with the Soviet Union. Obviously, it is better if she is anti-Soviet, even fiercely so; but to side with her too obviously or sell her arms is likely to stall efforts for détente with the Soviet Union."

THE DYNAMICS OF FACTIONS AND CONSENSUS IN CHINESE POLITICS. By Lucian W. Pye. Santa Monica: RAND, 1980, 250 pp.

Commissioned by RAND, this is an interesting study of factionalism in the Chinese leadership, based in part on interviews with emigrés from the PRC. The author contends that, as of last year, "it was widely recognized" (presumably by the Chinese, certainly not by Western China-watchers) that there were four basic factions in the Chinese Party. The first two either benefited from, or were not injured by, the Cultural Revolution. The last two were rehabilitated, along with Deng Xiaoping, after the purge of the Gang of Four. Since it is the last two who are now in commanding positions, it is significant that they are divided about the prospects for implementing Deng's "Four Modernizations." The so-called restoration faction is pessimistic. It believes that China can expect only limited help from Japan and the West and that Deng is encouraging romantic views about the actual economic choices available to China: what China really needs is not more decentralization and the development of market forces but tighter controls and greater economic discipline. Deng's so-called practice faction, on the other hand, believes that most of what went on before was disastrous for China and that entirely new practices are called for. One may conclude that there remain enormous bureaucratic opposition to, and skepticism about, Deng's economic experimentation.

MAO TSE-TUNG: AN IDEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PORTRAIT. By Fedor Burlatsky. Moscow: Progress, 1980, 397 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor).

A prominent Soviet social scientist explores Mao's ideology and psyche. This is a book from which Westerners can profit. Burlatsky sees three choices for China: "The first is to restore friendship and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries. This is the natural path for China if it wants to

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return to socialist construction and desires disinterested assistance . . . for the modernization of its economy." The other two are "the path of maneuvering between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A." and the path which China has been following for 15 years, "a path of rapprochement with the capitalist West on a platform of joint struggle against the U.S.S.R."

SINO-SOVIET CRISIS POLITICS. By Richard Wich. Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1980, 313 pp. $15.00

The author has an unfortunate tendency to make simple things complicated and complicated things even more complicated than they are. Nevertheless, for the patient reader, this is a rewarding study of Sino-Soviet relations after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

THE SECURITY OF KOREA: U.S. AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES ON THE 1980s. Edited by Franklin B. Weinstein and Fuji Kamiya. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1980, 276 pp. $20.00 (Paper, $8.50).

In a series of meetings, Japanese and American scholars identified a number of key questions, and five or six of their group were asked to study the same issue from different perspectives. The book, which grew out of the resulting working papers and the discussions which followed, is perhaps the best volume on the Korean security problem yet published. The controversies which are revealed are much more interesting than the conclusions, and the Japanese are much more skeptical than the Americans of any solutions, particularly those imposed from outside. The entire project, and this book, could serve as a model for future studies of important international security issues.

OCEANIA AND THE UNITED STATES. By John C. Dorrance. Washington: National Defense University, 1980, 92 pp.

The South Pacific islands, or Oceania, contain ten independent and quasi-independent states, with the prospect that there will be 16 or more by the mid-1980s. Except for American Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands—the U.S. possessions—we have taken the view that the region is the responsibility of our allies with colonies there. Dorrance holds that, although Australia and New Zealand will continue to play the leading role, the U.S. must take more interest in Oceania. He sees a number of potentially destabilizing elements: changing leadership patterns, economic problems, the possibility of violence accompanying the decolonization of the French territories, the probable emergence of decolonization pressures directed against the U.S. territorial presence, and the likelihood of some form of Soviet engagement.

INDIRA GANDHI. By Dom Moraes. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980, 340 pp. $15.00.

Well written, full of color and anecdotes about the author's personal contacts with Mrs. Gandhi, this book is a triumph of style over substance.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

ERITREA: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION. By Richard Sherman. New York: Praeger, 1980, 197 pp. $19.95.

A sympathetic observer of the Eritrean liberation movements lays out the

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history of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict (starting his account with the earliest known movement of peoples into the area in 3000 BC). His depiction of the two major groups' origins, structures, ideologies, foreign relations and administration is the fullest and seemingly most authoritative of any published recently. He is at odds with most other commentators, however, in positing an active Cuban combat role in Eritrea.

DECODING CORPORATE CAMOUFLAGE: U.S. BUSINESS SUPPORT FOR APARTHEID. By Elizabeth Schmidt. Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980, 140 pp. $4.95 (Paper).

Leaning heavily on previously published data gathered by the Investor Responsibility Research Center, this is a forthright brief against the Sullivan Principles—the fair employment practices code subscribed to by a large number of U.S. corporate employers in South Africa—on two main grounds. The first is that the current level of compliance by code signatories has had at best a meager impact on their black workers; the second, that even a much more vigorous implementation of the code would not affect the bases of apartheid.

CUBA'S POLICY IN AFRICA, 1959–1980. By William M. LeoGrande. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980, 82 pp.

In this brief study, a Latin American specialist presents an excellent detailed exposition of Cuban troop movements in Africa, Cuban diplomatic activity there, relations with the Soviet Union and the nonaligned movement; however, he misconstrues several important junctures in the Carter Administration's Africa policy, most notably on Zimbabwe, and also on the Horn of Africa.

THE SOVIET UNION AND AFRICA: THE HISTORY OF THE INVOLVEMENT. By Milene Charles. Lanham (Md.): University Press of America, 1980, 237 pp.

The view here is largely from the Kremlin, as the author, a Czech emigré, traces evolving Soviet ideological perspectives on Africa, from Lenin through Stalin and Khrushchev, drawing on sources for the most part antedating the mid-1970s.

THE AFRICAN CONDITION: A POLITICAL DIAGNOSIS. By Ali A. Mazrui. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980, 192 pp. $17.50 (Paper, $5.95).

Once again Mazrui sashays blithely through history, covering a span from the Garden of Eden to nuclear holocaust. As usual with this author the byways are many and varied, including, for example, digressions upon Edmund Burke, women's liberation, and the Japanese fishing industry.

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ERRATA

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1. In "Recent Books on International Relations," on p. 1206, *Suffer the Future: Policy Changes in Southern Africa* by Robert I. Rotberg, the subtitle should read *Policy Choices in Southern Africa.*

Fall 1980

1. In "Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and His Critics," in Robert W. Thurston's letter: on page 188, line 15, the question to which Professor Thurston refers should read, "Whither Russia on the eve of the First World War?"

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

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

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